The economics of institutions, institutional governance and efficiency: the case of water distribution in Lower Sundays River Valley by Madigele, Patricia Kefilwe
THE ECONOMICS OF INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE AND EFFICIENCY: THE 
CASE OF WATER DISTRIBUTION IN LOWER SUNDAYS RIVER VALLEY  
 
 
A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the 
requirement for the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF ECONOMICS 
 
  
RHODES UNIVERSITY 
 
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS AND ECONOMIC HISTORY 
 
by 
 
Patricia Kefilwe Madigele 
G13M7764 
 
Supervised by: Prof. J. D. Snowball 
ii 
 
DECLARATION 
 
I, the undersigned, hereby declare that the work contained in this assignment is my original 
work, and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it at any university 
for a degree. 
 
 
Signature: ……………………..........................  
 
Date: ………………………..............................  
 
iii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I owe a debt of gratitude to many precious people whose invaluable experience, assistance 
and advice helped me bring this study together.  
 
My sincere gratitude goes to my supervisor, Professor J. D. Snowball for her patience, 
encouragement, time and much needed support. Her invaluable support throughout the 
development of this thesis is highly appreciated. 
 
I would also like thank the coordinators of Environmental and Resource Economics Focus 
Area (ENREFA) programme, Professors Snowball and Fraser, for the financial assistance as 
well as for providing me with other resources during my candidature.  
 
My sincere gratitude also goes to the key informants of this study for their time and 
insightful information. I would like to sincerely thank Jai Clifford-Holmes, Professor Tally 
Palmer and the rest of the IWR researchers for the information and their invaluable support.  
 
To my family, you are the simply the best, a true blessing indeed. To Goemeone E. J. 
Mogomotsi, thank you for all the support, motivation and advice. This study is the success 
that it is because of your much-needed help.  
 
Finally yet importantly, I would also like to extend my sincere appreciation and gratitude to 
all ENREFA students. You are shining stars in your own right. Your input is highly 
appreciated.  
 
Above all, my deepest gratitude goes to the Almighty for His love and blessings. 
 
iv 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The institutional dynamics, policies and legislation that were prevalent during the apartheid 
era have left imprints that are difficult to ignore as they still dictate the interaction between 
different elements in the water sector to date. During the apartheid era, the formulation of 
policies was informed by racial segregation, resulting in a socio-economic pattern that 
dictated the distribution and access of resources for the people of different races in the 
country. Post-apartheid, the National Water Act has established the basis for management 
of water resources on a catchment basis (for equity, efficiency and sustainability), and the 
Water Services Act aims to ensure everybody has access to basic water supply and 
sanitation services.  
 
Regardless of the improvements in water supply to the rural sector made by the South 
African government, many of the current patterns of water use are still characterised by 
inequality, inefficiency, and inadequacy. The poor remain marginalised, and emerging 
farmers and poor rural communities have limited access to water resources while water 
continues to be used inefficiently by some farmers in the agricultural sector with few 
incentives to improve its water use efficiency.  
 
Despite the existence of the thriving citrus industry in the area, around 60% of people in the  
Sundays River Valley Municipality (SRVM) live below the poverty datum line. The inequality 
between the municipal populace and the commercial citrus industry is noticeable and the 
inequitable water redistribution is prevalent in the Lower Sundays River Valley (LSRV). The 
problem of disrupted water supply is prevalent in the catchment. However, there is also 
currently no physical shortage of water in the catchment. Therefore, the currently 
experienced problems with water supply in the LSRV are consequence of a lack of effective 
institutions and infrastructure, not of physical water scarcity. 
 
It is argued in this paper that there is a notable lack of understanding about the design of 
institutions for water management in developing countries.  The vast majority of research 
on water management and access is premised on neoclassical economics ideas related to 
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water markets and pricing among others. The neoclassical economics  approach, however, 
does not adequately define the role of institutions in shaping the direction of water access 
and supply. 
 
This study uses new institutional economics (NIE) arguments to define the institutional 
arrangements and dynamics defining the water sector in South Africa, using the Lower 
Sunday River Water Users Association (LSR-WUA) as the case study. It aims at analysing the 
institutional governance and performance of the using equity, efficiency and effectiveness 
as key indicators. The various research methods employed in this study include; interpretive 
and post-positivist paradigms, quantitative and qualitative research, the case study research 
method and in-depth key informant interviews.  
 
It is concluded that that the current and future decisions made by the LSR-WUA are not 
entirely independent of those made in the past under Sundays River Irrigation Board (SRIB). 
The thesis argues that such factors as old effective networks, vested interests of commercial 
farmers, sunk costs towards the building of canals, among other factors, may have 
influenced the dependence of the LSR-WUA on the SRIB’s set path. It is further concluded 
that the absence of contractual agreement between the LRS-WUA which acts as the bulk 
water supplier, and the SRVM which acts as both the water services authority (WSA) and the 
water service provider (WSP) creates an institutional arrangement deficiency. Such an 
institutional arrangement vacuum can lead to a failure of the water institutions in the 
catchment to provide water resources effectively. The study further argues that because the 
post-apartheid National Water Policy of South Africa is largely influenced by neoclassical 
economics foundations, the desired results in the water sector, such as equitable 
distribution of water resources, have not yet been fulfilled completely.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH CONTEXT 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
Water has been identified as one of the integral drivers of socio-economic development 
(Global Water Partnership (GWP), 2012). Despite this crucial role, it is estimated that 
approximately one in nine people worldwide lack access to safe, rel iable and clean water 
resources (GWP, 2012).  In most developing countries, the discrepancies in water supply and 
access have been caused by the failure of governments and water institutions to appreciate 
water as an economic good and/or to at least recognise that water has social and economic 
value in its various competing uses (Savenije and van der Zaag, 2002; Saravanan et al., 2009; 
GWP, 2012).  
 
Although water does not possess the primary traits of a typical ‘economic good’ except the 
rivalrous condition, it can, however, for purposes of institutional economic analysis be 
viewed as an economic good (Sharma, 2012). The parlous state of water resources around 
the world necessitates that water be treated as an economic good and should be subject to 
appropriate valuation (Van der Zaag and Savenije, 2000). Savenije and van der Zaag (2002) 
state that treating water as an economic good also implies improving efficient allocation of 
scarce water resources through adopting integrated decision-making among all 
stakeholders.  
 
The Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) concept enshrined in the Dublin 
Principles aims at balancing diverse and multiple sectoral interests (Saravanan et al., 2009). 
In order to achieve this, it is argued that it is important for policy-makers to account for the 
biophysical characteristics of water, as well as to consider the economic, social and 
environmental concerns. The IWRM principle “limits the applicability of neoclassical 
economic principles” (Rockstrom, 2013: 4).  
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The concept of IWRM was developed in the 1990s to facilitate sustainable water resource 
management and use, and has continued to be influential in the water sector to date (GWP, 
2000; Braga, 2001; Saravanan et al., 2009). The underlying philosophy of the IWRM process 
is to “promote the co-ordinated development and management of water and land so as to 
maximise economic and social welfare without compromising the sustainability of vital 
ecosystems” (Haigh et al., 2010: 475).  IWRM is an approach that aims to address persistent 
problems in the water sector such as institutional inefficiencies, poor service delivery, a lack 
of integrated planning and allocation of water resources, and lack of participation of some 
relevant water sector stakeholders (Milly et al., 2008; Du Toit et al., 2011).  
 
IWRM is progressively being embraced at national level, with water resources  legislation 
and policies amalgamating IWRM ideologies. Countries such as Mexico, Brazil, Zimbabwe 
and Thailand have espoused the principles of IWRM in their water policies (Orne-Gliemann, 
2008). Similarly, South Africa’s water policy and legislation are argued to be reflective of the 
broad objectives of IWRM (Colvin et al., 2008; Anderson et al., 2008). In South Africa, the 
National Water Act (NWA) of 1998 promotes integrated and decentralised water resource 
management in order to attain its objectives of equity, sustainability, representatity and 
efficiency. The National Water Resource Strategy (NWRS) is used to describe the legal 
frameworks and implementation strategies of water policy. However, Anderson et al. (2008: 
666) argue that an “Over-emphasis on the policy and legislation component leaves little 
benefit to those on the ground and does little to effect real change or promote poverty 
reduction”. 
 
According to Colvin et al. (2008), the small and/or unsatisfactory benefits of IWRM to local 
communities can be attributed to the lack of a standardised definition of IWRM, and the 
absence of a clear definition of what exactly should be integrated and how. Colvin et al. 
(2008) argue that even though the South African water policy is progressive, if there are no 
progressive implementation strategies in place, then it is almost impossible to achieve the 
broader aims of the policy. The authors recommend that, given the complexity of water as a 
resource, a progressive approach to implementing water policy is not only dependent on 
the establishment of effective and efficient water institutions, but also on embracing 
iterative learning-by-doing as well as interactive learning across disciplines. Pollard and Du 
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Toit (2008) propose that IWRM is an appropriate approach suitable for managing complex 
systems as it necessitates a thorough understanding of relationships between various 
stakeholders in the water sector, thereby encouraging participatory and cooperative 
management of water resources. 
 
While the participatory principle proposed by IWRM is valuable in water management, 
some argue that the IWRM fails to address complexities and power dynamics and/or 
differentials in the water sector (Saravanan et al., 2009). According to Brown (2013: 273), 
“*a+n emerging body of evidence finds that power differentials impact negatively on the 
transformatory potential of participation”. It can hence be argued that the ability to address 
problems of institutional deficiencies and inadequate financial resources can be limited in 
the IWRM process (Saravanan et al., 2009).  
 
Institutional and natural resource economists have derived a model of the process of 
institutional change wherein both the economic environment and political environment in 
the natural resource sector are conceptualised (North, 1990; Challen, 2000). In the model, 
North (1990) describes how the interactions of humans and natural resource institutions in 
a political economy can create incentives to improve the utility derived from resource use 
given budget and technological constraints.  
 
Institutions are defined as the “established rules, norms, laws and practices and any other 
arrangement put in place that can influence social change” (North, 1990). Institutions at 
international, national and local levels in the water sector play important roles in arbitration 
and conflict resolutions between and/or among stakeholders, monitoring of water service 
providers and water users, and implementing strategic and sustainable planning for efficient 
and equitable use of water resources (Sullivan, 2002). These institutions are faced with 
complex natural and financial resource limits (Sullivan, 2002; Saravanan, 2008; Saravanan et 
al., 2009; Swilling, 2010; Lorz et al., 2011), prompting new thinking about successful 
resource management strategies as well as sustainable resource use.  
 
New institutional economists have identified a number of critical features of an effective 
water resource institution including: unambiguous objectives, adaptiveness, compliance 
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ability, technical rationality, good interaction with other institutions, political and 
organisational rationality, as well as appropriateness of scale and scope (Nystrom and 
Starbuck, 1981; Ostrom, 1992; Ackroyd, 2002; Gandhi and Crase, 2009). The scholars also 
argue that an equitable water resource institution should provide enhanced opportunities 
for social inclusion, be responsive to the needs of disadvantaged groups and be sensitive to 
local needs (Saleth and Dinar, 2004; Gandhi and Crase, 2009; Shen and Speed, 2010; 
Ostrom, 2011). 
 
In South Africa, as in other developing countries, water distribution faces numerous 
challenges at different stages in the distribution channel from catchments to water users, 
resulting in inequities (Du Toit and Pollard, 2008; NWRS, 2013). According to Tapela (2013), 
the frequency, violence and geographical spread of service delivery protests related to 
water in South Africa have increased to unprecedented levels over the years. The prominent 
escalation of water related protests not only highlights poor service delivery in the water 
sector, but also brings to the fore institutional inefficiencies in the sector (Mouton, 2013).  
 
The Lower Sundays River Valley (LSRV) catchment is not an exception. In spite of the thriving 
citrus industry in the catchment, the inequality between the municipal populace and the 
commercial citrus industry is noticeable with regards to water access. The problem of 
disrupted water supply is prevalent in the catchment (D’hont et al., 2013). In September 
2014, the local residents at Kirkwood, a town under the administration of the Sundays River 
Valley Municipality (SRVM), displayed their frustrations over water supply disruptions  
through violent protests that resulted in setting alight of municipal building (City Press, 
2014). However, there is also currently no shortage of water in the catchment. The demand 
for water resources is not higher than the available supply, hence it can be argued that the 
water scarcity in the catchment is not physical (Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 
2013). The currently experienced problems with water supply in the LSRV are consequence 
of a lack of effective institutions and infrastructure.  
 
There is a notable lack of understanding about the design of institutions for water 
management in developing countries (Saleth, 1996; Gandhi and Crase, 2009). The vast 
majority of research on water management and access is premised on neoclassical 
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economics ideas related to water markets and pricing among others (see generally Brajer et 
al., 1989; Brookshire et al., 2002; Yang, 2003; Bakker, 2007; Debaere et al., 2014). The 
neoclassical economics approach, however, does not adequately define the role of 
institutions in shaping the direction of water access and supply. Therefore, this study uses 
new institutional economics (NIE) arguments to define the institutional arrangements and 
dynamics defining the water sector in South Africa, using the Lower Sunday River Water 
Users Association (LSR-WUA) as the case study. 
 
1.2. Goals of the study 
 
The primary goal of this research is to analyse the institutional governance and performance 
of the Lower Sunday River Water Users Association (LSR-WUA), as a raw water supplier to 
various users, using equity, efficiency and effectiveness as key indicators , thus contributing 
to the body of knowledge in this area. This goal is addressed through defining the 
underlying economic theory behind the South African national water policy, and its impact 
on the overall institutional design and operations of water users’ associations (WUAs).  
 
The thesis also aims at describing the influence of the existing institutional and water 
governance arrangements, and economic dynamics in the LSRV in the efficiency, 
effectiveness and equity of water allocation in the catchment.  
 
Through using IWRM as well as institutional and resource economics paradigms , the study 
will contribute to the small body of literature about the underlying institutional factors 
influencing water supply, management and access in developing countries.  
 
1.3. Methods to be used 
 
Institutional governance and institutional framework analysis form the fundamental 
foundation of the study, enabling the exploration of relevant governance dynamics and 
mechanisms in the water allocation and distribution process (Henderson, 2011; Lee and 
Cassell, 2013). Hence, a narrative approach using literature and document analysis will 
provide an insight into the economic and institutional history of the LSRV. The influence of 
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economics and historical paths on the current institutional and governance arrangement in 
the LSRV will be investigated through both the selection appropriate institutional 
frameworks using the literature and the application of the framework to the institutional 
and governance analysis of Clifford-Holmes (forthcoming) and Clifford-Holmes et al. (2013). 
This study will be intensively investigating the LSR-WUA with close reference to the research 
questions, in order to illustrate path dependencies, contexts and values that define the 
current state of institutions. Therefore, the post-positivist and interpretive research 
approaches (defined in chapter six) serve as the core paradigms for this study (Wildemuth, 
1993; Schratz and Walker, 1995; Henderson, 2011; Sharp et al., 2011). The data required for 
analysis are both quantitative and qualitative in nature. A qualitative approach would 
enable the research to conduct an in-depth social inquiry (Patton, 2002; Ramsden, 2002). 
Certain indicators of efficiency require the use of quantitative data in the form of financial 
reports from the LSR-WUA, which will be used in this study.  
 
1.4. The context of the research 
 
Water resources are crucial, not only in ensuring sustainability in social progress and 
economic development (Sullivan, 2002: 1195), but also in preserving the integrity of other 
natural environmental resources for the use of future generations (UN-Water, 2008). 
Furthermore, poverty reduction and livelihood sustainability are dependent on water 
resources, as water is a vital factor in industrial and agricultural activity (Goldin, 2008). It is 
for these reasons that countries strive to improve water allocation, access, distributional 
equity and sustainable management through water policies and other statutory enactments 
(RSA, 1997; RSA, 1998; RSA, 2000; UNDP, 2004; UN-Water, 2008; Rockstrom et al., 2009; 
UN-Water, 2012). 
 
Despite the importance water assumes in overall economic and human development, many 
poor people remain trapped in the poverty cycle, with one of the key factors being poor 
access to the water resources needed for sustaining their livelihood activities (Moriarty et 
al., 2004; Haigh et al., 2008). Around 1.1 billion people worldwide do not have access to 
potable water resources (Moriarty et al., 2004; Haigh et al., 2008). In the context of South 
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Africa and other developing countries, many areas are faced with a number of constraints 
that hinder access to potable water (RSA, 1998: Du Toit et al., 2011). These constraints 
include ever-increasing demands for water resources, fragmented water institutions, 
diminishing supply of water resources, unfavourable climate changes, and lack of finances 
for infrastructural development in the water sector, among others (Tucci, 2001; Pollard and 
Du Toit, 2005; Braga et al., 2008; Fischhendler and Heikkila, 2010; Lorz et al., 2011; Du Toit 
et al., 2011; Engle et al., 2011).  The dynamics of water challenges have been summarised by 
Saleth and Dinar (2004: 1) as follows:  
“Although the nature and severity of water problems are different from country to 
country, one aspect is common to most countries: water scarcity – whether 
quantitative, qualitative, or both – originates more from inefficient use and poor 
management than from any real physical limits on supply augmentation.”  
 
1.4.1. Water issues in South Africa 
 
According to Schulze et al. (2005: 84), South Africa has a “high risk climatic environment”. 
Generally, the country is characterised by seasonal and uneven rainfall patterns (Vetter, 
2009). By implication, some parts of the country are more water scarce than other parts. 
South Africa is classified as a semi-arid country with an average annual rainfall of an 
estimated 450 mm (Palmer and Ainslie, 2007; South Africa Government Online (SAGO), 
2014). Palmer and Ainslie (2007) argue that approximately 70% of land surface in South 
Africa receives an average annual rainfall varying from less than 200 mm to 600 mm (Table 
1.1).  
 
Table 1.1: Climatic classifications and annual average rainfall in South Africa  
 
Rainfall (mm)  Classification  Percentage of land surface  
<200  Desert  22.8  
201–400  Arid  24.6  
401–600  Semi-arid  24.6  
601–800  Sub-humid  18.5  
801–1 000  Humid  6.7  
<1 000  Super-humid  2.8  
 
Source: Schulze 1997; Palmer and Ainslie, 2007 
8 
 
According to SAGO (2014), numerous dams have been constructed in several parts of the 
country to be used primarily for irrigation since there are no sizeable natural lakes in South 
Africa. The largest river in South Africa is the Orange River (SAGO, 2014) and two of South 
Africa’s largest dams are situated on the Orange River (DWA, 2013) (Table 1.2).  
 
Table 1.2: South Africa’s major dams  
Dam  Full supply capacity (106 m3) River  
Gariep 5341 Orange  
Vanderkloof 3171 Orange  
Sterkfontein 2616 Nuwejaarspruit 
Vaal 2603 Vaal 
Pongolapoort 2445 Pongola 
Source: DWA, 2013 
 
In 1930, the apartheid government initiated the construction of the Gariep Dam essentially 
as a poverty alleviation project for the whites (Department of Rural Development and Land 
Reform (DRDLR), 2011). It is argued that the apartheid government constructed dams 
largely as social-relief and development initiatives designed for poor white communities 
(DRDLR, 2011; Muller, 2012). 
 
In addition to unreliable and unfavourable climatic conditions, acid mine drainage, invasive 
alien vegetation, uncontrolled fires, climate change, poorly managed land resources and 
large-scale monocropping are other factors contributing to water scarcity in the country 
(Schulze and Perks, 2000; Tucci, 2001; Pollard and Du Toit, 2005; Braga et al., 2008; Lorz et 
al., 2011; Du Toit et al., 2011; Engle et al., 2011; WWF, 2013; NWRS, 2013). The scarcity of 
water resources in South Africa requires careful management and equitable allocation of 
water resources in order to contribute to inclusive economic growth (NWRS, 2013). Water 
allocation faces many challenges at different stages in the distribution channel from 
catchments to water users, resulting in inequities in its distribution (WWF, 2013; NWRS, 
2013). 
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In South Africa, some of the constraining factors hindering the equitable distribution of 
water resources currently are a product of the apartheid history of the country (Nash, 
2012). During apartheid, the Native Land Act of 1913, which was informed by racial 
segregation, led to skewed distribution of natural resources (Thompson et al., 2001). The 
existence of riparian water rights made the apartheid era legislation exclusive and racist as 
far as access to water was concerned because of the undisputable link between land 
ownership and access to water (Thompson et al., 2001; Nash, 2012). Thus, inequitable 
access to water was buttressed by the institution of private property (Thompson et al., 
2001; Nash, 2012; Muller, 2012). 
 
The apartheid government, through The Native Land Act among other legislative 
instruments, had forced the black majority onto less than one quarter of the South African 
land. Access to and control of land and other natural resources was thus in the hands of the 
white minority of the population (Schreiner and Naidoo, 2000: MacKay, 2003). Government 
policies were geared at advancing the needs of the white minority rather than alleviating 
the position of the poor in the social economy (Earle et al., 2005; Muller, 2012).  
 
It has been noted that wealthy municipalities and towns were able to afford the distribution 
of potable water supplies and water-borne sewage services to their mostly white residents, 
while black local authorities could not avail such services to the black population due to 
inefficient management and lack of funding (Goldin 2005: Earle et al., 2005). According to 
Cameron (2003), white local authorities had access to separate revenue in the government’s 
accounts, which was significantly greater than the revenue availed to black authorities, 
while rural areas were usually left to fend for themselves using self-generated finances. 
Local governments self-generated finances through the delivery of services and collection of 
taxes (The Green Paper on Local Government, 1997; Cameron, 2003). However, local 
governments in black communities were barred from developing retail outlets and 
industries (The Green Paper on Local Government, 1997). This consequently deprived local 
governments in black communities of the means to accumulate financial resources needed 
for meeting the local needs. The Green Paper on Local Government (1997: 12) states that,  
“Through spatial separation, influx control, and a policy of ‘own management for 
own areas’, apartheid aimed to limit the extent to which affluent white 
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municipalities would bear the financial burden of servicing black areas. The Group 
Areas Act restricted the permanent presence of Africans in urban areas through the 
pass system, and reserved a viable municipal revenue base for white areas by 
preventing townships from attracting industry.”  
 
In the post-apartheid era, the South African water legislative framework has been reformed. 
The 1956 Water Act, which had the provision of the economic growth of  South Africa as its 
core mandate without specific regard for the environment and/or social equity issues, was 
replaced by the enactment of the Water Services Act (WSA) of 1997 and National Water Act 
(NWA) of 1998. Both of these pieces of legislation call for participation of all stakeholders in 
the water sector as well as for equitable distribution of water resources for the benefit of 
all. Section 3(1) of the Water Services Act of 1997 states that “everyone has a right of access 
to basic water supply and basic sanitation”, wherein ‘basic water supply’ is understood as 
the “prescribed minimum standard of water supply services necessary for the reliable 
supply of a sufficient quantity and quality of water to households, including informal 
households, to support life and personal hygiene”.  
 
The Water Services Act of 1997 and National Water Act of 1998 are based on three 
important themes, namely; equity, sustainability and efficiency.  These legislative tools have 
enabled the government to make progressive changes as far as potable water access and 
access to water services are concerned (Muller et al., 2005; Kuusi, 2009; Wegelin and 
Jacobs, 2013).  
 
Despite their aims of achieving equitable distribution and sustainable use of water resources 
for the betterment of living standards for all, the NWA and the WSA are yet to deliver to the 
best of their potential in order to improve the country’s social and economic state. The 
allocation of water resources is skewed, with a bias against many poor communities. 
According to Muller et al. (2005: 5), the water resources and services in “well-off urban 
communities” are usually of a high standard compared to those in poor communities, where 
people go without water for days at a time.  
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In South Africa, municipalities are largely self-financing (RSA, 1998; Kuusi, 2012). However, it 
is argued that some municipalities do not have sufficient human, technical and financial 
resources to promote water conservation and demand management, resulting in limited 
access to water resources in some communities in South Africa (Muller et al., 2005, Kuusi, 
2009; Wegelin and Jacobs, 2013). Kuusi (2009: 2) argues that 
“*T+here are differences in the ability of the richer and poorer municipalities to 
generate revenue. The legislation provides that the municipalities are entitled to 
resources commensurate to their responsibilities, but in many service sectors this is 
not realised in practice as poverty is pervasive especially in the rural areas.”  
 
In the 2010 State of the Nation Address, the president of the Republic of South Africa noted 
that “We are not a water rich country. Yet we still lose a lot of water through leaking pipes 
and inadequate infrastructure.” According to a study conducted by the Water Research 
Commission (WRC) in 2013, water losses are one of the main factors impeding efficient 
allocation of water resources. The agricultural sector uses up to 60% of the country's water 
resources for irrigation. However, of the 60%, the water losses in the sector account for an 
average of between 35% and 45% (WRC, 2013). 
 
Some municipalities in South Africa do not have effective institutional capabilities, and 
hence they are often faced with a number of challenges, which lead to a failure to embrace 
IWRM fully and provide water resources to the best of their capacity (Saravanan et al., 2009; 
Clifford-Holmes et al., 2012). Such challenges include lack of funds to ensure uninterrupted 
water supply through to expansion the storage facilities. Lack of appropriate governance 
arrangements are often the root cause of various institutional deficiencies that result in 
poor service delivery, ineffective and inefficient resource allocation, poor revenue collection 
and poor resource mobility (Nallathiga, 2009).  
 
1.4.2. A brief introduction to the Lower Sundays River Valley (LSRV) and the Sundays 
River Valley Municipality (SRVM) case study 
 
The Sundays River Valley Municipality (SRVM) is one of nine local municipalities in the 
Cacadu District, Eastern Cape, South Africa (Figure 1.1). It is located at an area characterised 
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by wide, fertile flood plains, with its annual rainfall ranging between 250 – 500 mm (SRVM, 
2011). There are 54 500 people living in 14 700 households in the SRVM (Statistics South 
Africa, 2012). The economic growth and literacy rates in the SRVM are 3.5% and 55.5% 
respectively (SRVM, 2011). 
 
Figure 1.1: Location of the SRVM in South Africa (Source: Clifford-Holmes, 2013) 
 
The SRVM prides itself on its ecotourism and agricultural potential. There is a strong 
irrigation-based economic activity in the catchment as citrus production forms the main 
economic driver in the SRVM. About 48% of employment in the SRVM is provided by 
agricultural activities in the area (SRVM, 2011: 30).  
 
Despite the existence of the thriving citrus industry in the area, around 60% of people in the 
SRVM live below the poverty datum line (SRVM, 2011: 16). The inequality between the 
municipal populace and the commercial citrus industry is noticeable with regards to water 
redistribution in the Lower Sundays River Valley (LSRV). Commercial farmers get the largest 
amount of over 90% of water resources allocated by the LRV-WUA, while the SRVM 
accounts for less than 4% of the LSV-WUA’s allocation (Clifford-Holmes et al., 2012). 
 
One of the contributory factors to such a discrepancy is fragmented water institutions 
(Fischhendler and Heikkila, 2010; Lorz et al., 2011; Du Toit et al., 2011). These institutions 
are the LRS-WUA, which acts as the bulk water supplier, and the SRVM which acts as both 
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the water services authority (WSA) and the water service provider (WSP) for the areas 
within its boundaries. The institutions are faced with a number of challenges such as lack of 
clarity in respect of institutional arrangements and provisions, which can lead to a failure to 
provide water resources effectively (Saravanan et al., 2009; Clifford-Holmes et al., 2012). 
 
1.5. A preview of chapters 
 
The thesis is divided into eight chapters. The first three chapters provide an overview of the 
theoretical foundations within which the analysis of the study is generated. Chapter two 
discusses New Institutional Economics and its general influence on natural resource 
management. Over the years, the need to develop paradigms for evaluating problems of 
resource mismanagement, misallocation and scarcity prompted the shift from the 
neoclassical economics approach to establishing the influence of institutions, human choices 
and incentives in natural resource management.  
 
Chapter three presents a discussion of international water policies and legislations and 
argues that, in most countries, such policies are aligned to the macroeconomic objectives of 
the country in question. The chapter further reflects on the concept of water as an 
economic good, expanding on the complexity concept of water. It then gives an overview of 
water management institutions in both pre- and post-apartheid South Africa. 
 
Chapter four analyses South Africa’s post-apartheid water policy and legislation in terms of 
community participation, property rights, transaction costs and other themes related to NIE. 
The chapter further traces the influence of neoclassical economics principles in policy 
formulation. The levels of economic institutions framework is used to illustrate the 
interdependencies and interconnectedness of institutions operating at various levels.  
 
Chapter five discusses WUAs institutions for managing common pool resources. Common 
pool resources are often prone to overconsumption and consequently ‘tragedy of the 
commons’ (Meinzen-Dick, 2007; Orne-Gliemann, 2008). In some countries, WUAs are 
established to curtail the challenges of centralised systems, while in others they serve as key 
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institutions needed for promoting a more inclusive water allocation channel designed to 
provide sustainable livelihoods (Subramanian et al., 1997; Pegram and Mazibuko, 2003; 
Perret, 2006; Wilson and Perret, 2010). The chapter summarises the challenges faced by 
WUAs in South Africa and other countries using NIE theories of common pool resource 
management.  
 
Chapter six outlines a thorough description of research methods and paradigms used to 
address the research goal and questions of this study. The justification and rationale for 
selecting such methods and methodologies is provided in the chapter.  
 
A comprehensive analysis of the LSR-WUA’s governance and performance indicators is 
provided in chapter eight. In the chapter, the influence of historical path dependence on the 
current operations of the Association is traced and discussed. The chapter argues that the 
absence of institutional arrangements, such as service contracts, between the LSR-WUA and 
the SRVM consequently creates operational vacuums and water supply disruptions in the 
LSRV catchment area. 
 
Chapter eight concludes and provides a detailed summary of major findings and implications 
for national policy and national level water institutions. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE INSTITUTIONS APPROACH TO NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
 
2.1. Background: Towards institutions  
 
Economic theorists and other scholars of various disciplines have, over the years, given 
increasing attention, not only to understanding the position of institutions in the econo mic 
systems’ web (Saleth and Dinar, 2004; Rossiaud and Locatelli, 2010). They have focused on 
developing paradigms necessary for evaluating problems of resource mismanagement, 
misallocation and scarcity from an institutional perspective (Drobak and Nye, 1997; Smith, 
1998; Saleth and Dinar, 2004; Rossiaud and Locatelli, 2010). This interest has been 
encouraged by, among other factors, the fact that economists have come to appreciate that 
the discipline does not fully define and describe how various factors relate to one another in 
a complex interconnected system. Hence, it has failed to satisfy the effectiveness in policy 
implementation (Furubotn and Richter, 1991; Saleth and Dinar, 2004; Evensky, 2004). This 
argument finds support in Matthew’s (1986: 903) work, wherein Marshall was quoted as 
follows, “The chief fault in English economists at the beginning of the [nineteenth] century 
was...that they did not see how liable to change are the habits and institutions of industry.”  
In his article titled “The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead”, 
Williamson (2000: 595) made the following reflection:  
“I open my discussion of the new institutional economics with a confession, an 
assertion, and a recommendation. The confession is that we are still very ignorant 
about institutions. The assertion is that the past quarter century has witnessed 
enormous progress in the study of institutions. The recommendation is that, 
awaiting a unified theory, we should be accepting of pluralism.” 
 
A wide variety of literature has since emerged, with its primary interest being establishing 
how factors such as property rights, community participation and transaction costs affect 
economic development, human behaviour and incentives in any given economy (Furubotn 
and Richter, 1991; Macher and Richman, 2006). The literature has found the influence of 
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Institutional Economics in other fields of economics such as Environmental, Natural 
Resource and Ecological Economics to be more apparent over the years.  
 
2.2. The essence of Institutional Economics 
 
It has been observed that Institutional economics has become one of the most interesting 
and liveliest areas in economics (Matthews, 1986; Chang, 2010), and this is because this 
field of economics has turned on two propositions: first, “institutions do matter”; and 
second, “the determinants of institutions are susceptible to analysis by the tools of 
economic theory” (Matthews, 1986: 903). Institutional economics seeks to demonstrate 
how institutions influence public choice and human behaviour. According to North (2003), 
“institutions are incentive systems, that’s all they are. It is important to understand that 
because being incentive systems, they provide a guide to human behaviour.”  Institutional 
economics is hence the field of economics that uses a wide range of literature from other 
fields of study such as law, sociology, ecology, socio-biology and many others in an effort to 
establish the role played by institutions in defining the direction of economic development 
and behaviour (Brousseau and Glachant, 2008). This field of economics seeks to 
demonstrate how formal and informal institutions such as contracts, property rights, firms 
and other social arrangements may lead to positive economic growth and a reduction in 
transaction costs (Williamson, 1997).   
 
There is much interesting scholarly literature about the “old” and “new” institutional 
economics (Rutherford, 1994 and 1995; Nee, 2003; Rossiaud and Locatelli, 2010). The point 
of intersection of these two approaches is that they both relax some of the assumptions 
adopted in neoclassical economics analysis. Some of the proposed assumptions used in the 
neoclassical economics approach are: the availability of perfect information for all economic 
agents, zero transaction costs, rationality in human behaviour and markets being viewed as 
the only mechanism of allocation, and hence ignoring the role of institutions in the 
economic system (Poel, 2005).  
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New institutional economists argue that factors  such as, the opportunistic behaviour of 
agents, transaction costs that are greater than zero, information asymmetry and property 
rights, should be infused into economic analysis as they could affect the conclusions of the 
study (Rossiaud and Locatelli, 2010). These economists view institutions as key structures 
necessary for moulding the behaviour of economic agents in the real world of imperfect 
information (Ferrari-Filho and Conceição, 2005). 
 
The main emphasis of the new institutional economics is to illustrate the role played by 
transaction costs and information in influencing human and economic behaviour 
(Williamson, 1997). The core distinction between the “Old Institutional economics” (OIE) 
and the “New Institutional economics” is that the “old” fails to embrace the concept of self-
interest, thereby earning itself a label of “anti-theoretical” (Castle, 1999: 297). Rationality 
and the self-interest hypothesis from the neoclassical economics framework are applied in 
the public choice field as well as in NIE, while the OIE tends to reject the majority of the 
propositions of neoclassical economics including that of rational economic actors (Castle, 
1999; North, 1990, 1991; Rutherford, 1995 and 2001).  
 
Rutherford (1995 and 2001) argues that while the Old Institutional economists abandoned 
the assumption of unbounded rationality of economic actors, NIE scholars, on the other 
hand, extended and modified the assumption instead of abandoning it. This shortcoming 
ultimately led to the failure of the OIE in its bid to shape the direction of modern economics 
(Nee, 2003). According to Coase (1984: 230), the OIE produced a “mass of descriptive 
material waiting for a theory, or a fire.” In line with this argument, Williamson (2000: 596) 
quotes Kenneth Arrow as follows:  
“Why did the older institutionalist school fail so miserably, though it contained such able 
analysts as Thorstein Veblen, J. R. Commons, and W. C. Mitchell? I now think that . . .  
[one of the answers is in the] important specific analyses . . . of the New Institutional 
Economics movement. But it does not consist of giving new answers to the traditional 
questions of economics-resource allocation and the degree of utilization. Rather, it 
consists of answering new questions, why economic institutions emerged the way they 
did and not otherwise; it merges into economic history, but brings sharper [micro-
analytic] . . . reasoning to bear than had been customary.” 
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Figure 2.1 shows a causal model hypothesised by NIE adapted from Williamson (1995: 213) 
and Nee (2003: 4). According to the model, the main drivers of the institutional 
environment are the rules of the game (North, 1981; Williamson, 1995; Nee, 2003). 
“Institutional environment” in Figure 2.1 refers to a set of core principles that govern the 
production, exchange and distribution processes in the economy (Davis and North, 1971; 
Williamson, 1995). The shift parameters of the institutional environment include 
conventions, contract laws, property rights, norms and customs (Williamson, 1995; Nee, 
2003; Menard and Saleth, 2011). 
 
 
  
  
Shift parameters    Strategic  
   
                     Preferences  
   
Behavioural     Endogenous 
Attributes  
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: A causal model hypothesised by the new institutional economics (Source: Williamson 
(1995) and Nee (2003)) 
 
Changes in governance structures are prompted by changes in parameters of the 
institutional environment, represented by the downward arrow in Figure 2.1. These changes 
are a result of the interaction processes of a number of factors that are both exogenous and 
endogenous to, for example, the water sector. For instance, if there are changes in social 
norms, legal directives and property rights, relative prices for firms will change, and this will 
likely lead to changes in the governance structures of the firms (Nee, 2003; Menard and 
Saleth, 2011). In summary,  “the model includes a purposive actor whose behavioural 
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attributes—“self-interest seeking with guile”—lie behind many of the transaction costs 
governance structures are designed to address” (Nee, 2003: 5). 
 
2.3. The ideas of institutional economics in relation to environmental and natural 
resource economics 
 
The emergence of a large range of academic work on multidisciplinary research regarding 
environmental and natural resource management issues such as environmental policies, 
natural resource scarcity and resource conflicts has increasingly diverted the focus of 
environmental economists from the neoclassical approach (Leach et al., 1999; Deacon and 
Mueller, 2006; Hackett, 2011). Scholars now seek clarity on how institutions influence public 
choice, transaction costs and human behaviour from an institutional economics point of 
view (Leach et al., 1999; Deacon and Mueller, 2006). Common pool resources (CPR), such as 
water resources, are often prone to overconsumption and a problem referred to as ‘tragedy 
of the commons’ (Ostrom, 1990; Hackett, 2011). Economists define the ‘tragedy of the 
commons’ as depletion of a shared resource by rational individuals with full knowledge that 
overuse of the resource is against long-term interest of the group (Hardin, 1968: 1244).  
 
Neoclassical economists have recommended that the assigning of private property rights is 
one of the essential remedies for ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hackett, 2011: 100). 
Institutional economists extend this argument by arguing that institutions have to define the 
physical restrictions to CPR, and such restrictions should specify the method of financing the 
system, how the system should be monitored, how conflicts will be resolved and so forth 
(Ostrom, 1990; Bromley, 1992; Hackett, 2011). Furthermore, it is argued that there should 
be “local self-governance” (Sethi and Somanathan, 1996: 767), whereby the management of 
CPR is led by local communities. According to Ostrom (1990) and Hackett (2011), local self-
governance requires limited or no political interference in the operations of CPR institutions. 
The consensus emerging from the Neoclassical economics and NIE approaches is that, in the 
absence of restrictions on common pool resource use, the users are more likely to 
excessively extract and exploit the resource, leading to undesirable outcomes such as 
overexploitation and ultimately depletion (Wade, 1988; Ostrom, 1990; Baland and Platteau, 
1996; Bandaragoda, 2000; Agrawal, 2001; Libecap, 2008). The constraints should take into 
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account social costs and benefits of resource use to allow for broader and more inclusive 
net benefit (Agrawal, 2005; Libecap, 2008). This argument is supported by Libecap (2008: 
545), “Without some limits on individual behaviour to better reflect broader, social benefits 
and costs, only private net benefit calculations govern resource use decisions ”. 
  
Efficient economic and resource management forms the foundation of NIE (Gardner et al., 
1994; Brousseau and Glachant, 2002; Lieberherr, 2009). According to NIE s cholars, the 
discipline is centred on the need to align various imperfect institutional and contractual 
arrangements in order to determine the most suitable way to offset conflict and maximise 
the benefits of resource use with the least transactions cost (Gardner et al., 1994; 
Brousseau and Glachant, 2002; Lieberherr, 2009). New institutionalism hence argues that 
the institutional environment should lay a foundation that enables the attainment of 
efficiency in institutional arrangements through the provision of structures that allow for 
collaboration and cooperation (Brousseau and Glachant, 2002; Ostrom, 2005; Menard and 
Shirley, 2005; Kirsten et al., 2009). 
 
However, a major criticism levelled against the NIE is that, although efficiency forms the 
core idea of this branch of economics, the institutional efficiency context varies depending 
on the case in question (Platteau, 2008; Lieberherr, 2009). For instance, while water 
privatisation may function competently and effectively in a developed country due to 
factors such as transparency and accountability of relevant government annexes, it may fail 
in a less developed country due to corruption, lack of regulation and other factors 
(Lieberherr, 2009). Kirsten et al., (2009) argue that institutional inefficiencies have led to the 
inability of societies to progress effectively, and to develop low-cost enforcement of 
contracts, which has consequently led to both historical stagnation and current 
underdevelopment in the third world.  
 
Several ideas proposed by NIE have enabled institutional economics to increase its 
applicability to a wide range of disciplines such as environmental and natural resource 
economics. This has in turn led to the formulation of recommendations that are in line with 
economic and sociological needs of communities and individuals in developing countries  
(Williamson, 1995; Evensky, 2004; Deacon and Mueller, 2006; Thiel et al., 2012). Such 
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recommendations take into account local norms and customs. Examples include the call for 
policy reforms in the water sector that acknowledge social norms, community participation, 
as well as the general relationships of residents and the environment (Thiel et al., 2012; 
Sharma, 2012).  
 
2.3.1. Property rights to natural resources 
 
Property rights are broadly defined as “all laws, rules, social customs, and organisations that 
generate incentives for human action” (Marinescu, 2012: 256). Alternatively, property rights 
can be defined as social customs that define the range of privileges granted to individuals of 
specific natural resources (Mahoney, 2004). The main importance of property rights is to 
give the owner the right to exclude others from use of the resource and/or asset. Where the 
owner chooses to render conditional use of the asset, property rights give the owner the 
right to appropriate rents from the asset. They also allow the owner of the asset exclusive 
right of sale of the asset (Tregarthen and Rittenberg, 2000). Property rights could be 
enforced by formal arrangements as specified in statutes, national constitutions and 
international treaties, as well as through judicial rulings. They could also be enforced 
through informal arrangements, which include traditional values and customs in a given 
society (Deacon and Mueller, 2006). 
 
Neoclassical economics theory posits that, where property rights are enforced, there is 
optimal allocation of resources resulting from the price and demand of the resources 
(Williamson 1994; Saleth and Dinar, 2004; Hodgson, 2009). This implies that assigning 
property rights leads to efficient allocation of resources. Equally, if the resources are 
allocated under private ownership and all the price misrepresentations are eliminated, then 
such resources will be allocated optimally. Economists argue that a resource allocation 
Pareto optimal or efficient if it is impossible to make one member of society better off 
without making some other member or members worse off (Reinhardt, 2001). Generally, 
Pareto optimality is viewed as a necessary but not sufficient condition for attaining 
maximum social welfare (Reinhardt, 2001). The view of Pareto optimal allocation of 
resources in the absence of price misinterpretation has been criticised by proponents of NIE  
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as being too abstract, where allocations of resources based on property rights may not be 
“optimal” due to the presence of competing agents in the economy, and the ability of 
agents to make mistakes (Ollila, 2009). 
 
The importance of creating well-defined property rights when there are changes in relative 
scarcity of the natural resource can never be underestimated (North, 1990). Such changes 
include population growth, the rate of technological advancement and changes in taste and 
preference of economic agents, which often lead to shifts in the demand for the natural 
resource (Deacon and Mueller, 2006).  
 
Over the years, increased attention has been directed towards establishing the nature of 
the relationship between property rights enforcement and incentives (Libecap, 1989; Alston 
and Mueller, 2003; Thiel et al., 2012). The manner in which property rights are imposed 
often determines the reception and the success of the mandates of such rights in 
communities. Adoption of a “one-size-fits-all” approach by governments in the imposition of 
property rights on a large number of communities occupying different areas with varied 
ecological, geological and sociological features, often leads to adverse impacts on the 
conditions of natural resources (Ostrom, 2004). From this point of view, it is argued that the 
success of achieving allocation efficiency of communal resources is dependent on respecting 
traditional agreements that communities have in place instead of disregarding the existence 
of indigenous property rights (Ostrom, 2004). A proper understanding of the nature and 
functioning of local structures serves as a strong foundation for predicting the incentive 
shifts and responses to property rights enforced by the government (Heltberg, 2002).  
 
Property rights play a fundamental role in maintaining sustainable exploitation of natural 
resources in order to protect sources of livelihoods for people. According to Chambers and 
Conway (1991: i),  
“A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (including both material and social 
resources) and activities required for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable 
when it can cope with and recover from stress and shocks and maintain or enhance 
its capabilities and assets both now and in the future, while not undermining the 
natural resource base.” 
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Sustainable livelihoods translate into a reduction of rural pove rty, improvement in food 
security and decline in rural-urban migration (Heltberg, 2002). Livelihood activities of low-
income earners in rural communities of developing countries are directly dependent on 
natural resources such as land for farming, water for fishing and irrigation, animals and 
plants (Heltberg, 2002). Another crucial role played by property rights is that they could be 
designed in a way that could increase allocational efficiency when sources of market failure, 
such as externalities and public goods, are in existence (Deacon and Mueller, 2006). 
Furthermore, property rights are needed for defining the nature of resources that are 
exploitable, the timeframe for exploiting such resources, the individuals and/or 
organisations that have exclusive permission to exploiting such natural resources and the 
maximum amounts exploitable in a given period of time (Stroup and Baden, 1979; Deacon 
and Mueller, 2006). 
 
2.3.2. Transaction costs, inter-dependence and natural resource management 
 
NIE argues that economic agents are faced with positive transaction costs (North, 1997; 
Challen, 2000; Saleth and Dinar, 2004). Coase (1988: 15) posits that, because it assumes a 
world of zero transaction cost, neoclassical economics “is incapable of handling many of the 
problems to which it purports to give answers”. This argument is in line with another 
propounded in his earlier work, wherein Coase (1960: 15) highlighted that the processes of 
carrying out a market transaction entail positive transaction costs, and such costs would 
need to be allowed for in any policy implementation.  
 
Institutions are viewed as cost-minimising and interdependent arrangements that form part 
of the complex economic system. According to Ollila (2009), economic agents either have 
divergent or convergent interests with respect to scarce resources, and hence they are 
interdependent. They have relationships through the natural resource base they depend on, 
and through institutions that govern their actions. By virtue of being interdependent, the 
choice of one economic agent has a direct influence on that of another agent (Paavola and 
Adger, 2002).  
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New institutional economists argue that individuals on their own cannot appreciate how 
conflicting their interests are towards a specified scarce environmental and/or natural 
resource (North, 1997; Challen, 2000; Paavola and Adger, 2002). Therefore, there is a need 
to define environmental management guidelines as well as to define private property rights, 
a concept known as the Coase Theorem (Paavola and Adger, 2002). Such an exercise 
normally entails incurring transaction costs. The Coasian viewpoint is that property rights  
are essential for affirming the ultimate control over resources since transaction costs 
associated with the resources may often inhibit ‘efficiency-enhancing’ reallocations (Cole 
and Grossman, 2002: 321). Environmental governance is also influenced by factors such as 
the nature and use of environmental resources, as well as the nature of arrangements in 
place to direct the use of such a resource (Paavola and Adger, 2002).  
 
2.3.3. Collective action and natural resource management 
 
Cooperative governance or collective action is defined as the “willingness to pool resources, 
offsets the costs of control and increases efficiency through a cooperative atmosphere by, 
for example, increasing the sense of responsibility among human actors in a firm” 
(Lieberherr, 2009: 13). It is argued that collective groups, such as WUAs, can process and 
use information more effectively and efficiently than a centralised system as they generate 
customs and social conventions that fit their needs in an effort to maximise efficient 
resource use (Brousseau and Glachant, 2002; Menard and Shirley, 2005; Kirsten et al., 2009; 
Lieberherr, 2009).  
 
Ostrom (2009) states that cooperative governance at local level often manages to resolve 
conflicts and curb free-rider problems through shared learning, social norms and 
preferences, trust, as well as reciprocity of trust. Collective action has been established as 
one of the preferable avenues of managing common pool resources (Duncan, 2003). Some 
communities have, for centuries, enjoyed the positive results of collective action through 
their traditional or indigenous methods (Ostrom, 2004). Such arrangements need to be 
considered when making public policies, especially those related to agriculture, natural 
resources and institutional development (Duncan, 2003).  
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Proponents of collective action argue that individuals often do not possess perfect 
information, as per the assumptions of neoclassical economics, but they are capable of 
absorbing knowledge through interaction in a particular setting (Cox et al., 2010; Ostrom, 
2011). This serves as an effective path for achieving sustainable development, equitable 
distribution and allocation of public goods as well as internalising ecological externalities 
such as pollution (Adhikari, 2002). According to Ostrom (2004), communication and proper 
involvement of institutions that are concerned could help policymakers achieve desirable 
results from collective action. 
 
Despite the positive results of collective action in natural resource use, this approach has its 
weak points. One of the main issues related to common property resource management is 
that this method works best where only a few agents are dependent on the natural 
resource as it is easier to monitor each other’s conduct (Ostrom, 2004). This argument is 
supported by Reuben (2003) wherein he argues that, in many instances, agents often fail to 
cooperate and systematically group themselves despite the noticeable advantages of doing 
so. Opponents of collective action cite problems associated with financing collective action, 
the risks of free-riding, as well as the risks of facing law suits due to irresponsible behaviours 
of representative bodies as some of the disadvantages of collective action (Van den Bergh 
and Visscher, 2007).   
 
Furthermore, it is argued that cooperative governance often entails bureaucratic costs , that 
is, transaction costs (Menard and Shirley, 2005). Furthermore, some NIE scholars argue that 
cooperative governance is inefficient in reacting promptly to shocks and accumulating 
capital due to complexities associated with managing incentives of individuals with 
divergent and varying interests (Menard and Shirley, 2005; Brousseau and Glachant, 2008).  
Nonetheless, other scholars argue that cooperative governance creates ex post 
commonalities and harmonies, which are necessary for conflict resolutions as well as 
curbing rent-seeking behaviour of economic agents (Dosi and Marengo 1994; Teece et al., 
1994; Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Brousseau and Glachant, 2008).  
 
Ostrom (2009 and 2011) uses game theory and Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) 
to illustrate how attributes of the community, such as trust and social capital, and 
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information sharing between agents through various interactions interrelate in order to 
bring desirable outcomes for CPR management within a cooperative governance setup. In 
Figure 2.2, action situations are understood as the social spaces within which agents or 
stakeholders “interact, exchange goods and services, solve problems, dominate one another 
and fight” (Ostrom 2011: 11). 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework. (Source: Ostrom, 2009) 
 
2.3.4. Political economy and natural resource management 
 
There seems to be a consensus between neoclassical economists and new institutional 
economists that there are several links between political systems and natural resource use 
by agents in the economy (Hackett, 1998; Adger et al., 2006; Collier, 2010). For instance, if 
the laws in any given jurisdiction clearly state the ownership details of, and claims from, the 
natural resource, then the element of uncertainty and ambiguity is eliminated. On the other 
hand, instability of the country’s political environment and ambiguity in the ownership 
claims of the natural resource often lead to uncertainty on future returns to be accrued 
from the resource, increases disincentive of conserving the resource, and consequently lead 
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to depletion and over-exploitation of the natural resource in question (Sanderson, 1994; 
Adhikari, 2002; Collier, 2010).   
 
Both schools of thought concur that an important role played by a stable economic system 
in environmental conservation is providing the poor with an equal opportunity of having 
access to resources and claiming accountability and responsibility towards such resources 
and the environment at large (Duncan, 2003). Sustained economic growth, unbiased 
redistribution of natural resources and national wealth, and reduction of rural poverty are 
dependent on economic stability (Duncan, 2003; Collier, 2010). Partisan government 
policies, such as marginalising the agriculture sector and neglecting rural infrastructure, 
have been identified as chief contributors to both rural and urban poverty (Duncan, 2003; 
Collier, 2010). 
 
2.4. The importance of contracts 
 
Contracts are used as one of the essential analytical tools by new institutional economists 
(Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975 and 1991; North; 1990; Brousseau, 2008). In his paper 
entitled “The Nature of the Firm” Coase analyses the firm’s contractual agreements. 
Williamson extends the work by analysing governance and transaction costs’ relationships 
to contracts (Williamson, 1991). As analytical tools, contracts are used to analyse 
transactions between entities as well as their relationships (Brousseau, 2008). They are used 
as a way of mitigating transactional hazards and improving the quality of services exchanged 
by the parties (Brousseau, 2008; Mihau et al., 2008). 
 
Brousseau (2008) used contracts to examine the degrees of cooperation, coordination and 
organisational interactions between entities. The argument made by NIE scholars is that 
contracts dictate the actions of the agents (North; 199 0; Brousseau, 2008). However, 
according to Brosseau (2008), the success or failure of contractual agreements depends 
largely on the nature of the institutional environment within which they have been 
endorsed. For this reason, it is argued that contracts are “embedded in an institutional 
framework” (Brousseau, 2008: 38). The enforcement of contracts is thus constrained by the 
existing institutional environment.  
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While NIE refers to contracts as one of the fundamental points of analysis, the scholars of 
this discipline have acknowledged that contracts entail transaction costs (Coase, 1937; 
North; 1990; Weingast, 2007; Brousseau, 2008). The costs of managing and designing 
contracts lead to an increase in the overall costs endured by the agents (Weingast, 2007;  
Brousseau, 2008). Moreover, adjusting contracts to suit the interests of both parties might 
be both a lengthy and time-consuming process (North; 1990; Weingast, 2007; Brousseau, 
2008). 
 
Nonetheless, contracts that are flexible and, adjusted to harmonise the diverse interests of 
the parties involved, create an incentive for service delivery, profit maximisation and 
relationship building (North; 1990; Williamson, 1998; Weingast, 2007). This is realised when 
the hazards of opportunism have been factored in during the drafting process of the 
contract (Williamson, 1998).   
 
The overall benefits of establishing contractual agreements, especially between water and 
other basic needs institutions, are argued to outweigh the costs (Milgrom and Roberts, 
1992; Weingast, 2007). It is argued that contracts present a deterrent effect necessary for 
balancing the scale for profit maximisation and social inclusion, and for governing the 
actions of the agents towards greater social equity (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Weingast, 
2007). Even though the LSR-WUA is not a profit maximisation company, it is important to 
appreciate that the Association exists as a result of the transformed structure of irrigators 
who share hydraulic infrastructure and associated complex administrative and financial 
systems (LSR-WUA, 2011). Financial sustainability is hence one of the obligations of the LSR-
WUA to its stakeholders (LSR-WUA, 2009, 2010 and 2011).  
 
Scholars of NIE recognise that for institutions to function effectively, there needs to be 
institutional support in the form of well-defined property rights and contractual agreements 
(Greif, 2005; Menard and Shirley, 2005; Lieberherr, 2009). Neoclassical economists, on the 
other hand, argue that price mechanisms can lead to efficiency and effectiveness even when 
the administrative control of institutions is “hands -off” (Lieberherr, 2009: 9). It is argued 
that, according to neoclassical economics theory, the existence of the legal system is 
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necessary for the attainment of efficiency and mutually beneficial exchanges in the 
economy (Greif, 1996 and 2005; Menard and Shirley, 2005; Lieberherr, 2009).  
 
2.5. Path Dependency and Cooperative Institutional Governance 
 
The concept of ‘path dependency’ is used to describe the adaptation of historical 
experiences, behaviours and/or identities that once proved to be effective and efficient in 
new tasks and challenges (Lowndes, 2005; Streeck and Thelen, 2005; Heinmiller, 2009). 
Neoclassical economists use the concept of increasing returns to describe path dependency  
(Pierson, 2000; Sehring, 2009). Their argument is that path dependency takes place when 
the cost of alternative behaviour increases while the benefits derived from staying on the 
path increase (Pierson, 2000; Sehring, 2009).  Some scholars of neoclassical  economics have 
upheld the argument that understanding institutional change is dependent on the past, 
present and future events (David, 1994; Lowndes, 2005; Streeck and Thelen, 2005; 
Heinmiller, 2009). David (1994: 207) states that  
“Institutional arrangements were plastic and, therefore, could and would be readily 
adapted to achieve efficiency wherever people saw that doing so would be to their 
economic advantage” 
 
To a certain extent, the views of neoclassical and new institutional economists about 
institutions being the carriers of history converge (David, 1994; Lowndes, 2005; Streeck and 
Thelen, 2005; Heinmiller, 2009; Sehring, 2009). For instance, the implicit assumption made 
by new institutional economists that institutional arrangements are “perfectly  malleable” 
(David, 1994: 207) is heavily aligned to neoclassical economics assumptions. Moreover, both 
schools of thought seem to propose that,  
“The longer an institution exists, the greater are the investments and adaptations in 
the institution, and the more difficult it is to undertake major institutional change” 
(Heinmiller, 2009: 135).  
 
As argued by new institutional economists, initiating major institutional changes often 
results in high transaction costs (North, 1990; Heinmiller, 2009). Major institutional changes 
may also result in reluctance of stakeholders to abandon their investment in existing 
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institutions (North, 1990; Heinmiller, 2009). According to NIE scholars, institutions strive 
towards efficiency through minimising transaction costs and the use of macro-institutional 
arrangements such as property rights (David, 1994; Pierson, 2000; Sehring, 2009). These 
strategies may make institutions dependent on tried and tested ways of attaining efficiency 
(Heinmiller, 2009; Sehring, 2009). Furthermore, path dependency is inevitable where actors 
invested their resources in an effort to shape the direction of the institutions towards 
greater profitability (Heinmiller, 2009). Power relations hence play a crucial role in shaping 
and influencing the actions of cooperative institutions (Streeck and Thelen, 2005; Sehring, 
2009; Brown, 2013).  
 
It is argued that path dependency usually results in power asymmetries because of 
embedded personal economic interests that have to be satisfied simultaneously with 
performing the constitutional functions of the institutions (Streeck and Thelen, 2005; 
Sehring, 2009). Often, reform policies are too quick to propose the establishment of new 
institutions, without paying regard to deinstitutionalising old institutions in a way that 
allows them to be complemented, as opposed to being replaced, by new ones (Lowndes, 
2005; Sehring, 2009). 
 
2.6. Institutional governance: Performance indicators and concepts 
 
The debates over the nature of institutional arrangements that should account for effective, 
equitable, efficient and sustainable management of common pool resources have 
undergone a remarkable shift over the past three decades (Ostrom, 1990; North, 1990; 
Bandaragoda, 2000; Libecap, 2008; Brousseau and Glachant, 2008; Kirsten et al., 2009). The 
shift has occurred in part as a response to emergence of new academic ideas of non-
cooperative game theory (Agrawal, 2001), and partly as a result of development and 
expansion of the body of literature on new institutionalism and common pool resources 
(North, 1990; Ostrom, 1990 and 2005; Agrawal, 2001; Brousseau and Glachant, 2008).  
  
The use of game theory in analysing the behaviours of agents in markets as prominent 
institutions can be traced as far back as Adam Smith if not beyond (Agrawal, 2001; Aoki, 
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2001). In his writing entitled “The Theory of Moral Sentiments”, Adam Smith (1759: 234) 
notes that  
“*I+n the great chessboard of human society, every single piece has a principle of 
motion of its own, altogether different from that which the legislature might choose 
to impress upon it. If those two principles coincide and act in the same direction, the 
game of human society will go on easily and harmoniously, and is very likely to be 
happy and successful. If they are opposite or different, the game will go on 
miserably, and the society must be at all times in the highest degree of disorder.”  
 
The classic “Prisoners’ Dilemma” concept of game theory is said to have had a major 
influence in the collective action argument coined by new institutional economists (Robin 
and Staropoli, 2008; Brousseau and Glachant, 2008). The prisoner’s dilemma is a concept of 
game theory that is often used for analysing collective action and social relationships 
(Penard, 2008). 
 
Acknowledging the effects of institutions in the general performance of the economy has 
necessitated NIE to use game theory to explain various institutional arrangements and 
phases using equilibria (North, 1990; Aoki, 2001; Brousseau and Glachant, 2008). 
Furthermore, conceptualising an institution as an “equilibrium outcome of a game” (Aoki, 
2001: 2) directly allows for the investigation of institutions using equilibrium phenomena 
(North, 1990; Aoki, 2001; Brousseau and Glachant, 2008). There is significant body of NIE 
literature analysing the risks of opportunism from contractual agreements, collective actions 
and other institutional arrangements, using both cooperative and non-cooperative game 
theory (Greif, 1989, 1994, 1997, 1998 and 2000; Coleman, 1987 and 1990; Kandori, 1992;  
Weingast, 1994; Aoki, 2001; Brousseau and Glachant, 2008). Aoki (2001) illustrates how the 
formation of WUAs could lead to the elimination of free-rider problem in the management 
and use of a common-pool resource using game theory. It is argued that there is “the 
possibility of a strong collectively imposed penalty in the community/social exchange game 
can deter free-riding in the irrigation game, even if the incentive constraint in the irrigation 
game is not satisfied when it is played independently” (Aoki, 2001: 73).  
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The common consensus between institutionalists, environmentalists and political scientists 
is that, in the absence of effective governance institutions at the required scale, natural 
resources and the environment are in peril from overuse and mismanagement (Dietz et al., 
2003). However, it is argued that there is no unique way of defining a “suitable” institutional 
arrangement because different institutional governance systems bring different outcomes 
depending on the features of the resource as well as the location in question (Griffiths et al., 
2007). Furthermore, institutional arrangements are often complex and diverse, with many 
layers of hierarchies, different markets and variable interests from beneficiaries  (Agrawal, 
2001; Griffiths et al., 2007; Libecap, 2008).  
 
Ostrom (1990) and Weinstein (2000), among other scholars, have identified several  general 
principles for robust governance institutions for natural resources. Their assertion is that 
each principle is relevant for meeting several requirements, as indicated in Figure 2.3. 
Principles necessary for robust institutional governance for local resources are outlined in 
the first column. The second column represents a list of requirements, while the third 
column indicates the list of principles necessary for robust institutional governance for 
regional and global natural resources. The arrows are used for mapping some of the most 
likely connections between principles and requirements. The principles indicated in Figure 
2.2 are in line with those identified by some new institutional economists that define an 
effective resource institution as one with a number of features such as unambiguous 
objectives, adaptiveness, compliance ability, technical rationality, good interaction with 
other institutions, political and organisational rationality, as well as appropriateness of scale 
and scope (Gandhi and Crase, 2009).  
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Figure 2.3: Principles necessary for robust institutional governance. (Source: Dietz et al., 2003) 
 
There is an array of academic literature across disciplines on other models for evaluating the 
performance of institutions. One of such models is the ‘economy-efficiency-effectiveness’ 
model, commonly known as the 3Es model. In the model, ‘economy’ is defined as the 
expenditure associated with obtaining specific service inputs (Boyne, 2002). However, it is 
argued that economy in itself adds little value in evaluating the performance of an 
institution because it reveals nothing about the failure and/or success of the institution in 
question (Bouckaert, 1993; Boyne, 2002).  
 
Efficiency is loosely defined as “doing things right” (Elebring et al., 2012). Efficiency is 
commonly understood as an internal measure of process operations in terms of resource 
use. The resources could be monetary or non-monetary in nature. Generally, institutional 
inefficiencies are a result of number of factors, such as inaccessible information, high 
transaction costs, and corruption, among other factors (Dietz et al., 2003; Engle et al., 2011). 
According to Mihaiu et al. (2010), measuring the efficiency of a public institution has often 
proved to be difficult. The difficulty is largely due to the failure to find measures needed for  
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accurately quantifying the public institution’s outputs as such outputs are often both direct 
and indirect depending on the type of externalities which they generate (Mihaiu et al., 
2010). Economists define the term ‘efficiency’ in two ways, namely ‘technical efficiency’ and 
‘allocative efficiency’. Technical efficiency is defined as “the per unit output” (Boyne, 2002: 
17). Allocative efficiency refers to sensitivity or “responsiveness of services to public 
preferences” (Boyne, 2002: 18). The model uses the technical efficiency concept because, in 
some instances, services that are considered to be efficient may be of no significant value 
(Boyne, 2002).  
 
Effectiveness is often referred to as “doing the right thing” (Elebring et al., 2012). It is often 
viewed as an external measure of the success of formal objectives (Boyne, 2002).  
Ineffectiveness can be due to the lack of a clear set of objectives, lack of a clear 
communication line, and divergent expectations of stakeholders, among other factors 
(Mandl et al., 2008). Environmental factors, which are often socio-economic in nature, have 
a major influence on effectiveness (Mihaiu et al., 2010). Several indicators such as the 
quality, quantity and accessibility of services provided by, or through, the institutions are 
used to measure output.  
 
Equity is loosely defined as fairness and/or impartiality (Boyne, 2002; Aderies et al., 2013). 
Equity of service provision forms a vital component of outcomes (Boyne, 2002). Public 
institutions are expected to embrace equity through the allocation of resources  based on 
criteria of need rather than ability to pay (Boyne, 2002). According to Aderies et al. (2013), 
the institutional arrangements, which consist of adaptive rules can skilfully take equity and 
fairness issues into account. Figure 2.3 summarises the 3Es model as well as the inputs-
outputs-outcomes relationships. 
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Figure 2.3: The 3Es model of performance. (Source: Mihaiu et al., 2010)  
 
2.6.1. Efficiency, effectiveness and equity in new institutional economics 
 
New institutional economists argue that institutions affect performance through 
determining the cost of transacting and producing, as well as through defining property 
rights (North 1997; Gandhi and Crase, 2009). One of the key assumptions posited by new 
institutional economists is that real costs of economic activities include greater than zero 
transaction costs (Saleth and Dinar, 2004). It is reasoned that a failure to acknowledge the 
positive transaction costs that institutions face often results in a significant reduction in 
efficiency and effectiveness as performance measures for institutions (Gandhi and Crase, 
2009). This is a contradictory proposition to that of neoclassical economists. In neoclassical 
economics, transaction costs are assumed to be zero. Consequently, institutional efficiency 
is meaningless as institutions are “allocation neutral” (Richter, 2012: 2). Furthermore, new 
institutional economists argue that the concept of equity is not sufficiently described by 
neoclassical economics models such as the general equilibrium model wherein perfect 
competition is Pareto efficient but not necessarily socially equitable (Richter, 2008).    
 
According to Gandhi and Crase (2009), an ‘ideal’ institution is the one in which transaction 
costs are kept to a minimum, incentives associated with certain property rights associated 
with the resources are well defined, and the benefits of collective action are maximised. NIE 
essentially operates on the premise that efficient economic and institutional management is 
a result of evaluating various contractual and institutional arrangements to find the most 
appropriate means to conduct a transaction at the least possible cost (Brousseau and 
Glachant, 2008). 
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In the early 20th century, relative institutional efficiency was measured using the firms’ 
realised positive profits - an “ex post measure” (Richter, 2012). The main shortcoming of 
using an ex post measure is that it is often characterised by maladaptation to various 
economic environments because it is premised on the assumptions of common knowledge 
and zero transaction cost bargaining (Williamson, 2000; Richter, 2012). The inadequacy of 
the ex post measure prompted the development of ante post measures of institutional 
efficiency under all of the assumptions proposed by new institutional economics (Richter, 
2008 and 2012).  
 
Williamson’s (1996) transaction cost approach theory argues that economic agents are able 
to forecast and identify potential risks, and hence they are able to formulate responsive 
institutions that adapt to various contractual relations. New institutional economists define 
such institutions as “efficient” (Richter, 2008). North (1990) defines efficiency as the ability 
of the institution to withstand a large set of dynamic problems it faces from time to time. 
Williamson and North’s definitions of new institutional economics efficiency encompass 
both adaptability and transaction costs concepts.  
 
Richter (2012: 3) neatly sums up both of the descriptions and defines new institutional 
economics efficiency as “a term that comprises both economic effective transactions today 
and effective adaptability to unknown states of the world in the future”. This definition 
reflects how intertwined the concepts of efficiency and effectiveness are. It could hence be 
argued that in NIE, effectiveness is a necessary condition to achieving efficiency. This 
reasoning seems to find support in Mihaiu et al.‘s (2010) assertion that there is essentially 
no way an institution could be efficient without being effective because it is more important 
for institutions to do what they have proposed well, than do well something else that was 
not necessarily initially proposed.  
 
McDonough and Braungart (2002) posit that equity should continually operate as one of the 
anchors to a spectrum of values of a social institution. Equity between people and 
generations is defined as the state of applying equal rights of all peoples to environmental 
and/or natural resources (Gray and Bebbington, 2000; Young and Tilley, 2006). Economists 
have traditionally underestimated the importance of including “fairness” as well as 
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individuals’ ideological preferences in the designation of property right as constants in their 
modelling of institutional performance, often leading to flaws in estimation of their models 
(North, 1986). According to Boyne (2002 and 2010), including indicators of equity in 
performance models can help establish whether a social institution is meeting its mandates, 
and to measure the degree of fairness between services offered by the institution or across 
jurisdictions covered by the institution.   
 
2.7. Conclusion 
 
One of the main propositions of NIE is that institutions influence public choice and human 
behaviour. The NIE relaxes some of the assumptions of neoclassical economics, such as the 
availability of perfect information for all economic agents, zero transaction costs and 
unbounded rationality (Poel, 2005; Rossiaud and Locatelli, 2010).  This school of thought 
draws lessons from various disciplines such as politics, anthropology and sociology, among 
others, hence it can be argued that its ideas are relevant in policy formulation, policy 
implementation and socio-economic needs of communities in developing countries (Deacon 
and Mueller, 2006; Thiel et al., 2012).  
 
The chapter also discussed how NIE concepts of property rights, transaction costs, collective 
action and political economy address issues of natural resource management.  It also 
discussed how the NIE defines the concepts of equity, efficiency and effectiveness  (North 
1997; Gandhi and Crase, 2009; Mihaiu et al, 2010). The following chapter analyses water 
resource governance in the South African and international cases  using the theory discussed 
in this chapter.   
 
 
 
 
38 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
 INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE IN THE WATER SECTOR 
 
3.1. Water as an economic good: Meaning and implications  
 
Since the 1992 Dublin conference on Water and Environment, resource economists have 
widely accepted water as an economic good whose price is charged against its value, and 
whose allocation could be improved through integrated decision-making (ICWE, 1992; 
Savenije and van der Zaag 2002). An ‘economic good’ is defined by Rutherford (2002: 160) 
as “(a) scarce good, yielding utility, which must be allocated either by rationing or by the 
price mechanism; not a free good”. 
 
According to Yuling and Lein (2010), regarding water as an economic good is crucial, not 
only ensures that this scarce resource is used more efficiently, but also creates a basis for 
cost recovery. The former argument implies that if water is not treated as an economic 
good, it is more likely to be subject to overuse and inefficient use, leading to water crises 
and shortages in a given location. In South Africa, water is regarded as an economic good 
that has to be used and allocated in the most efficient, effective and well-organised way 
possible in order to ensure that the macroeconomic objectives of the country are promoted 
(Earle et al., 2005). 
 
As an essential natural resource, the economic value of water is incontestable (Yuling and 
Lein, 2010). However, water should not be treated like a normal economic good as this 
natural resource displays a large array of features that distinguish it from other economic 
goods. Such features include that: water is vital for human activity, economic production 
and ecosystem survival, water is scarce, water is fugitive, water is a system, water is bulky, 
water is non-substitutable, water is not freely tradable, and water is complex (Gribble, 1999: 
Savenije, 2002).   
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3.2. The complexity of water: Exploring the concept 
 
There seems to be consensus among ecologists that water access, distribution and 
sustainability are emergence properties, hence qualifying them as complex systems (Berkes 
et al., 2003; Audouin et al., 2013). According to McFallan et al. (2011: 30), “a complex 
system is a system that shows emergence behaviour that is more than a sum of the parts of 
the system alone”. The concept of “emergence” in this context is used to describe a system 
that portrays properties such as rich, dynamic and non-linear interactions that often provide  
output known as feedback (Cilliers, 2000; Berkes et al., 2003; Mitchell, 2009; Audouin et al., 
2013).  
 
The role of water as a social, environmental, financial and economic resource, as well as its 
role in fulfilling a basic need has prompted economists to appreciate that water is complex 
or “at least very special” compared to other economic goods (Savenije, 2002: 173). The 
following characteristics define the complexity concept using economics theory: 
 
Water has no homogeneous market  
 
Water is used as an input in various sectors and sub-sectors in the economy and these 
sectors portray different characteristics. Some users may have both low ability and 
willingness to pay, yet they require large water quantities, while others may have either 
high willingness to pay for small water quantities, or high willingness to pay for large water 
quantities (Savenije, 2002: Van der Zaag and Savenije, 2006). Different users of water 
cannot be amalgamated into a single market. Economic principles can be employed to set a 
suitable water price within one of these sectors, but such principles cannot be equally 
applied between sectors (Savenije and Van der Zaag, 2001: Van der Zaag and Savenije, 
2006). 
 
Water and property rights 
 
According to Grimble (1999), water resources are initially publicly owned, but this type of 
ownership undergoes a transition from public to communal and/or private ownership 
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during the collection and delivery stages. Grimble (1999: 80) further posits that “ (w)here 
property rights are communal or unclear there are particular difficulties attached to  
charging, especially in open-access situations with access by free-riders.” Where property 
rights are private, individuals have an incentive to use water resources efficiently (Saleth 
and Dinar, 2004: 12). However, some of the physical properties of water create co-
dependency and conflicts among rightful owners of water rights (Savenije, 2002; Saleth and 
Dinar, 2004). In most cases, the government has the responsibility of providing safe water 
resources for both households and industries (Van der Zaag and Savenije, 2006).  
 
Water using activities display macroeconomic interdependencies 
 
Water using activities are interdependent across various economic sectors and the relations 
of inter- and multi-sectoral water uses are complex (Van der Zaag and Savenije, 2006: 15). 
This implies that water demand, access and management issues in one sector of the 
economy may have an impact on production, employment, incomes and overall consumer 
welfare patterns in other economic sectors.  
 
Water has high production and transaction costs 
 
Potable water services have higher transaction and production costs, and they require 
sophisticated and costly quality production mechanisms (Bel et al., 2010: 558). Water 
transportation and reallocation requires the use of pumps, billing, boreholes, metering, 
canals, pipelines, dams, reservoirs and other instruments that entail cost incurrences 
(Savenije, 2002: 743). 
 
3.3. Water uses and challenges in the water sector  
 
Most developing countries are lagging behind not only in adopting, but also in implementing 
strategies that are sustainable, financially viable and ecologically sensitive in their mandate 
of ensuring equitable water allocation (Pähle and Pahl-Wostl, 2012). Scholars of institutional 
economics attribute the shortage of water resources in many societies to inadequate 
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management and institutions (Saleth and Dinar, 2004; Saravanan et al., 2009; Pähle and 
Pahl-Wostl, 2012).  
 
Water institutions in South Africa and other developing countries are faced with a number 
of challenges, such as lack of clarity in respect of institutional arrangement and provisions, 
which can lead to a failure to provide water resources effectively (Saravanan et al., 2009; 
Clifford-Holmes et al., 2012). Other constraints include ever-increasing demands for water 
resources, fragmented water institutions, diminishing supply of water resources, 
unfavourable climate changes, and lack of finances for infrastructural development in the 
water sector, among others (Lorz et al., 2011; Du Toit et al., 2011; Engle et al., 2011).   
 
Generally, in developing countries, the observable role of governing water resources is 
played by local and national institutions, using the water sector’s underlying regulations, 
policies as well as statutory enactments (Water Partnership Program (WPP), 2002). Other 
roles played by local and national institutions include: arbitration and conflict resolutions 
between and/or among stakeholders; monitoring of water service providers and water 
users; and implementing strategic and sustainable planning for  efficient use of water 
resources (Sullivan, 2002). These institutions are often faced with complex natural resource 
limits, prompting new thinking about successful resource management strategies as well as 
sustainable resource use (Swilling, 2010; Lorz et al., 2011).  
 
3.4. Governance in the water sector  
 
Previously, governance was perceived to be almost a synonym for government, and it was 
associated with bureaucratised control and authoritative power and control (Tropp, 2007). 
The current perception of governance is much broader than it used to be. According to the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), governance defines the ways through 
which citizens can make their voices heard and their constitutional rights respected (UNDP, 
2004). Alternatively, the World Bank (WB) defines governance as a set of traditional and 
institutional channels through which the authority of the country is exercised (WB, 2004).  
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Scholars have developed varied definitions for water governance (see generally Ivanova, 
2002: Castree, 2005: Bakker, 2007). Most of these definitions of water governance are in 
line with the authoritative-control definitions of governance. For the purposes of this study, 
water governance is defined as “…the range of political, social, economic and administrative 
systems that are in place to develop and manage water resources and the delivery of water 
services, at different levels of society” (Rogers and Hall, 2003: 7). This definition puts 
emphasis on the water management process, as well as on the ties  between different 
stakeholders at various levels of the water sector.  
 
The overall processes and functions of the institutions involved in water allocation and 
management are defined within the existing governance framework in the country in 
question (WPP, 2002). The issues of water governance and the overall governance of the 
economy should be treated as two sides of the same coin. This is because forms of 
governance are, in one way or the other, both striving to achieve equitable distribution of 
resources, improve participation, transparency and accountability, and to reduce 
mismanagement of resources (Rogers and Hall, 2003; Plummer and Slaymaker, 2007). 
Furthermore, it is argued that there seems to be a direct relationship between good water 
governance and good governance (Plummer and Slaymaker, 2007). Weak governance in the 
country often translates to weak governance in the water sector, leading to poor access to 
water resources by the citizens, poor service delivery in the water sector and 
mismanagement of water resources (WPP, 2002). 
 
According to Plummer and Slaymaker (2007), many countries are faced with the challenge 
of poor access and service delivery. However, the challenge is a symptom of an underlying 
problem in the water sector. For these issues of poor access to water resources to be 
addressed, the vital step is to start by addressing the underlying issue of governance i n the 
water sector (WPP, 2002).  Ensuring appropriate and transparent budgeting practices by 
public institutions in the water sector is one of the key elements that could lead to effective 
governance (Dollery and Graves, 2009).  
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3.5. International water policies and legislation 
 
National water policies for many countries have universal features. This could be because 
the water-related problems such as scarcity, common property complications, inefficiency 
and inequitable allocation of water resources are common faced by many countries (Mehta, 
2007).  
 
The countries often adopt water policies, laws and plans in an effort to achieve two main 
objectives. The first objective is often aligned with the macroeconomic goals of the country, 
such as poverty reduction, attainment of short-, medium- and long-term visions of the 
country, and for maintaining peace and security (WPP, 2002). The second objective is to 
ensure that resources are not lost through corrupt, ineffective and inefficient operations of 
institutions responsible for water-services delivery (Dollery and Graves, 2009). The latter is 
necessary for improving stakeholder participation and ensuring accountability and 
transparency in the handling of finances directed to water resources in order to maximise 
the benefits from irrigation, infrastructural development, and overall service delivery fro m 
the water sector (WPP, 2002).  
 
There are two main approaches used in policy-making processes in the water sector, namely 
centralised and decentralised policy-making. The study conducted by WPP (2002) revealed 
that the quality of policy outcomes is largely dependent on the approach employed in policy 
development. The centralised policy-development system uses a top-down hierarchy where 
policy formulation and sector planning are tailored by ministries using information gathered 
from water users associations and local government structures (Saletha and Dinar, 2000). 
Some of the advantages of a centralised policy-development system include: stabilisation of 
macroeconomic policies, equitable provision of public goods, creation of a single market 
through trade barriers, and redistribution of resources  across citizenry (Tabellini, 2002). 
 
Despite its popularity in a large number of countries, the centralised system has significant 
opposition. The opponents of this system argue that it fails to incorporate the individual 
needs of societies (Plummer and Slaymaker, 2007). A decentralised system, on the other 
hand, involves local governments and water users in policy-formulation through 
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encouraging networking, building relationships and emphasising negotiation and collective 
action (Tropp, 2007). Some institutional economists argue that institutional efficiency could 
be achieved through some forms of decentralisation such as public-private partnerships 
(PPPs).  
 
Decentralised water service systems, however, have a number of shortcomings. In a study 
by Wilder and Lankao (2006) on the social implications of decentralisation of water services 
in Mexico, it was found that decentralisation failed in the attainment of more efficient, 
sustainable, and accountable management of water under private management 
arrangements. Despite the implementation of a wide variety of decentralisation systems 
over the years across nations, it was found that decentralisation has not yet uniformly 
yielded either the efficiency gains or environmental benefits  anticipated (Gleick and Wolff, 
2002; Wilder and Lankao, 2006; Calabrese et al., 2012). Another framework within which 
policy-makers try to move the skewed water redistribution towards greater equity is IWRM 
(Haigh et al., 2010). 
  
The concept of IWRM was developed in the 1990s to facilitate sustainable water resource 
management and use, and has continued to be influential in the water sector to date (GWP, 
2000; Braga, 2001; Saravanan et al., 2009). The underlying philosophy of the IWRM process 
is to “promote the co-ordinated development and management of water and land so as to 
maximise economic and social welfare without compromising the sustainability of vital 
ecosystems” (Haigh et al., 2010: 475).  IWRM is an approach that aims to address persistent 
problems in the water sector such as institutional inefficiencies, poor service delivery, a lack 
of integrated planning and allocation of water resources, and lack of participation of some 
relevant water sector stakeholders (Milly et al., 2008; Du Toit et al., 2011).  
 
There are different approaches and conceptualisations of IWRM, such as Habermasian 
communicative rationality approach, and the World Bank’s “comb” conceptualisation. The 
Habermas approach promotes the making of rational choices through communicative action 
in the water sector’s institutions (Habermas, 1984, 1987 and 1990; Flyvberg, 2000: 
Saravanan et al., 2009), and it is in line with the collective action approach put forward by 
Ostrom (1990) and Ostrom et al., (1994). The World Bank views IWRM as a “comb” which 
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has various water-using sectors as the “teeth” and water resources  itself defined by its 
quantity, quality and location as the “handle” (WB, 2004; Saravanan et al., 2009: 78). 
 
While the participatory principle proposed by IWRM is valuable in water management, 
some argue that the IWRM fails to address complexities and power dynamics and/or 
differentials in the water sector (Saravanan et al., 2009: 76). According to Brown (2013: 
273), “*a+n emerging body of evidence finds that power differentials impact negatively on 
the transformatory potential of participation”. Ioris (2008) argues that in most developing 
countries, the ability to translate IWRM goals into practice is often limited due to the 
contradictory directions of regulatory reforms. This is because in some developing countries 
such as Brazil and South Africa, water problems are highly complex and politicised (Ioris, 
2008).  
 
Legislation in the water sector plays an important role in determining the level of 
effectiveness of the governance mechanism in place through stipulating the roles of sector 
institutions, defining private and communal water rights, and linking policy to legal 
framework (WPP, 2002; Plummer and Slaymaker, 2007). According to Kaufmann et al. 
(2008), governments should set policies that are both enforceable and realistic given the 
available financial resources, human capital and other resources needed to enforce and 
implement them. 
 
3.6. Institutional frameworks and requirements for efficient, effective and equitable 
water allocation 
 
Many arid and semi-arid regions across the world are faced with the persistent problems of 
growing demand for water resources due to population and expanding economic activities. 
This has led to declining water supplies, which have consequently contributed to the rising 
cost of water (Ludwig and Moench, 2009). In some of sub-Saharan countries, the challenge 
of water scarcity has led to conflicts over water uses and allocation within many river basins 
(Kashaigili et al., 2003). Many livelihood activities directly and indirectly depend on water 
resources, so that water scarcity leads to high poverty rates and stagnated growth of some low-
income countries (Grafton et al., 2011). There is an evident need, therefore, to develop 
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comprehensive policies and institutions that would enable efficient, sustainable and 
equitable allocation of scarce water resources.   
 
Various studies have been conducted in an effort to devise ways of improving markets, 
typically from an economic efficiency perspective (Rosegrant and Binswanger, 1994; Easter 
et al., 1999; Sullivan, 2002; Kashaigili et al., 2003; Saleth and Dinar, 2004; Dinar and Saleth, 
2005; Grafton et al., 2011). Broader measures of evaluating the extent of inefficiencies in 
the water sector, such as water poverty indices, have been developed and devised as a 
result. However, the characterisations of water institutions in most studies define efficiency 
in terms of ‘normal’ market requirements without incorporating NIE and IWRM efficiency 
considerations in their descriptions (Sullivan, 2002; Kashaigili et al., 2003; Saleth and Dinar, 
2004; Dinar and Saleth, 2005; Grafton et al., 2011).  
 
Analysis and ranking of water institutions in terms of efficiency, effectiveness and equity 
requires the amalgamation of several indicators from an array of studies. Some studies 
analyse institutional governance within frameworks that use qualitative or quantitative 
criteria, or both. A framework developed by Grafton et al. (2011) assessed water institutions 
in using institutional governance indicators and economic efficiency.  
 
3.6.1. Indicators for robust water governance institutions 
 
Figure 2.3 in the previous chapter outlined the principles necessary for robust governance 
institutions for natural resources. This section narrows the discussion by using a framework 
for robust water governance institutions. The framework developed by Grafton et al. (2011) 
uses the following criteria to assess the institutional governance foundation for water 
resources: 
 
a. Recognition of the public interest 
 
In the framework, ‘public interest’ does not only refer to beneficiaries and end-users of 
water resources, but also refers to the environmental sustainability and conservation of 
ecosystems (Grafton et al., 2011). Water institutions should be able to recognise legal 
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interests in water uses. For instance, Section 27.1(b) of South Africa’s constitution confirms 
that everyone in the country has the right of access to sufficient water (RSA, 1996). Water 
institutions should also appreciate the multi-interest, multi-objective and multi-sectoral set 
of economic interests in water resources when allocating and redistributing water to 
different groups (Grimble, 1999; Savenije, 2002; Grafton et al., 2011) 
 
b. Administrative capacity of the institution 
 
In most developed countries, institutions have the capacity to implement their 
governments’ water policies due to the high level of financial and human resources (Grafton 
et al., 2011). However, the capacity of developing countries to manage water resources 
effectively, efficiently and sustainably is often limited (Malzbender et al., 2005; Grafton et 
al., 2011). For example, social problems, such as poverty and skewed distribution of land,  
inherited from the apartheid regime are a constant factor inhibiting the successful 
establishment of CMAs in South Africa (Farolfi and Rowntree, 2007; Grafton et al., 2011). 
Institutions which do not have adequate resources and administrative expertise and power 
often fail to manage water resources effectively. Furthermore, fragmented administrative 
authority often leads to “fractured water management systems” (Grafton et al., 2011: 224) 
 
c. Clear and well-defined institutional relationships 
 
For effective and efficient management of water resources, institutions should display good 
interactions that are able to bring both formal and informal rules together, between and 
across governments and agencies (Gandhi and Crase, 2009). Well-defined institutional 
relations should not only exist internally, but should also govern the interaction of the 
institution with relevant external entities. Maintaining clear institutional relations helps 
promote accommodative and cooperative conflict resolutions and also reduces both 
internal and external transaction costs (Gandhi and Crase, 2009).  
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d. Adaptiveness 
 
Institutional adaptiveness transpires when the institution is able to adjust to dynamic and 
unanticipated shocks, incorporate new and reviewed information, and respond promptly to 
fluctuations in societal preferences regarding water management and use (Gandhi and 
Crase, 2009; Grafton et al., 2011). This contributes to maintaining minimal transaction costs 
(Gandhi and Crase, 2009). 
 
e. Acknowledge of “priority of use” 
 
Water is a basic human need. It is for this this reason that access to clean and sufficient 
water resources is embraced as one of the international human rights (United Nations, 
2010). According to the World Health Organization (WHO), human being should get access 
to daily water supply of between 50 and 100 litres (WHO, 2013). Water institutions should 
hence define ‘priority use’ of water in terms of the implications of treating water as a basic 
need, and also by outlining conditions relating to beneficial use of water resources, such as 
how water should be used (Grafton et al., 2011).  
 
3.6.2. Efficiency indicators 
 
The two quantitative measures of the economic efficiency of water institutions discussed in 
this study are; volume and cost of water supplied, and estimates of the annual monetary 
gains. However, due to the unavailability of data on volume and cost of water supplied, the 
only indicator that will be analysed in chapter 7 is the estimates of annual monetary gains.   
 
a. Volume and cost of water supplied 
 
This measure provides a good indication of the ability of the water institution to supply 
water at the lowest possible cost. Efficiency is calculated as the ratio of operating cost per 
volume of water supplied (Woodbury and Dollery, 2004). Some countries have managed to 
maximise the ratio and attain efficiency by the implementation of technologies that have 
water-saving potential (Saleth and Dinar, 2004). Water institutions have to operate at the 
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“market transaction” point where their operation and maintenance costs are covered, or 
they are too low to have any impact on demand (Perry, 2001; Haldane et al., 2010).   
 
b. Estimates of the annual monetary gains 
 
Calculating the annual financial gains accrued requires data on actual water transactions 
that have taken place (Grafton et al., 2011). In countries where water is treated by a public 
good and water management falls almost entirely in the government’s realm, data are 
rarely available (Haldane et al., 2010; Grafton et al., 2011). The water sector in many 
developing countries is faced with a negative financial trend (Haldane et al., 2010; UNESCO, 
2012). This is due to factors such as poor cost recovery by water institutions, low water 
charges, failure of the institutions to invest in profitable water development projects, as 
well as failure to invest in maintenance of water infrastructure (Saleth and Dinar, 2004; 
UNESCO, 2012).  These factors serve act as a threat, not only to the efficiency of water 
institutions, but also to the overall existence and sustainability of the water sector (UN, 
2013). 
 
3.6.3. Effectiveness and equity indicators 
 
Effectiveness in the water sector is defined as the ability of water institutions to provide a 
suitable and adequate structure that can enable interactions and participation by various 
stakeholders in the sector with the lowest transactions costs (Bandaragoda, 2000). 
Effectiveness and equity considerations are included in several sub-categories of both 
institutional governance and efficiency such as recognition of public interest, 
acknowledgment of priority of use and policy requirements. It is often difficult to 
disentangle effectiveness from institutional governance (Menard and Saleth, 2011).  
 
In a study by Roger and Hall (2003), nine quantitative and qualitative indicators of an 
effective water institution were identified, namely: transparency, accountability, regulation, 
civil society participation, communication, efficiency, incentive-compatibility, equity and 
sustainability. Of all the nine indicators of effectiveness, transparency, accountability, 
regulation, civil society participation and communication will be used in chapter 7 to analyse 
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the case study. The choice of the indicators is not only influenced by the availability of data, 
but also by the fact that efficiency and equity are extensively analysed in the case study.   
 
In their study, Menard and Saleth (2011) added feasibility and ‘replicability’ as indicators of 
an effective water institution. It is argued that stakeholder participation in budgeting, policy 
implementation and project planning often improves accountability, transparency, 
sustainable management of resources as well as overall effectiveness of the institution 
(WPP, 2002). Similarly, factors such as lack of transparency, inadequate mechanisms for 
stakeholder participation and lack of accountability in the institution often lead to 
inequitable distribution and allocation of wate r resources (WPP, 2002; Roger and Hall, 2003; 
Menard and Saleth, 2011).  
 
3.7. Conclusion 
 
This chapter provided a narrow analysis of water institutions. It also discussed the meaning 
and implications of defining water as an economic good. It is argued, however, that water 
should not be treated as any other economic good because of its complexity feature 
(Savenije, 2002). Fragmented water institutions, increasing water demands, unfavourable 
climatic conditions among others, constrain the operations water institutions in many 
developing countries (WPP, 2002; Du Toit et al., 2011; Engle et al., 2011).  
 
In South Africa, various water institutions operate at various levels in order to attain the 
objective of the country’s water policy post-apartheid. Despite the general aims of equity, 
efficiency and sustainability outlined in the NWA of 1998, problems of urban-bias and lack 
of regard for the health state of wetlands by municipalities still persist in South Africa 
(Muller, 2005; Schreiner, 2007: Haigh et al., 2010). The chapter discussed the institutional 
frameworks and requirements for efficient, effective and equitable water allocation, with 
emphasis on the framework developed by Grafton et al. (2011).  
 
The following chapter provides an in-depth analysis of South Africa’s water policy and 
legislation within a NIE. The underlying economic theory behind the South African national 
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water policy and its impact on the institutional design and operations of water users’ 
associations (WUAs) is discussed in the following chapter.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
AN ANALYSIS OF SOUTH AFRICA’S WATER POLICY AND LEGISLATION : A NEW 
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMIC PARADIGM 
 
4.1. Introduction  
 
The institutional landscape for water resource management in South Africa has changed 
significantly since the general review of Water Law in 1995.  The review subsequently led to 
the publishing of the White Paper on National Water Policy (RSA, 1997), followed by the 
promulgation of the National Water Act (NWA) (RSA, 1998) which focused more on a 
decentralised participatory governance model to redress disparities in the water sector. This 
chapter provides a review of relevant water policy and/or statutes from a New Institutional 
Economics (NIE) perspective, using themes such as property rights, transaction costs and 
community participation discussed in chapter 2 in order to assess the success, or lack 
thereof, of post-apartheid water policy in South Africa.  
 
In addition to analysing some of the governance indicators (discussed in chapter 3) within 
the South African context, the chapter also provides a brief overview of the water policies 
and legislation pre-1994. This exercise is not only important in describing the underlying 
institutional factors influencing water management, supply and access in South Africa, but 
also in defining the underlying economic theory behind the South African national water 
policy, as well as its impact on the overall institutional design and operations of WUAs.  
 
4.2. Water policies and legislation in South Africa pre-1994 
 
The institutional dynamics, policies and legislation that were prevalent during the apartheid 
era have left imprints that are difficult to ignore as they still dictate the interaction between 
different elements in the water sector to date (Nash, 2012). During the apartheid era, the 
formulation of policies was informed by racial segregation, resulting in a socio-economic 
pattern that dictated the distribution and access of resources for the people of different 
races in the country. Policy formulation was based on the notion of “separate development” 
(Thompson et al., 2001: 7) and white supremacy.  
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The then applicable law, The Native Land Act of 1913, not only contributed to the skewed 
distribution and allocation of land resources against black South Africans, but also enforced 
stern restrictions on their property rights, leading to poor potable water access, poverty, 
illiteracy and malnutrition amongst people of this race (Thompson et al., 2001). This 
broadened the inequality gap between the white people and people from other race groups 
(Thompson et al., 2001; Nash, 2012). The existence of riparian water rights made the 
legislation excluding and racist as far as water access was concerned because of the 
indisputable link between land ownership and access to water (Thompson et al., 2001).  
 
Under apartheid, highly unequal access to water and water services by the country’s 
population became entrenched, and an important aspect of the government’s economic 
development is to meet a minimum set of ‘basic needs’ of the population and to reconstruct 
the social base of the country (Goldblatt and Glynn Davies, 2002). Within the framework of 
constitutional rights to water and a national Free Basic Water Policy (FBWP), water is 
defined of as a social good and forms an essential aspect of the broader developmental 
project (FBWP, 2002). 
 
The National Water Act (RSA, 1998) has established the basis for management of water 
resources on a catchment basis (for equity, efficiency and sustainability), and the Water 
Services Act (RSA, 1997) aims to ensure everybody has access to basic water supply and 
sanitation services (Mokgope et al., 2001). Regardless of the improvements in water supply 
to the rural sector made by the South African government, many of the current patterns of 
water use are still characterised by inequality, inefficiency, and inadequacy. The poor 
remain marginalised, and emerging farmers and poor rural communities have limited access 
to water resources while water continues to be used inefficiently by  some farmers in the 
agricultural sector with few incentives to improve its water use efficiency (Thompson et al., 
2001: Brown, 2011: Karar et al., 2011). 
 
4.3. The Constitution of South Africa: Water law, property rights and equity 
 
In South Africa, as in other democratic states, the Constitution is the supreme law of the 
country and any other law should conform to its provisions. Water law in South Africa is 
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aligned consistently with the provisions of the Constitution (RSA, 1996). In essence, water 
matters with regard to determination of public and/or private rights towards water 
resources are pre-described in the Constitution.  
 
The old water laws in South Africa were biased against domestic water users and emerging 
farmers as they were skewed towards “supply-side management” (Stein, 2005: 2170), 
predominantly commercial and large-scale irrigation based agricultural sector. The new 
water laws are more inclusive insofar as water allocation is concerned. According to Stein 
(2005), in South Africa, water is a public, not a private, good which is managed by the state 
on behalf of all South Africans. Sections 27(1)(b) and 27(2) of the Constitution state that 
everyone in South Africa is entitled to adequate water resources, and the state is duty 
bound to achieve realisation of sufficient water provision through the use of legislature and 
other measures (RSA, 1996).   
 
The Constitution, however, does not explicitly provide for the right to obtain and hold water 
rights under its property clause (Stein, 2005). Section 25 of the Constitutions  states that no 
one should be subject to deprivation of property and that the state can take legislative 
measures to redress water and land matter regardless of the property rights provided 
during a given time (RSA, 1996). New Institutional economists have established that for 
efficiency, sustainability and optimal allocation of natural resources to be achieved, 
property rights should be well-defined (North, 1990; Libecap, 1989; Alston and Mueller, 
2003; Thiel et al., 2012). They further argue that property rights should define the nature of 
the resource to be exploited, the timeframe for exploiting such a resource and the 
maximum amounts exploitable in a given time (Stroup and Baden, 1979; North, 1990; 
Libecap, 1989; Alston and Mueller, 2003; Thiel et al., 2012). Subjecting the property rights 
clause to the proviso that legislation and other procedures comply, shows uncertainty and 
information vacuums which may act as disincentives for individuals and organisations given 
water rights. 
 
Ecologists and economists assert that water access, distribution and sustainability display 
emergence properties, hence qualifying them as complex systems (Berkes et al., 2003; 
Audouin et al., 2013). According to Corson and Aziz-Alaoui (2009), a complex system 
55 
 
displays emergent properties if the behaviour of the system cannot be simply defined from 
the behaviour of its components. Essentially, emergent properties that cannot be identified 
through functional decomposition. Corson and and Aziz-Alaoui (2009: 258) define emergent 
properties as “properties of the “whole” that are not possessed by any of the individual 
parts making up the whole”. Institutional economists postulate that water is complex or “at 
least very special” compared to other economic goods because of its roles as a social, 
environmental, financial and economic resource, as well as its role as a  basic need (Savenije, 
2002). Therefore, lack of clarity on the circumstances within which measures should be 
taken could create complications in the decision-making processes of those in power.  
 
The Constitution of South Africa under the Bill of rights has effectively enshrined various 
socioeconomic rights including the right to access of water, and they have been viewed as 
progressive (Francis, 2005).  Section 27 of the Constitution places responsibility of provision 
of sufficient water resources on government, not individual entities. Therefore, “a person 
who is deprived of access to sufficient potable water must assert that the government’s 
action (or inaction) is unconstitutional within the meaning of Section 27” (Francis, 2005: 45). 
Cases of inequitable water allocation and distribution reflect the failure of the government 
to fulfil its Constitutional obligations.  
 
4.4. The National Water Act: Property rights, regulation and pricing strategies 
 
The NWA has transformed the water regulatory landscape from the riparian system to a 
system aimed at achieving equitable water allocation for the benefit of all. It has done away 
with a private rights system of water allocation by detaching water rights from land 
ownership. The national government, through the Department of Water Affairs (DWA), has 
replaced the riparian rights system with an administrative permit system (NWRS, 2013). 
Subsequently, the NWA has established a public rights  system in the water sector wherein 
the government plays the role of “public trustee” (Stein, 2005: 2167). The public trust 
principle not only gives the state a set of constitutional obligations, such as equitable 
provision of water resources, but also provides ways through which the state could give 
effect to such obligations (Stein, 2000 and 2005). 
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Capital 
Operation costs 
Maintenance costs 
Costs of planning, 
monitoring and 
regulating 
In South Africa, the public trust doctrine gives the state monopoly power over water 
resources, as the NWA entrusts the ownership and control of water resources to the state 
(Conradie et al., 2001; Stein, 2005). Despite the state’s ownership of water resources, 
section 56 (1) the Act makes provisions and/or considerations for water allocation through 
the market by instituting price strategies for users and polluters. Through the imposition of 
pricing strategies, the Act aims to create incentives for effective and efficient water 
allocation as well as water use. The National Water Resource Strategy (NWRS) stipulates 
that in order for the supply of water to be reliable, three sets of costs should be considered; 
namely direct infrastructure and management costs, economic costs, and full costs. Direct 
infrastructure and management costs include costs of planning, monitoring and regulating, 
the cost of capital, as well as operation and maintenance costs. These are summarised in 
Figure 4.1 below. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: The costs incurred in reliable water supply provision. (Source: Adapted from RSA, 1998)  
 
The first post-apartheid Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry, Kader Asmal’s first policy 
proposed that the supply of water to consumers should be done at the marginal cost, that is 
a price equivalent to the operating and maintenance costs (Asmal, 1998). According to the 
National Water Resource Strategy (NWRS) report of 2012, in South Africa, a sustainable 
price for water resources should promote provision of water at the least possible cost, 
The costs incurred in reliable water supply 
provision 
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externalities) 
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incorporate and reflect true costs of water supply, implement cost-sharing that will promote 
equity for all classes of people in the society, and should also ensure that water institutions’ 
viability is enhanced in the long-run (NWRS, 2012). In essence, South Africa’s  White Paper 
on a National Water Policy recognises and appreciates that the transaction costs involved in 
the water allocation process are positive.  
 
New institutional economists argue that economic agents are faced with greater than zero 
transaction costs (North, 1997; Challen, 2000; Saleth and Dinar, 2004). The Coasian 
viewpoint, enshrined by the Coase Theorem, is that positive transaction costs often have 
the potential of constraining ‘efficiency-enhancing’ reallocations (Cole and Grossman, 2000). 
Williamson (2000) argues that adopting transaction costs minimising and incentive-
enhancing governance strategies not only contributes to the realisation of mutual gains 
between concerned parties, but also the crafting of conflict mitigation mechanisms 
(Williamson, 2000).  
 
The incentive-enhancing governance strategies encapsulated in the NWA can be argued to 
be a reflection of the recognition of economic externalities. The Act is mandated to curb 
negative externalities, such as pollution of water bases, through pricing strategies (RSA, 
1998).    
 
4.5. National Water Policy: Water as an economic good and the complexity of water 
 
The White Paper on a National Water Policy states that, “Under the new system, allocations 
will be made on the basis that it promotes water use that is optimal and for the 
achievement of equitable economic and social development” (RSA, 1997). In essence, it 
acknowledges that water has economic and socio-ecological value. It also recognises water 
as a complex system in which it is difficult, if not impossible, to disentangle socio-economic 
benefits from socio-ecological costs and benefits attached to the use of water resources 
(NWRS, 2012). A complex system portrays properties such as rich, dynamic and non-linear 
interactions, and water qualifies as one (Cilliers, 2000; Berkes et al., 2003; Mitchell, 2009).  
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According to Dent (2004, 2006 and 2008), ideal water institutions should make certain 
considerations when dealing with water demands. Firstly, a commitment should be made by 
stakeholders to work cooperatively despite their competing water uses (Dent, 2006; 
Meissner et al., 2013). Further, institutions should maintain constant communication 
dialogue and eliminate communication barriers between the management of institutions 
and the beneficiaries (Dent, 2006; Meissner et al., 2013). It is posited that well-functioning 
and long-term relationships should be built between end users of water resources and 
water institutions (Dent, 2006 and 2008; Meissner et al., 2013). Moreover, water 
management institutions should not only invest in innovation and technical advancement, 
but also in environmental management (Dent, 2006; Meissner et al., 2013). Lastly, water 
management institutions should appreciate the multi-sectoral uses of water resources and 
understand the existence of inter-linkages of stakeholders in various hierarchs in the water 
sector (Dent, 2008; Meissner et al., 2013).  
 
In a nutshell, the decision on how best to allocate water between contesting uses 
necessitates a complex and multidimensional assessment, which takes into account a range 
of social, economic and ecological values emerging from various water uses (NWRS, 2012 
and 2013).  
 
It can be argued that the National Water Policy of South Africa not only acknowledges the 
interconnectedness of levels of economic institutions in the water sector, but also 
recognises the multi-sectoral uses of water resources. However, the relevant policies seem 
to adopt a one-size-fits all approach, without special regard to social norms, traditional 
values and customs. For instance, the NWA of 1998 mandates WUAs to be accountable to 
government institutions such as the Department of Water Affairs Regional Office (DWA-RO). 
As argued by Kapfudzaruwa and Sowman (2009: 691),  
“Failure to acknowledge and incorporate aspects of these traditional governance 
systems may undermine the very purpose of the [National Water] Act, namely to 
facilitate access to water for productive purposes for the poor, through 
establishment of new water management institutions and equitable allocation of 
water resources”. 
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The failure of the NWA to recognise and incorporate social norms and customs is more likely 
to lead to the persistence of skewed distribution of water resources and other problems 
that the Act aims to redress. New institutionalists argue that some of the malfunctions of 
the water sector are partly due to failure of the relevant water policies to incorporate social 
norms, rules and behaviours of agents (North, 2000; Joskow, 2008).  
 
4.6. National Water Policy: Decentralisation, community participation and cooperative 
governance 
 
The NWA makes provisions for cooperative governance and decentralisation in the water 
resource management processes. These provisions are in line with world trends wherein 
decentralisation is largely embraced in an effort to promote public participation as well as 
local socio-economic development (McEwan, 2003; Funke et al., 2007: Meissner et al., 
2013). There are two distinct interpretations for the trend: positively as a potential model 
for good governance, or negatively as an admission of lack of accountability and failure of 
the state (McEwan, 2003). The NWA and the Constitution of South Africa use the former 
argument to validate the role of the community in the management, protection, 
conservation and sustainable use of water resources (RSA, 1998). Theoretically, the 
participative approach is enhanced by decentralisation of governance. For efficient and 
effective accomplishment of water management processes, it has been noted that local 
governance should be promoted and water management responsibilities should be 
transferred to water users associations (Meissner et al., 2013; Kemerink et al., 2013). 
 
Several clauses in the NWA promote community participation in the water sector in South 
Africa. For instance, chapter 2 advocates for the establishment of appropriate institutions 
that enable community representation and participation (RSA, 1998). Section 9 (g) proposes 
that a catchment management strategy must empower community members to play an 
active role in managing the water resources within its water management area (RSA, 1998). 
Section 80 (e) acknowledges the role of the community in the effective and efficient 
management and conservation of water resources (RSA, 1998). Chapters 2, 7 and 9 of the 
NWA call for the establishment of catchment management strategies (CMSs) that enable 
public participation, establishment of catchment managements agencies (CMAs) that closely 
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work with communities within a formal setup, and the development of necessary capacity 
of CMAs through establishing advisory committees respectively (RSA, 1998). CMAs are 
accountable for ensuring sustainable water use through community participation and 
overall cooperative governance (RSA, 1998; Pieterson et al., 2012). The relationship 
between various clauses of the NWA is represented in Figure 4.2. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 4.2: The relationship between various clauses of the NWA of 1998. (Source: Adapted from 
RSA, 1998). 
The cooperative governance enactments in the NWA of 1998 conform to the ideas NIE, in 
terms of their view of cooperative governance as a potential way of dealing with the free-
rider problem and managing externalities (Poteete et al., 2010; Ostrom, 2010). They further 
argue that cooperative governance plays a crucial role of managing common property 
resources (Duncan, 2003; Ostrom, 2004 and 2010). Some literature uses the terms 
cooperative governance and collective action interchangeably to refer to public 
participation (Duncan, 2003; Ostrom, 2004 and 2010; Poteete et al., 2010; Pieterson et al., 
2012; Meissner et al., 2013).  
 
According to new Institutional economists, cooperative governance can take a multiplicity of 
forms, ranging from highly structured processes of cooperative and inclusive decision 
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representation and 
participation (Chapter 2) 
Establishing catchment 
management strategies (CMSs) 
that enable public participation 
(Section 9(g)) 
Provisions for progressive of catchment managements 
agencies (CMAs) that promote sustainable water use 
through cooperative governance (Chapter 7) 
Development of necessary capacity of CMAs through the establishment of 
advisory committee (Chapter 9) 
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making, enactment, and accountability, to informal structures at micro levels (Duncan, 
2003; Cox et al., 2010; Ostrom, 2010; The Global Compact, 2013). They further argue that 
the micro levels related to agriculture, natural resources and institutional development 
need to be considered when making public policies (Duncan, 2003). According to Ostrom 
(2010), individuals almost never possess perfect information, as per the assumptions of 
behavioural theory, but they are capable of absorbing knowledge through interaction in a 
particular setting. Therefore, cooperative governance could serve as an effective strategy 
for achieving sustainable development, equitable distribution and allocation of water 
resources as well as internalising ecological externalities (Adhikari, 2002). Institutions that 
embrace cooperative governance are argued to be an advantage because of the creation of 
a large pool of shared ideas to help overcome water management challenges in an inclusive 
manner (The Global Compact, 2013). 
 
4.7. Policy and water challenges currently faced by South Africa 
 
Despite the fact that the regulatory framework and institutional lands cape for water 
management have reformed since the attainment of democracy in South Africa, the water 
sector is still facing challenges. Some of the goals of the post-apartheid water law and policy 
have not been achieved (NWRS, 2012 and 2013). South Africa had made considerable 
progress in widening of access to water and sanitation across races, but this progress has 
decelerated in recent years (NWRS, 2012). The number of poor people without access to 
adequate water resources is still too large (NWRS, 2012 and 2013).  
 
The share of the population without access to an improved water source declined from 17% 
in 1990 to 9% in 2010 (WHO, 2010). However, the performance of the sector has fallen 
short of expectations. One of the direct effects of lack of access to water resources is 
poverty especially in communities where livelihood activities are dependent on water 
resources (DWA, 2010). South Africa is thus faced with the challenge of developing “water 
resources management as a tool, and not an end in itself” (DWA, 2000: 29). This means that 
water resource management should be treated as a component in the general attempt of 
the country to achieve socio-economic equity, environmentally just and inclusive growth 
objectives.  
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Furthermore, water resources in South Africa are not being managed in a sustainable 
manner and the country remains water-stressed (NWRS, 2012). According to Global Policy 
Forum, the term ‘water-stress’ is used to describe conditions in which the amount of water 
available for access for each person in a country is less than 1500 cubic metres per annum 
(UNESCO, 2012). In South Africa, the current water supply is severely constrained by 
insufficient aquifers, unpredictable rainfall patterns and low levels of rainfall (Boccaletti et 
al., 2010). The situation of water-stress is expected to get worse by 2030. The estimated 
water supply will be 15 billion cubic metres, while water demand is expected to be 17.7 
billion cubic metres in 2030 (Boccaletti et al., 2010). According to Boccaletti et al., (2010), 
the effects of climate change could aggravate the problem significantly, resulting in an 
increase in the deficit gap by 1.1 billion cubic metres.  
 
Moreover, there has been overall poor performance in the water sector due to lack of 
clarity with respect to institutional roles and responsibilities in the sector (NWRS, 2012). 
New Institutional economists posit that, for effective and efficient management of water 
resources, well-defined institutional relationships should exist to eliminate uncertainty and 
ambiguity in the roles of the agents (Gandhi and Crase, 2009). Maintaining clear institutional 
relations contributes to the promotion of accommodative and cooperative conflict 
resolutions and reduces transactions costs (Gandhi and Crase, 2009). 
 
Some of the institutional reforms proposed by the NWA of 1998 such as the establishment 
of catchment management agencies (CMAs) are yet to be implemented in many areas 
(NWRS, 2012). CMAs are primarily responsible for crafting and managing of catchment 
management strategies (CMSs) through which they would be able to perform duties such as 
water resource planning in a particular catchment, licensing, water charge collection, and 
water use authorisation with ease (Kapfudzaruwa and Sowman, 2009). CMAs are also 
responsible for regulating and controlling water demand (Farolfi, 2004) in order to assure 
socio-economic development for all (RSA, 1998). According to Chapter 7 of NWA (1998), 
CMAs are responsible for ensuring sustainable water use through community participation 
and overall cooperative governance. These duties are aligned with international water 
management theory which argues that managing water within a catchment or river basin is 
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both a necessary and sufficient condition for effective and efficient management 
(Malzbender, 2005). 
 
The NWRS-1 proposed the establishment of the 19 CMAs (NWRS, 2004). However, due to 
financial, capacity, skills and expertise constraints, the successive NWRS-2 has since 
proposed the 19 WMAs initially recommended by NWRS-1 be consolidated into nine as 
reflected in Figure 4.3 (NWRS, 2014).  
 
 
Figure 4.3: Map of the Proposed 9 Water Management Areas. (Source: NWRS, 2012)  
 
According to the NWRS (2012), the creation of new boundaries would lead to broader inter-
sectoral communication as well as better cooperative governance. A more inclusive 
cooperative governance is argued to be a more effective water resource management 
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strategy as it is likely to be more responsive to the needs of the marginalised and the poor in 
the community (Pieterson et al., 2012; NWRS, 2012; The Global Compact, 2013; Meissner et 
al., 2013). 
 
According to Grafton et al., (2011), cooperative water institutions, such as WUAs, should be 
of an appropriate and size, comparable with their institutional capacity as well as availa ble 
resources. New institutional economists argue that such institutions should operate within 
clear boundaries, with adequate financial and human capital resources (Ostrom, 1990; 
Bandaragoda, 2000; Agrawal, 2001; Dinar and Saleth, 2005; Grafton et al., 2011). 
Notwithstanding, there seems to be a consensus among scholars of NIE that small water 
institutions with well-defined boundaries generally perform more effectively than large 
water institutions (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2000; Pegram and Mazibuko, 2003; Fox, 2012).  
 
4.8. Water policy: Equity considerations 
 
Equity is one of the fundamental principles of the NWA (RSA, 1998). Addressing equity 
concerns through water policy in order to deal with skewed allocation which was a legacy of 
apartheid remains a paramount national priority. The NWRS (2012) strategy draws a 
distinction between ‘equity in access to water services’, ‘equity in access to water resources’ 
and ‘equity in access to benefits from water resource use through economic, social and 
environmental development and management’.  The concept and/or principle of equity in 
water provision is multi-faceted, the various but inter-related definitions are captured and 
discussed at length below. 
 
Equity in access to water resources refers to the provision of reliable water supplies to 
various water users in the economy in accordance with the provisions for quality and 
quantity of the Water Services Act (RSA, 1997). Despite financial and infrastructural 
investment that has enabled the provision of water supplies to a mixed array of water users 
in the economy, there is a still a sector of the population that lacks access to reliable water 
supplies and remains water insecure (NWRS, 2012 and 2013).  
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Equity in access to water resources refers to “the concept of direct access to water for 
productive purposes such as water for irrigating crops or water for a business or an 
industry” (NWRS, 2012: 22). Although it is socially ideal to allocate water resources in an 
equitable manner, it is practically impossible to allocate equal amounts of water to each 
person in South Africa (NWRS, 2012). Equity in access to water resources should be pillared 
on the productive usage of water resources and the benefits derived from water use such as 
poverty eradication, job creation, sustainable economic growth and overall reduction in 
socio-economic inequalities (Grafton et al., 2011; NWRS, 2012; NWRS, 2013). 
 
Lastly, equity in access to the benefits from water resource use refers to allocation of water 
resources in a manner that attains maximum benefits for all, either directly or indirectly 
(NWRS, 2012). According to Section 6(1)(b)(iv) of the NWA, most priority in water allocation 
is given to water uses that contribute to national economic growth and development (RSA, 
1998). According to Brown (2013), in water-scarce countries, relative power relations within 
the society determine access to water resources as well as planning and management 
processes in the water sector.  
 
Although the legislation and water policy of South Africa have been widely commended for 
being advanced and progressive with regard to their equity considerations, the water sector 
has over the years experienced significant challenges that have hindered the progressive 
attainment of the water sector’s equity objectives (DWA, 2012). Such challenges include 
inefficient internal organisation, management and integration, legislative and policy gaps, 
water authorisations under the control of whites and commercial farmers, unregulated 
trading of water use between parties, and lack of external integration and alignment with 
other enactments (DWA, 2008; NWRS, 2004 and 2013).  
 
Despite having equitable water allocation as one of its core principles, the NWA has 
achieved minimal substantive progress in realising its objective of providing equitable water 
allocation across all races regardless of gender and location (DWA, 2011 and 2013). The 
DWA has established the water allocation reform (WAR) programme in an effort to redress 
disparities and inequities in the water sector (DWA, 2008; NWRS, 2013). Chapter 4 of the 
NWA outlines the general principles, essential requirements and considerations for 
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permissible water use in South Africa (RSA, 1998). This chapter is of key significance to the 
WAR programme (DWA, 2008).  
 
The WAR programme proposes to achieve equitable water access through supporting 
resource poor and emerging farmers financially, compulsory licensing to promote equitable 
water allocations within catchments, and giving historically disadvantaged groups priority in 
licensing processes (DWA, 2013). According to the DWA (2004: 7), resource poor farmers 
are legal citizens of South Africa who are involved in farming activities and are “members of 
the historically disadvantaged population groups”. In 2004, the then Department of Water 
Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) formulated a rule to support the irrigation needs of poor 
farmers financially as per requirements of Sections 61 and 62 of the NWA. The rule was as 
follows:  
 
 
 
Where:  
“R (%) is the percentage reduction in the total grant to the legal entity, with R always 
bigger than or equal to zero (R ≥ 0);  
F (%) is the percentage of the irrigated area on a scheme which is under the control 
of historically disadvantaged female decision makers/farmers, as reflected in the 
legal entity's official list of scheduled areas;  
C (%) is the proportion of historically disadvantaged women on the management 
committee of the relevant WUA or other approved legal entity” (DWA, 2004: 8) 
According to the rule, if the proportion of women in the management committee of the 
relevant WUA is equal to or more than the percentage of the scheduled area on a scheme 
driven by historically disadvantaged female decision makers and/or farmers, then no 
reduction in the total grant is applied (DWA, 2004).  
 
The implementation of the rule as well as of the WAR programme has faced a number of 
challenges that have prevented the achievement of greater equity in water allocation for 
R = ½ (F - C) 
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historically disadvantaged groups. One of such challenges is lack of appropriate institutional 
arrangements (NWRS, 2012). Through the NWRS2, the DWA intends to intensify its working 
relations with the Department of Agriculture in order to ensure that both male and female 
historically disadvantaged farmers are given priority in the water reallocation pr ocess 
(NWRS, 2012). The DWA has appreciated that well-resourced and effective institutions with 
sufficient administrative authority are crucial for equitable water access (NWRS, 2013).  
 
The formulation of WAR programme could be seen by institutional economists as a way of 
correcting the inefficiencies and unintended effects of path dependency and unequal power 
relations generated by existing institutions (March and Olsen, 1984; Hall and Taylor, 1996; 
Lawrence, 2008).  
 
Over the years, a significant body of literature has emerged within NIE providing insights 
with respect to the relationships between power relations, path dependence and the 
operation of institutions (March and Olsen, 1984; Hall and Taylor, 1996;  Bartley and 
Schneiberg, 2002; Stryker, 2004; Lawrence, 2008). New institutional economists argue that 
public or government institution sometimes reform public policies in an effort to achieve 
equity by taking a “sharp break from established procedures” (Williamson, 2000: 598). The 
sudden shift of the public policy to effect reform within a short space of time, often in less 
than a decade, is described as a “opening a rare window of opportunity” (Williamson, 2000: 
598). However, it is common for such institutions to implement reforms within longer 
periods of time, often in phases divided by time, regions, and other measures (Williamson, 
2000).  
 
In South Africa, the post-apartheid water laws and policies created a window of opportunity 
for broader social inclusion in the water sector. However, the country has not fully taken 
advantage of the window of opportunity due to factors such as lack of greater public and 
stakeholder participation in the policy formulation and decision-making processes, and 
unutilised cooperation opportunities. Furthermore, the post-apartheid policy entrusts a 
resilient political and social agenda to local water management institutions, such as WUAs, 
without providing enforceable solutions required for balancing social equity and political 
obligations with their finances as well as embedded interests (Orne-Gliemann, 2008). 
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4.9. Water governance and Integrated Water Resource Management principles 
 
The policies and legislation related to the water sector in South Africa are founded on the 
principles of Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) (NWRS, 2012). IWRM is a 
framework within which policy-makers try to move the skewed water reallocation towards 
greater equity (Haigh et al., 2010). IWRM operates within various ideologies which reflect 
political philosophies as well as governance paradigms embraced by societies (Claassen, 
2014).  
Section 6(1)(l) of the NWA proposes that water resources need to be managed in an 
integrated manner in order to achieve efficiency, equity and sustainability in the water 
sector (RSA, 1998). However, there is no explicit mention of the IWRM in NWA of 1998. 
Nonetheless, the South Africa’s NWA encompasses and endorses the 1992 Dublin Principles 
for Water Resources Management (Savenije and van der Zaag, 2002; Brown, 2013). 
  
Integrated management requires the recognition of inter-linkages of water uses and the 
relationships that exist between water and the biophysical environment (RSA, 2000). The 
recognition of such relationships is argued to be a vital step in proper planning and informed 
decision-making processes in the water sector (RSA, 2000; NWRS, 2012). One of the key 
elements of the NWRS is the promotion of inter-sectoral and civil society partnerships and 
integrated governance in order to achieve good water governance (NWRS, 2004 and 2012).  
  
The attainment of efficient and effective water management is dependent on good water 
governance (NWRS, 2013). Other elements of good water governance include 
accountability, wider participation, greater equity, ethical decision making, transparent 
operations, predictability, coherence and responsiveness to the needs of users  (NWRS, 
2012).  The elements of good water governance outlined by the NWRS (2012), summarised 
in Figure 4.4, are in line with characteristics of effective water institutions discussed by New 
Institutional economists outlined in chapter 2 of this thesis  (Saleth and Dinar, 2004; Gandhi 
and Crase, 2009; Shen and Speed, 2010; Ostrom, 2011). Ostrom (2011: 9) argues that some 
of elements of an effective common pool resource institution are, “(i) economic efficiency, 
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(ii) equity through fiscal equivalence, (iii) redistributional equity, (iv) accountability, (v) 
conformance to values of local actors, and (vi) sustainability”. 
 
According to NIE, good governance consequently leads to effective and efficient ins titutional 
performance (Saleth and Dinar, 2004; Gandhi and Crase, 2009; Shen and Speed, 2010). 
However, new institutional economists argue that the proposed characteristics of effective 
water institutions in figure 2.2 are a principle, rather than a rule (Muller, 2006 and 2013). 
According to institutionalists, no two institutions are identical, hence it is practically 
impossible to propose a one-size-fits-all model for all institutions (Muller, 2006, 2008 and 
2013).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Elements of good water governance in South Africa. (Source: Adapted from NWRS, 
2012) 
 
Institutionalists argue that IWRM framework cannot fully address emerging challenges in 
the water sector such as; inefficiencies created by fragmentation and duplication of 
authorities, information asymmetries, lack of greater public and stakeholder participation in 
the decision making processes, and unutilised cooperation opportunities (North, 1997; 
Imperial, 2012). According to Imperial (2012: 5), contradictory “policies and priorities that 
work at cross purposes” often produce inefficiencies through embedded problems such as 
fragmentation and duplication of authorities and unutilised cooperation opportunities.   
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The NRWS of 2013 proposes that the National Water Policy of South Africa should be 
revised with emphasis and focus on the balancing of power among various stakeholders 
with dissimilar water interests and uses (NWRS, 2013). Furthermore, effectiveness of water 
institutions should form the core of the revised National Water Policy (NWRS, 2013). This 
will require extensive development of skills and expertise of relevant stakeholders and 
personnel in the water sector (Claassen, 2014).  
 
 
4.10. New Institutional Economics and its applicability to water policy  
 
Economists argue that neoclassical economic concepts and paradigms have influenced most 
policy formulation processes over the years (Berg and Tschirhart, 1995; Savenije and van der 
Zaag, 2002; Geradin 2006; Guthrie 2006; Lieberherr, 2009). They maintain that neoclassical 
economics’ analytical tools and conceptual framework have played a pivotal role in the 
implementation of regulatory enactments, as well as in the design of optimum pricing of 
water resources (Berg and Tschirhart, 1995). Because of the neoclassical economics 
foundations of water resource allocation, in most developing countries such as South Africa, 
water policy has not yet yielded consistently desired results (Berg and Tschirhart, 1995; 
Savenije and van der Zaag, 2002; Grafton et al., 2011; NWRS, 2013).  
 
Proponents of NIE note that some of the under-achievements of the water sector are in part 
due to failure of the water policy to incorporate social norms, rules and behaviours of 
agents and the reliance on neoclassical economic paradigms of pricing strategies  and 
production efficiency (North, 2000; Joskow, 2008; Lieberherr, 2009). Furthermore, they 
posit that the lack of achievement can be attributed to failure to recognise the 
interconnectedness of levels of economic institutions during the formulation and 
implementation stages of water policy (Williamson, 2000; Menard and Shirley, 2005; Joskow 
2008; Brousseau and Glachant, 2008; Lieberherr, 2009). 
 
According to NIE, there are four interconnected and interdependent levels through which 
the roles of economic, political, social and cultural institutions of economic activity can be 
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examined (Williamson, 2000; Menard and Shirley, 2005; Brousseau and Glachant, 2008; 
Lieberherr, 2009). Level 1, which is the uppermost level of the institutional hierarchy, 
consists of embedded or cultural institutions (Williamson, 2000; Brousseau and Glachant, 
2008; Lieberherr, 2009). These institutions include informal institutions, norms, ethics, 
traditions, religion and customs that influence choices and individuals as well as the 
principles of the society (Williamson, 2000; Brousseau and Glachant, 2008; Lieberherr, 
2009). 
 
Level 2 outlines elements that make up the basic institutional environment (Brousseau and 
Glachant, 2008). These include formal institutions such as the constitutions, property rights, 
courts, law and other institutions that enforce the government’s power to allocate and 
distribute water resources effectively, efficiently, sustainably and equitably (Williamson, 
2000; Menard and Shirley, 2005; Brousseau and Glachant, 2008; Lieberherr, 2009).  
 
The third level encompasses governance institutions (Williamson, 2000; Brousseau and 
Glachant, 2008; Lieberherr, 2009). Governance institutions are necessary for regulating the 
relationships between agents in the water sector in order to offset conflict, provide stability 
and to allow agents in the sector to maximise their gains at the least possible cost 
(Williamson, 2000; Lieberherr, 2009). Governance institutions vary from one country to the 
other, depending on the economic and political environment of the country at any given 
point in time (Williamson, 2000; Libecap, 2006; Brousseau and Glachant, 2008). 
 
Lastly, level 4 comprises of institutions of resource allocation and employment creation 
(Williamson, 2000; Brousseau and Glachant, 2008; Lieberherr, 2009). These institutions 
allow for the daily operations of the economy given the preceding institutions encompassed 
by the other three levels (Glachant, 2008; Lieberherr, 2009). The levels are summarised in 
Figure 4.5. 
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Figure 4.5: Levels of economic institutions. (Sources: Williamson, 2000; Brousseau and Glachant, 
2008; Lieberherr, 2009) 
New institutional economists argue that level 4 is the “purview of neoclass ical economics” 
(Lieberherr, 2009: 6), which focuses on derived outcomes of the institutional foundations 
laid by the first three levels. Their argument is that at this level, neoclassical market 
imperfections such as oligopoly and monopoly are used to determine incentives, wages, 
prices and quantities of water resources needed for allocation and conservation in the 
water sector (Williamson, 2000; Brousseau and Glachant, 2008; Lieberherr, 2009).  
 
In South Africa, the government is regarded as a public trus tee of water resources, hence it 
is afforded monopoly power and control over the country’s water resources (Conradie et al., 
2001; Stein, 2005). Section 56 (1) of the NWA allows the state to use price strategies to 
influence efficiency, sustainability, effectiveness and equity in water allocation (RSA, 1998). 
Neoclassical economists argue that “economic pricing of water will facilitate the re -
allocation of water from sectors with lower added value (such as agriculture) to sectors with 
a higher added value (such as urban water use)” (Savenije and van der Zaag, 2002: 98). The 
NWA, through Section 6(1)(b)(iv), gives utmost priority in water allocation processes to 
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sectors that contribute to national economic growth and development such as commercial 
agriculture industry and mining sector (RSA, 1998). 
 
Furthermore, given the current water resource allocation stipulated by the NWA and other 
policies in South Africa, it can be argued that there is potential prohibition of any 
reallocation, and consequently the policy will fail to accommodate the emergence of social 
and economic uses of water resources (Berg and Tschirhart, 1995; Libecap, 2006). Based on 
these arguments, it can hence be concluded that the water policy in South Africa is centred 
largely on neoclassical economics framework. 
 
However, certain aspects of the policy embrace NIE principles in an effort to achieve optimal 
allocation of water resources even though they are mostly not implemented. This is in part 
due to the noticeable inertia displayed by some stakeholders, such as commercial farmers, 
who benefit from the status quo. In a study by Brown (2013), it was concluded that the 
potential of participatory institutions such as Catchment Management Agencies (CMAs) and 
WUAs, to achieve some of the social goals of national-level policies is rendered void due to 
the paralysis of the status quo and resistance of commercial farmers. Brown (2013) argues 
that the forms of resistance include commercial farmers in WUAs withholding payment, 
thereby threatening the financial viability of the WUAs. It can hence be argued that 
although the concept of IWRM proposed by water policy in South Africa, which appreciates 
the complexity and multi-sectoral characteristics of water, restrains the applicability of 
Neoclassical economic paradigms in water resource management, pricing based on market 
principles can undercut some of the social goals of national-level policies (Savenije and van 
der Zaag, 2002; Brown, 2013).   
 
4.11. Conclusion 
 
During apartheid, the Natives Land Act of 1913, which was informed by racial segregation, 
led to skewed distribution of natural resources  (Thompson et al., 2001; Nash, 2012). 
Riparian water rights made the apartheid era legislation exclusive as far as equitable water 
access is concerned because of the undisputable link between land ownership and access to 
water (Thompson et al., 2001; Nash, 2012). Post-apartheid, the water legislation of South 
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Africa was reformed, resulting in the enactment of the Water Services Act of 1997 and 
National Water Act of 1998, which both call for participation of all stakeholders in the water 
sector as well as for equitable distribution of water resources for the benefit of all. The 
general aim of the NWA is to achieve greater equity between and within users groups, 
through greater cooperative governance and improved communication among all affected 
stakeholders (RSA, 1998).  
 
South Africa’s water policy is internationally regarded as progressive and forward thinking, 
as it is reflective of the broad aims of IWRM proposed by the 1992 Dublin Principles for 
water resources management (Saravanan et al., 2009). However, the water sector in South 
Africa is still facing a number challenges, leading to a delay in achieving some of the goals of 
the post-apartheid water law (Muller et al., 2005, Kuusi, 2009; Wegelin and Jacobs, 2013). 
The challenges can be attributed to policy and legislative gaps, water allocation driven by 
commercial farmers, among other factors. New institutional economists argue that the 
rapidly changing world, which entails emerging water uses, requires the appreciation of NIE 
economic principles such as participatory and integrated governance, as well as the 
recognition of social norms and customs in policy development.  
 
Because the post-apartheid National Water Policy of South Africa is largely influenced by 
neoclassical economics foundations, the desired results in the water sector, such as 
equitable distribution of water resources, have not yet been fulfilled completely. Driving the 
implementation of the post-apartheid water policy towards equitable, efficient, effective 
and participatory management and allocation remains a challenge at local level as social 
norms and customs are not recognised.  
 
The following chapter provides an analysis of the role of WUAs as common pool resource 
institutions in order to give a broad contextual backdrop within which WUAs operate.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
WATER USERS ASSOCIATIONS AS COMMON-POOL RESOURCE INSTITUTIONS 
 
5.1. Introduction  
 
Over the past five decades, a number of institutional arrangements have emerged globally 
in an effort to improve water management, increase effectiveness and efficiency in the 
water sector, and to promote poverty reduction gains associated with inclusive water 
allocation (Agrawal, 2001; Meinzen-Dick, 2007; Orne-Gliemann, 2008; van Steenbergen, 
2013). Such arrangements include water markets, government agencies and Water Users 
Associations (WUA) (Agrawal, 2001; Meinzen-Dick, 2007; Orne-Gliemann, 2008). The 
establishment of WUAs in some countries was a result of a need to curb the problems and 
challenges of a centralised system. Considerable variations in the nature and models of 
WUAs exist as local needs and realities have to be considered and incorporated when WUAs 
are established (Ostrom, 1990; Orne-Gliemann, 2008). In some countries, WUAs have failed 
to operate sustainably as they were given great responsibilities with limited resources, while 
other countries are success stories (Subramanian et al., 1997; FAO, 1999; Faysse, 2004; van 
Steenbergen, 2013).   
 
This chapter provides an analysis of the motivation for WUAs and the challenges they are 
faced with. It will draw lessons from both the international and South African context, using 
New Institutional Economics (NIE) theories of common-pool resource management 
discussed in chapter 2, as well as institutional governance indicators discussed in chapter 3. 
 
5.2. The need for Water Users’ Associations 
 
In most countries, water is regarded as a ‘common-pool’ or ‘common-property’ resource 
due to its scarce yet non-excludability characteristics (Ostrom, 1990; Pegram and Mazibuko, 
2003; Hackett, 2011). The common-pool resource argument is often used to qualify the 
need for centralised regulation and management of water resources (Subramanian et al., 
1997; Pegram and Mazibuko, 2003; Perret, 2006; Wilson and Perret, 2010). However, 
managing water resources under a centralised system has been subjected to a number of 
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challenges (Subramanian et al., 1997; Pegram and Mazibuko, 2003; Perret, 2006). Such 
challenges include: failure of markets, high transaction costs, failure to incorporate local 
needs and knowledge, creation of disincentives for conservation by local communities, and 
ineffective and inefficient overall management of water resources by the state (Ostrom, 
1990; Subramanian et al., 1997; Agrawal, 2001; Pegram and Mazibuko, 2003; Perret, 2006; 
Meinzen-Dick, 2007; Orne-Gliemann, 2008; Wilson and Perret, 2010; van Steenbergen, 
2013).  
 
It is argued that a decentralised water management system is more likely to create 
incentives for conservation and general participation of the local communities in water 
management through the generation of distinctive intangible social capital for members 
(Aoki, 2001). The argument is that decentralisation creates a common sense of belonging,  
solidarity and social esteem. These are important elements needed for encouraging 
networking, building relationships and emphasising on negotiating and collective action 
(Aoki, 2001; Tropp, 2007). In the study on irrigation associations in Korea by Miyajim et al. 
(1992), it is shown how the lower income farmers in Korea,  referred to as yangban and 
nobi, gradually colluded to pool resources and share ideas under an irrigation association. In 
1930, the colonial government in Korea imposed an irrigation system, through a centralised 
setup on, the farmers (Miyajim et al., 1992; Aoki, 2001). However,  
“*T+he most effective system evolved in the area where the traditional irrigation 
associations had been active since the late Yi Dynasty, whereas the irrigation 
associations founded according to the legal stipulations of the colonial governme nt 
… had only a limited success” (Aoki, 2001: 57). 
 
The case studies of Philippines, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, and Nepal follow a similar 
pattern. Meinzen-Dick (2007) argues that despite the limited resources of farmer-managed 
irrigation associations, the associations generally have better managed and cooperative 
structures and they contribute more to farm output compared to government-run irrigation 
associations.  According to Meinzen-Dick (2007), the cooperation of farmers in large systems 
with rigid structures is often unsatisfactory. This is largely because such systems often fail to 
align their operations with the needs of farmers due to the imposition of top-down rigid 
hierarchy.   
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NIE argues that a centralised water management system may fail to adequately succeed in 
its mandate of providing water resources to all citizens at the least possible cost if the 
institutional arrangements in the water sector are weak and ineffective (Orne-Gliemann, 
2008). These failures of the centralised water resource management systems are argued to 
have prompted a paradigm shift to decentralised water management strategies that are 
incorporate cooperative governance and a holistic regard for local governance structures 
(Subramanian et al., 1997; Agrawal, 2001; Pegram and Mazibuko, 2003; Meinzen-Dick, 
2007; Orne-Gliemann, 2008).   
 
In essence, there is a need to implement policies that that incorporate both local realities 
and 1992 Dublin Principles for Water Resource Management, (hereafter referred to as the 
‘Dublin Principles’).  One of the Dublin Principles requires integrated decision making on the 
allocation of scarce water resources - a shift away from top-down hierarchal water resource 
management (Van der Zaag and Savenije, 2000; Perret, 2006; Brown, 2013). Literature from 
disciplines such as economics, sociology, anthropology, as well as environmental and 
political sciences argues that a bottom-up approach to water resource management may be 
more likely to lead to desirable water management and conservation outcomes as it is could 
give the local communities a sense of ownership over their water resources (Wilson and 
Perret, 2010; Brown, 2013).  In some countries, statutory bodies such as WUAs are 
established according to the specifics of operation outlined by water policy and law 
(Subramanian et al., 1997; Agrawal, 2001; Pegram and Mazibuko, 2003; Meinzen-Dick, 
2007; van Steenbergen, 2013). 
 
According to Pegram and Mazibuko (2003), WUAs are cooperative associations of water 
users established legally to govern decision-making processes towards a common goal 
related to sustainable water management for the benefit of all members. Generally, the 
main objective of WUAs is the maintenance of infrastructure in order to provide an 
uninterrupted and dependable water supply to water users (Subramanian et al., 1997; 
Pegram and Mazibuko, 2003). In other countries, the objectives of WUAs may extend to 
issuing water licenses, provision of human capital development, and serving as overall 
consultants in the water sector (Subramanian et al., 1997; Pegram and Mazibuko, 2003; van 
Steenbergen, 2013).  
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In some of the areas in South Africa and other countries where WUAs operate, some 
advances such as increased agricultural activity, reduced transaction costs, enhanced service 
delivery, prompt system maintenance, and improved inclusion and empowerment of 
previously excluded and disadvantaged groups have been observed (Subramanian et al., 
1997; FAO, 2001; Pegram and Mazibuko, 2003; van Steenbergen, 2013). Narain (2004) 
argues that the establishment of cooperatives in the form of WUAs often leads to a 
significant reduction of marginal costs for water management.  
 
It is argued that WUAs perform better where centralised governance is less effective than 
local governance (Pegram and Mazibuko, 2003; van Steenbergen, 2013). Their effectiveness 
and sustainability is also dependent upon the nature of activities that members have 
selected as their focal point (FAO, 2001). Furthermore, some researchers posit that the 
success of WUAs is determined by an amalgamation of factors such as the nature of their 
internal structures, external conditions within which they operate, as well as local and 
technical considerations (Subramanian et al., 1997; Pegram and Mazibuko, 2003; Fox, 2012; 
van Steenbergen, 2013).  
 
The external conditions alluded to above that influence the outcomes of WUAs include 
among others; the governing policies and legislation of the country, the structure of 
agencies interacting with the WUA, physical infrastructure, socio-economic factors such as 
market penetration (World Bank, 1996; Subramanian et al., 1997; Meinzen-Dick et al., 2000; 
Pegram and Mazibuko, 2003; Fox, 2012; van Steenbergen, 2013). Scholars of NIE argue that 
the governing policies and the legislature of the country are some of the crucial elements 
that define the country’s political economy (Adhikari, 2002; Duncan, 2003). According to 
NIE, the political economy plays a pivotal role in the overall resource management (Adhikari, 
2002). The clarity of the governing policies and laws in any given jurisdiction often leads to 
increased certainty about expected returns to be accrued from the natural resource within a 
given period of time, as well as to the creation of resource conservation incentives 
(Sanderson, 1994; Adhikari, 2002). 
 
On the other hand, internal conditions have been identified to be; the size and scope of the 
WUA, membership definition, the age of the WUA, as well as leadership roles provisions of 
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the WUA (World Bank, 1996; Subramanian et al., 1997; Meinzen-Dick et al., 2000; Pegram 
and Mazibuko, 2003; Fox, 2012; van Steenbergen, 2013). New institutionalists unanimously 
argue that institutional environments, arrangements and landscapes give each institution a 
distinct identity and contribute to institutional diversity (Agrawal, 1999; Aoki, 2001; 
Ackerman, 2004; Orne-Gliemann, 2008; Menard and Saleth, 2011).  
 
Notwithstanding, there seems to be a consensus among scholars of NIE that small water 
institutions with well-defined boundaries generally perform effectively ( Meinzen-Dick et al., 
2000; Pegram and Mazibuko, 2003; Fox, 2012). Furthermore, is argued that WUAs which 
were formed from previously efficient and effective irrigation associations, with qualified 
and knowledgeable leaderships are more likely to be effective ( Meinzen-Dick et al., 2000; 
Pegram and Mazibuko, 2003; Fox, 2012).  
 
 A significant body of research raises questions about the effectiveness and efficiency of 
WUAs with regard to finding a balance between improving equitable allocation amongst all 
members (Shah et al., 2002; Mukherji et al., 2009; International Water Management 
Institute (IWMI), 2011). According to the IWMI (2011), the questions reflect a deficiency of a 
rigorous and extensive assessment linking institutional performance to existing policies 
(IWMI, 2011). They also serve as a reflection of the complexity of duplicating institutions 
from one context to the other (Meinzen-Dick, 2007; IWMI, 2011). 
 
5.3. The definition of Water Users’ Associations in South Africa 
 
Subsequent to the attainment of democracy, a legislative appraisal and reform in the water 
sector resulted in the formulation of the NWA (Act 36 of 1998) and the 1997 White Paper of 
a National Water Policy for South Africa (RSA, 1997). These set out the rules and 
requirements for water resource management and allocation, and provide imperatives for 
the establishment of WUAs and other water management institutions. In South Africa, 
WUAs are water management legislative bodies established by the Minister of Department 
of Water Affairs (DWA) under Section 92 of the NWA of 1998 (RSA, 1998; Pegram and 
Mazibuko, 2003; Brown, 2011). Historically, Irrigation Boards, which were generally 
governed by white people, represented the interests of commercial farmers (National 
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Department of Agriculture, 2001; Mokgope et al., 2001; Brown, 2011; Nash; 2012). The 
enactment of the NWA subsequently called for the transformation of Irrigation Boards into 
more inclusive WUAs (Brown, 2011; DWA, 2013). 
 
The NWA further outlines the basic categories of entitlement to use water, which are; 
schedule 1, general authorisation, water use licenses and existing lawful water use (RSA, 
1998; Pegram and Mazibuko, 2003). According to Section 4(1) of the NWA, schedule 1 
provides for the use of water resources for purposes such as gardening, fire-fighting, 
domestic use, animal watering and recreational use (RSA, 1998). Section 39 provides general 
authorisation provisions under which water use does not require a license, while section 41 
outlines water uses that are subject to compulsory licensing (RSA, 1998). Section 33 of the 
NWA acknowledges water uses that existed prior the introduction of the NWA (RSA, 1998). 
According to Pegram and Mazibuko (2003: 4), “any group of water users associated with any 
of these categories may be members of (or represented on) a WUA”. 
 
5.4. The functions of Water Users’ Associations in South Africa 
 
The NWA has listed a range of principal functions to be performed by the  WUA in schedule 
5, item 4. These are: 
 
 “To prevent water from any water resource being wasted 
 To protect water resources 
  To prevent any unlawful water use 
 To remove or arrange to remove any obstruction unlawfully placed in a watercourse 
 To prevent any unlawful act likely to reduce the quality of water in any water 
resource 
 To exercise general supervision over water resources 
 To regulate the flow of any watercourse  
 To investigate and record the quantity of water at different levels of flow in a 
watercourse; the times when; and the places where water may be used by any 
person entitled to use water from a water resource.  
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 To construct, purchase or otherwise acquire, control, operate and maintain 
waterworks. 
 To supervise and regulate the distribution and use of water from a water resource” 
(RSA, 1998).  
 
The Act, however, makes provisions for WUAs to select a range of their intended functions 
from the list, and/or to propose their own set of functions upon registration (RSA, 1998). 
The proposed functions of WUAs have to be strongly consistent with the visions and 
interests of respective members of the associations (DWFA, 2001). For example, while the 
Thabina WUA in Limpopo Province has conflict resolution mechanisms between users with 
competing interests as one of its functions, the LSR-WUA in the Eastern Cape Province does 
not (LSR-WUA, 2004; Orne-Gliemann, 2008).  
 
Similarly, one of the ancillary functions of LSR-WUA is to be financially prudent (LSR-WUA, 
2004), but this has not been explicitly listed as one of either Thabina WUA or eDikeni WUA’s 
key supplementary functions (LSR-WUA, 2004; Orne-Gliemann, 2008; Kapfudzaruwa and 
Sowman, 2009). It is, however, important to note that some WUAs perform additional 
duties other than the ones listed in their respective constitutions. For instance, in a study by 
Orne- Gliemann (2008), it was revealed that the Thabina WUA performs the role of training 
emerging farmers even though such a role did not appear in the list of its functions.   
 
In addition to the proposed principal functions, according to schedule 5, item 5 of the NWA, 
WUAs should also perform ancillary functions, such as the provision of training and 
management services for water service institutions and rural communities, as well as 
provision of catchment management serves (RSA, 1998). Ancillary functions, however, 
should only be performed by WUAs mandated to perform the water services functions and 
with the resource capacity sufficient for the successful execution of their principal functions 
(RSA, 1998; Pegram and Mazibuko, 2003). 
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5.5. Challenges faced by Water Users’ Associations in South Africa 
 
Some scholars argue that, although the WUA model proposed by the post-apartheid 
government is ideal with noble intentions, the expectation of achieving equitable water 
allocation through participation is unrealistically optimistic (Hickey and Mohan, 2004; 
Swyngedouw, 2006; Brown, 2013). Such scholars argue that some of the stakeholders in the 
water sector, such as commercial farmers, have always had vested interests which are 
difficult, if not impossible, to change (Hickey and Mohan, 2004; Swyngedouw, 2006; Brown, 
2013). As argued by Sehring (2009: 65), “The reason for the genesis and persistence of 
institutions is … not only that they perform a certain function, but also that they serve 
certain interests.” By implication, the interests of the powerful stakeholders “whether or 
not they always prevail, are taken into account” (Roy, 1981: 1289), on decisions that affect 
such stakeholders in the present.  
 
According to the DWA (2013), the lack of cooperative partnerships and required 
engagements between the South Africa Association for Water User Associations (SAAFWUA) 
and the DWA presents a communication challenge that extends to individual WUAs. The aim 
of SAAFWUA is to give the WUAs the necessary support through working closely with the 
DWA in order to address challenges that are constraining WUAs from performing effectively 
and efficiently (SAAFWUA, 2013). However, the degree of engagement between the DWA 
and the SAAFWUA is not yet satisfactory (DWA, 2013). For instance, the SAAFWUA was not 
consulted during the policy review process. In its response to the DWA concerning the 
NWPR of 2013, SAAFWUA (2013: 3) cited its three main reasons for opposing the 
implementation of Policy changes as follows; 
“a) The time frame and notices to the water users were insufficient; 
b) The way some of the consultations were done, did not enable the attendees to 
make proper inputs. It was handled more like information transfer sessions and most 
of the statements were based on wrong perceptions and unfounded allegations; and 
c) At some of the Regional sessions the Regional Head even informed the 
stakeholders that the decision to implement the policy position with specific 
reference to Water Users Associations that will cease to exist has already been made 
by Government.” 
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Khosa (2003) and de Coning and Sherwill (2004) argue that the lack of intensive consultative 
process on policy formulation and policy reviews often leads to unintended negative 
impacts during policy implementation processes. Although the relationship between policy-
making and implementation is generally complex and multi-facet, it argued that 
miscommunications, lack of consultation and fragmented relationships between various 
stakeholders often lead to deficiencies in policy implementation (Khosa, 2003; de Coning 
and Sherwill, 2004). According to the former president of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki (2002),  
“The policy is there, the institutions are there. The critical matter to address is: are 
they functioning? It is not a matter of changing policies, but to ensure their 
implementation.” 
 
It can be argued that some of the challenges faced by WUAs in South Africa are influenced 
by the theoretical foundations within which the National Water Policy is founded. As argued 
in the previous chapter, in South Africa, water policy and allocation mechanisms are largely 
influenced by neoclassical economics principles, principally in attaining efficiency through 
pricing and incentive-enhancing  measures, including allocation and transferability of 
property rights (Williamson, 2000; Brousseau and Glachant, 2008; Lieberherr, 2009).  
 
In light of the above, it follows, therefore, that water policies and/or allocation mechanisms 
based solely on neoclassical assumptions are likely to be inefficient and inequitable. As 
noted by North (1997), governments often fail in their duty of securing contracts and 
protecting property rights. In the same vein, it can be argued that some WUAs are struggling 
to achieve efficient and equitable water allocation in part due to the influence of national 
level water policies and their bias towards neoclassical principles. However, in South Africa, 
the National Water Policy narrowly embraces property rights with regards to water (Stein, 
2005). 
 
The policy also entrusts a strong political agenda to WUAs in their role as one of the local 
water management institutions expected to redress apartheid era inequities (Stein, 2005; 
Orne-Gliemann, 2008). As noted by Orne-Gliemann (2008), the question that emerges is: are 
WUAs, already impeded by historical legacies, able to perform and conciliate these multiple 
objectives, (including implementation of IWRM, promotion of community participation and 
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advancement of the political agenda) given the vested interests and power relations 
inherited from their previous organisations? Institutional economists argue that local self -
governance, where CPR management is led by local communities, with little or no political 
interference, local institutions operate more efficiently, monitor resources better and 
resolve conflicts more effectively (Ostrom, 1990; Bromley, 1992; Sethi and Somanathan, 
1996; Hackett, 2011).   
 
5.6. Path dependency and governance of Water Users’ Associations 
 
As discussed in chapter 2 of this thesis, neoclassical and NIE argue that institutions are 
carriers of history (Streeck and Thelen, 2005; Heinmiller, 2009; Sehring, 2009). It is argued 
that understanding institutional change is not only dependent on linking the path of history 
to the present and the future, but it is also reliant on the unravelling of power plays that 
shaped the institutions in the past (Streeck and Thelen, 2005; Heinmiller, 2009; Sehring, 
2009).  The path dependence feature of institutions is one of the reasons why no particular 
institutional arrangement would be efficient or at least functional in all contexts (Sehring, 
2009; Saleth and Menard, 2011).  
 
Commercial farmers in both transformed and existing irrigation boards have invested many 
resources in influencing the shape of their boards, as well as playing a crucial role in 
proposing a set of duties to be carried out by their respective CMAs and consequently WUAs 
(Brown, 2013). The NWA mandates CMAs with the responsibility of regulating and 
controlling water supply in a way that ensures socio-economic development for all (RSA, 
1998). Furthermore, CMAs are responsible for ensuring sustainable water use through 
cooperative governance (RSA; 1998). However, the institutional framework through which 
CMAs and WUAs operate, and the current understanding of cooperative governance in 
South Africa’s water sector remain complex (Boyd and Tompkins, 2011). Furthermore, 
structures that allow for accountability of CMAs and WUAs remain vague (Boyd and 
Tompkins, 2011; Brown, 2013). As Brown (2013: 277) argues, 
“In a seeming paradox of participation, reform-oriented central government officials 
assume the role of countervailing power to white farmers. This regulatory role 
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requiring continual, but justifiable, interventions by central government offic ials 
makes a mockery of the decentralized participatory ethos.” 
 
Moreover, where WUAs act are tasked with water service delivery functions in accordance 
with requirements outlined by the Water Services Act (RSA, 1997), the complexity of 
accountability of WUAs arises (Thompson et al., 2001; Pegram and Mazibuko, 2003; Haigh 
et al., 2010). Furthermore, although South Africa’s water policy has succeeded in describing 
how WUAs should be defined within a water resource management framework, questions 
on how WUAs should link with other institutions within the broader Integrated Sustainable 
Rural Development Strategy (ISRDS) remain unanswered (DWFA, 2001; DWA, 2013).  
 
5.7. External factors that affect effectiveness, efficiency and viability of Water Users 
Associations 
 
It is argued that the effectiveness, efficiency and the general success of WUAs in South 
Africa is partly dependent on the external environment within which WUAs operate 
(Pegram and Mazibuko, 2003). The operations of the WUA are influenced by the external 
institutional relationships such as water policy, catchment management agencies (CMAs), 
and water service authorities (WSAs), among others. The types of external institutional 
relationships can be divided into four broad categories, namely statutory, repres entative, 
contractual and cooperative relationships (Pegram and Mazibuko, 2003).  
 
Statutory relationships are essentially those governed by the NWA (Pegram and Mazibuko, 
2003). As stated in the NWA, the WUAs are established and monitored by CMAs and the 
Minister responsible for DWA (RSA, 1998). In essence, DWA and CMAs are responsible for 
the provision of financial support, delegation of functions, provision of suitable training and 
conflict resolutions for WUAs (RSA, 1998; Pegram and Mazibuko, 2003). In the absence of 
CMAs in water management areas, the DWA regional office (DWA-RO) is tasked with the 
responsibility of performing catchment management duties (DWFA, 2001 and 2003; 
Clifford-Holmes et al., 2013).  
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Representative relationships consist of interactions between the management committee of 
the WUA and its respective members, as well as the representation of the WUA on 
institutional bodies such as catchment forums (Pegram and Mazibuko, 2003; Clifford-
Holmes et al., 2013). Where WUAs perform water service provider (WSP) duties and act as 
the Water Service Authority (WSA), contractual relationships are a necessity. According to 
NIE, contracts are not only essential for dictating the relationships between entities, but 
also for improving the quality of services exchanged between parties (Brousseau, 2008; 
Mihau et al., 2008). 
 
The Water Services Act governs the decisions of the WUA that acts as a WSA (RSA, 1997). 
Cooperative relationships may emerge between the WUA and various local government, 
civil society, private sector, government departments and international bodies (DWFA, 2001 
and 2003; Pegram and Mazibuko, 2003; Clifford-Holmes et al., 2013). The fundamental 
institutional relationships are indicated in Figure 5.1 as follows; 
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Figure 5.1: Primary institutional relationships between various water sector institutions. (Sources: 
Adapted from Pegram and Mazibuko, 2003; Clifford-Holmes et al., 2013)  
 
 
5.8. New Institutional Economics and common pool resource management 
  
Generally, WUAs are not only important for managing and regulating common pool 
resources in order to avoid overexploitation, but also for attaining a more equitable and 
sustainable water resource allocation and management (North, 1990; Bandaragoda, 2000; 
Agrawal, 2001; Lipecap, 2008). New Institutional economists argue that effective collective 
action institutions are necessary for internalising the consequences and externalities of 
individual actions regarding common pool resource use (Libecap, 2008; Brousseau and 
Glachant, 2008). According to Ostrom and Gardner (1993: 93), 
“If exclusion is not accomplished by the design of appropriate institutional 
arrangements, free-riding related to the provision of the common-pool resource can 
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be expected. After all, what rational actor would help to provide the maintenance of 
a resource system, if non-contributors can gain the benefits as well as contributors .”  
 
In South Africa, WUAs as management institutions, have vested powers and obligations to 
prevent unlawful water use, protect water resources, safeguard and promote 
environmental and water resource conservation, as well as to exercise any management 
powers and functions assigned to them by the NWA. Some  NIE scholars of suggest that 
instituting rights and powers of use, access, exclusion and/or inclus ion, management and 
transferability could lead to more equitable and sustainable common pool resource 
allocation and management (North, 1990; Bandaragoda, 2000; Agrawal, 2001; Lipecap, 
2008).  
 
It can be argued that, theoretically, WUAs are more effective in ensuring efficient and 
equitable water allocation than instituting rights from a centralised organisation. It can 
further be argued that WUAs management strategies often tend to be more responsive to 
the needs of local residents. These propositions are largely premised on the argument that, 
“regulated common property and private property are equivalent from the stand point of 
the efficiency of resources use” (Baland and Platteau, 1996: 175), hence establishing 
property rights and powers over common pool resource use could lead to efficient resource 
use (Agrawal, 2001; Lipecap, 2008; Kirsten et al., 2009). This argument is in agreement, 
though to a limited extent, with neoclassical economic theory, which posits  that assigning of 
property rights leads to proper allocation and management common pool resources 
(Williamson 1998; Hodgson 1998; Saleth and Dinar, 2004). 
 
Although cooperative governance, in the form of WUAs, allows for the creation of mutual 
trust between members, it cannot guarantee a complete elimination of opportunistic 
behaviour of members within the group, nor can it ensure sustainability, equity and 
efficiency in common pool resource allocation. This assertion is premised on the argument 
that there is no definite widely accepted set of factors  that contribute to efficient, equitable 
and effective cooperative governance in NIE (Wade, 1988; Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom et al., 
1994; Bandaragoda, 2000; Agrawal, 2001; Lipecap, 2008). Scholars, however, have identified 
a range of conditions necessary for efficient and sustainable common pool resource  
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management (Ostrom, 1990; Agrawal, 2001; Grafton et al., 2011). Such conditions are 
related to resource community characteristics and rules -in-use, which in turn affect the 
interactions and outcomes within the resource allocation sphere. Figure 6.2 applies the IDA 
framework discussed in chapter 2 by outlining some conditions necessary for efficient, 
effective and equitable institutional governance. The conditions are an extension of the 
principles necessary for robust institutions discussed in chapter 2.  
 
Attributes of community include size, power relations dominant with the groups, path 
dependence influenced by past successful experience, among other characteristics (Wade, 
1988; Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom et al., 1994; Bandaragoda, 2000; Agrawal, 2001; Lipecap, 
2008). However, the definition of these characteristics is relative to the case in question. 
They are used to serve as basic requirements and not as a way of redressing substantive 
institutional issues. As argued by Agrawal (2001: 1654), “… we have to contend with the 
possibility that the enterprise of attempts to create a list of critical enabling conditions that 
can apply universally can founder at a very basic epistemological level”.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework. (Source: Ostrom, 2009) 
 
Attributes of Community: 
Small size, well-defined 
boundaries, shared norms, 
past successful experience, 
appropriate leadership, 
homogeneity of identities 
and interests 
Rules-in-Use:  The National 
Water Policy and respective 
constitutions for WUAs among 
other formal regulations, rules; 
informal rules; social norms, 
conventions, and public, 
common/shared and individual 
property rights 
Action Situations – 
Rules are simple and 
easy to understand; 
locally devised 
access and 
management rules; 
ease in enforcement 
of rules 
Interactions among and 
between resource users 
and other stakeholders/ 
“players” 
Outcomes – increased capacity of 
WUAs, reliable water supply, 
facilitation of common 
understanding, identification of 
limiting factors 
Evaluation indicators 
Fiscal sustainability, 
responsiveness to the needs of 
disadvantaged groups, enhanced 
opportunity for social inclusion, 
transparency, communication, 
civil society participation  
Feedback and 
Adaptive Learning 
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In a nutshell, according to NIE scholars, gauging the success of WUAs in terms of efficiency, 
effectiveness and equity necessitates the amalgamation of several indicators (Saleth and 
Dinar, 2004; Dinar and Saleth, 2005; Grafton et al., 2011). According to Grafton et al., 
(2011), cooperative water institutions, such as WUAs, should have well-defined institutional 
relations both internally and externally. New institutional economists further argue that 
such institutions should operate within clear boundaries with adequate financial and human 
capital resources (Ostrom, 1990; Bandaragoda, 2000; Dinar and Saleth, 2005; Grafton et al., 
2011).  
 
New institutional economists argue that the processes of institutional evolution and 
cooperative governance do not guarantee efficiency (Narain, 2004; Robin and Staropoli, 
2008; Brousseau and Glachant, 2008). Their argument is that some institutions are 
inefficient, despite their underlying cooperative principles (Narain, 2004; Robin and 
Staropoli, 2008; Brousseau and Glachant, 2008). This is partly due to selection failures, and 
largely because institutions are faced with numerous yet coordinated equilibria which do 
not necessarily lead to attainment of efficiency (Brousseau and Glachant, 2008). 
 
5.9. Conclusion 
 
This chapter analysed WUAs as one of the institutional arrangements needed to ensure 
effective and efficient management of water resources. Over the years, the debates on 
suitable water management strategies have shifted from a technical approach that focused 
mostly on engineering capabilities to an integrated approach which recognised the 
interconnectedness of water resources, water policies and human behaviour, and 
appreciates the need for cooperative governance (Orne-Gliemann, 2008; Wilson and Perret, 
2010; van Steenbergen, 2013). New institutional economists argue that the externality 
principle reflects opportunistic and rent-seeking behaviour of economic agents. Therefore, 
cooperative governance is one of the strategies of internalising the effects of externalities 
(Dinar and Saleth, 2005; Lipecap, 2008; Brousseau and Glachant, 2008; Kirsten et al., 2009).  
 
In some countries, WUAs were established to serve as engines through which problems and 
challenges faced by the centralised system could be curbed, while in others they were 
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established to form a necessary pool to cushion farmers from the general risks of farming  
(Miyajim et al., 1992; Aoki, 2001). Significant variations of the nature and models of WUAs 
exist as local needs and realities have to be considered and incorporated when WUAs are 
established.  
 
Although considerable theoretical efforts have been made to establish conditions necessary 
for effective and efficient operations of WUAs in South Africa, some WUAs are faced with 
challenges that hinder their efficiency effectiveness and equity. Therefore, there is a need to 
direct efforts to determining how WUAs can perform efficiently, equitably and effectively in 
practice.  
 
The following chapter provides an extensive description of research methods used in this 
study.   
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter explains the research methods that were used to address research questions of 
this thesis. The rationale for selecting certain research methods is also addressed in this 
chapter. The application of NIE theory methods to data collection and analysis are 
explained. The study utilised mixed methods and data types. The various methods 
employed include interpretive and post-positivist paradigms, quantitative and qualitative 
research, the case study research method and in-depth key informant interviews. The study 
used both secondary and primary data sources.  
 
6.2. Post-positivist and interpretive research paradigms 
 
Despite the predominance of the positivist research approach in economic research, this 
study assumes a post-positivist research approach. Positivism assumes that the data and 
analysis used in a research are value-free (Healy and Perry, 2000; Krauss, 2005). As stated by 
Krauss (2005: 759),  
“In the positivist paradigm, the object of study is independent of researchers; 
knowledge is discovered and verified through direct observations or measurements 
of phenomena; facts are established by taking apart a phenomenon to examine its 
component parts.” 
 
Essentially, the positivist research paradigm dictates that the researcher should use 
quantitative data and economic assumptions to view the world through a “one-way mirror” 
(Healy and Perry, 2000: 119). The extensive use of various sources of qualitative data such 
as opinions of key informants, data collected by Clifford-Holmes in his doctoral study 
entitled “A transdisciplinary investigation of water governance in the Lower Sundays sub-
catchment of South Africa”, financial and annual reports, among other sources, necessitated 
the use of post-positivist approach in this study. Clifford-Holmes collected both qualitative 
and quantitative data through conducting fieldwork in the LSRV catchment between 
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October 2011 and August 2013. The data was collected using various data collection 
techniques such as documentation, semi-structured interviews, direct observation and 
participant observation. The participants of his study included staff and councillors of the 
SRVM, staff of the LSR-WUA, officials from the Regional Office (RO-DWA), engineers from 
the regional water Board of Eastern Cape, and residents , farmers and community groups 
within the SRVM. Farmers interviewed were predominantly commercial farmers.  
 
Post-positivist research supports “methodological pluralism” (Wildemuth, 1993: 451) largely 
because it acknowledges that there is no particular flawless scientific method (Wildemuth, 
1993). Post-positivists, therefore, intensively investigate case-studies with close reference to 
the research questions, in order to illustrate path dependencies, contexts and values that 
define the current state of institutions (Wildemuth, 1993; Henderson, 2011; Sharp et al., 
2011).  
 
The interpretive research paradigm is necessary for disentangling extant institutions, 
organisations and relationships in order to deal with social realities (Patton, 2002). The 
paradigm descriptively analyses a social phenomenon using mostly qualitative data 
(Neuman, 2000). One of the fundamental assumptions of interpretive research is that the 
various social factors led to the existing realities of institutions, and the researcher’s role is 
to reveal the realities through providing insights into the complex social institutions (Cavana 
et al., 2001; Andrade, 2009).  
 
Given the need to explore institutional governance within the Lower Sundays River Water 
Users Association (LSR-WUA) and its influence on equity and efficiency in allocation of water 
resources, fusing post-positivist and interpretative paradigms in this study was necessary 
(Henderson, 2011; Sharp et al., 2011). Institutional governance and institutional framework 
analysis formed the fundamental foundation of this study, enabling the exploration of 
relevant governance dynamics and mechanisms in the water allocation and distribution 
process (Henderson, 2011; Lee and Cassell, 2013).  
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6.3. Mixed research method 
 
According to Creswell (2012), mixed methods in research entail using a diverse mix of 
procedures for collecting, analysing both qualitative and quantitative data and methods 
within a single study to address research questions. The mixed methods approach has the 
advantage of providing a comprehensive analysis of the research problem where one 
particular method or data type cannot address the study’s indicators fully (Creswell, 2008 
and 2012). The study used a multi-method data gathering approach to minimise flaws and 
to increase the accuracy of research results (Brewer and Hunter, 2006). Patton in 
Oosthuizen et al. (2005:72) argues that, “By using a combination of observations, (e.g. 
interviewing and document analysis) the field worker is able to use different sources to 
validate and crosscheck findings”.  
 
6.3.1. Quantitative research 
 
Quantitative research uses quantifiable data from primary and/or secondary data sources 
and statistical descriptions to analyse the numbers and conduct a social inquiry with 
minimal bias (Creswell, 2008 and 2012). In this study, certain indicators of efficiency 
prompted the use of quantitative data. The main sources of quantitative data for this study 
were the LSR-WUA’s annual financial reports for financial years 2008/2009, 2009/2010, 
2010/2011 and 2011/2012. These reports were obtained from the LSR-WUA’s official 
website – www.sundaysriverwater.co.za. They were all prepared by external auditors to 
avoid bias (LSR-WUA, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012).    
 
The financial reports were used to examine the financial balances and fiscal sustainability of 
the LSR-WUA in order to evaluate the association’s efficiency in its operations. Analysing 
efficiency in terms of trends in expenditure and income necessitated the use of quantitative 
data. The use of expenditure and income served as measures of allocative efficiency. The 
data were inflated to current 2014 prices using the Producer Price Index (PPI) provided by 
Statistics South Africa.  
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6.3.2. Qualitative research 
 
Although there were quantitative elements of the study, it was largely qualitative. A 
qualitative approach enabled the research to conduct an in-depth social and institutional 
inquiry (Patton, 2002; Ramsden, 2002). According to Patton (2002), qualitative research 
methods are crucial for addressing “how”, “what” and “why” research questions. This study 
aimed at exploring the links between institutional governance, equity and efficiency in 
allocation and management of water resources, with reference to institutional and resource 
economics paradigms. It also analysed the role of the existing institutional and water 
governance arrangements in the LSRV in influencing efficiency and equity of water 
allocation in the catchment.  These exercises required a narrative approach using literature 
and document analysis in order to provide an insight into the economic and institutional 
history of the LSRV.  
 
According to Bowen (2009), document analysis is a methodical technique for studying or 
evaluating both electronic and printed documents. In this study, data were explored and 
examined using various themes related to the research area, topic and research questions. 
This exercise was essential eliciting meaning as well as for providing a broader 
understanding of the research area.  
 
It is argued that document analysis is generally used in consolidation with other qualitative 
research methods as a means of triangulation (Bowen, 2009). Triangulation is defined as 
“the combination of methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon” (Denzin, 1970: 
291). Data triangulation helps to provide “a confluence of evidence that breeds credibility” 
(Eisner, 1991: 110). Several scholars argue that document analysis is often a preferred 
method applicable to qualitative case studies (Stake, 1995; Yin, 1994; Bowen, 2009), due to 
its ability to reveal meaning, improve understanding and determine insights relevant to the 
research (Merriam, 1998; Bowen, 2009).  
 
A broad range of literature and/or documents, such as water policy documents for the 
Republic of South Africa, reports, books, journal articles, maps and charts and survey data, 
among others. The influence of economics on the current institutional and governance 
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arrangement in the LSRV was investigated through both the selection of appropriate 
institutional frameworks using the literature, and the application of the framework to the 
institutional and governance analysis of the work of Clifford-Holmes (forthcoming) and 
Clifford-Holmes et al. (2013). Administrative documents from the LSR-WUA, national, 
provincial and local government documents, maps of the geographical area, as well as the 
LSR-WUA website provided data used for analysis in this study.   
 
The analytical framework to study path dependency and power relations in connection with 
the water distribution reform particularly in the LSR-WUA was drawn from a literature 
review of transition studies and NIE. 
 
6.4. Social learning and transdisciplinarity 
 
This research is part of a broader transdisciplinary research body from which data was 
largely drawn. Transdisciplinary research transgresses boundaries between various 
disciplines and affords the podium through which researchers transcend their own 
disciplines to “inform one another’s work, capture complexity, and create new intellectual 
spaces” (Gehlert, 2010). According to Patterson et al. (2013), transdisciplinarity is 
increasingly being embraced as a way of analysing wicked problems. Wicked problems are 
defined as those problems that are multifaceted and multilayered, which often result in 
unexpected effects and some degree of uncertainty when tackled (Rittel and Webber, 1973; 
Hearnshaw et al., 2011). These problems include water allocation, distribution, 
management and governance issues (Hearnshaw et al., 2011).  
 
The researcher worked closely with researchers from the Institute for Water Research (IWR) 
who had conducted various studies in the LSRV and were knowledgeable about the study 
area. As part of the social learning process, the researcher attended monthly 
transdisciplinary (TD) research group meetings. The meetings provided a platform within 
which researchers working on water related issues from different disciplines shared ideas, 
case study facts and references. Through the TD meetings, an environment characterised by 
rich network of collaboration, sharing of resources and learning beyond specific disciplinary 
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boundaries was created. The meetings played a major role in creating a link between the 
case study, the research questions and the overall research approach.  
 
According to Schusler et al. (2003: 311), social learning is “learning that occurs when people 
engage one another, sharing diverse perspectives and experiences to develop a common 
framework of understanding and basis for joint action” . Over the years, social learning has 
been increasingly viewed as one of the crucial elements needed in maintaining cooperative 
management of natural resources (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2007; Muller, 2013).  
 
6.5. The case study method 
 
This study adopted a case study research method. This is an investigative method that seeks 
the answers to research questions of the study in a single entity (Cohen et al., 2000; Yin, 
2003), using relevant data gathering techniques. The case study method permits the 
researcher to analyse an existing social problem within its actual context (Yin, 2009).  
 
Since this study was a part of a larger transdisciplinary research project, the choice of the 
case study was largely influenced by the research gaps within the IWR research body. One 
of the main objectives of transdisciplinary research is to tackle problems that are context-
specific and grounded in existent socio-economic circumstances. This aim is consistent with 
undertaking research using the case study research method (Clifford-Holmes, forthcoming).  
 
According to Alston (2008), case studies are crucial as they enable new institutional 
economists to investigate overall forces of institutional changes and their underlying effects. 
In NIE, case studies are predominantly called “analytical narratives” (Alston, 2008: 103). It is 
argued that ““analytical” conveys the use of a theoretical framework or set of theoretical 
concepts and the term “narrative” conveys the use of historical qualitative evidence” 
(Alston, 2008: 103). This study combined historical narratives with NIE theory in order to 
analyse the influence of economics on the National Water Policy of South Africa as well  as 
on the current institutional and governance arrangement in the LSRV catchment.  
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6.6. Key Informant Interviews 
 
According to Boyce and Neale (2006), in-depth key informant interviews are essential tools 
needed for exploring the perspectives of individuals who have first-hand knowledge about 
an idea, the study area or a situation. Key informants of the study provided insights into 
water management instruments, institutional frameworks and programmes that are 
currently in place and/or needed to ensure sustainability, efficiency and equity in the 
allocation and management of water in the LSRV. The main informants in this study were 
the Chief Executive Officer of the LSR-WUA and an emerging farmer who has been involved 
in small scale commercial farming in the area for over five years.  
 
The CEO represented the management and administrators of the LSR-WUA. His major role 
in the study was to give insights into management issues affecting the association. As the 
CEO, he has in-depth knowledge of the daily administrative issues and he is best placed to 
discuss and share the long-term strategic plans of the LSR-WUA, the challenges constraining 
the association from fulfilling their statutory duties and the strategies they have in place to 
mitigate challenges. The interview also provided perspective on how the LSR-WUA relates 
with emerging farmers and other users within its boundaries. The emerging farmer 
interviewed gave a different organisational landscape or view about the LSR-WUA as an 
organisation. Clifford-Holmes’s (forthcoming) data extensively provided the views and 
insights of commercial farmers. As part of the TD team, students and/or researchers are 
encouraged to use and build on the work of other researchers working in the LSRV 
catchment to avoid interviewing stakeholders multiple times. According to Voss et al. 
(2002), to avoid bias, the use of informants from differentiated organisational landscapes is 
necessary. The interviews took place in May, 2014.  
 
A key informant interview guide, written in English, was used to direct the interviews (see 
appendix 1). The questions in the guide were classified into four sub-headings, namely; a) 
general questions, b) equity indicators, c) efficiency and effectiveness indicators, and d) 
closing questions. Framing the questions around specific sub-headings is crucial in 
minimising the ambiguity of information obtained during the data analysis stage (Malhotra, 
2004). The interviewees consented to the recording of the interviews  that were 
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subsequently transcribed. The transcribed notes were then emailed to Clifford-Holmes and 
the interviewees for verification as information quality assurance mechanism.   
 
The researcher acknowledged that the study had ethical issues by virtue of involving human 
subjects in the data collection process. The confidentiality of the information provided by 
respondents was respected and their anonymity was protected. Prior to the interview, the 
respondents were informed about the purposes of the study and the overall meaning of the 
participation. Furthermore, prior to undertaking the study, the researcher obtained ethical 
clearance in terms of the university’s research policy. 
 
The closing questions of the interview prompted the emergence of issues that were not 
covered in the key informant guide, but that were deemed important by the interviewees.  
 
6.7. A brief overview of indicators used in the study 
 
The table below gives an overview of the indicators used in this study, measures used for 
those indicators and their main sources. It further gives brief references of literature where 
those indicators have been used and/or defined.  
 
Table 6.1: Indicators of choice, their respective measures and main data sources for the 
study 
Indicator  Measure used in 
the study 
Main data sources Literature where the 
measure has been 
applied and/or defined 
 
Responsiveness to 
the needs of 
disadvantaged 
groups 
LSR-WUA (2012 and 2013), LSR-
WUA representative (Pers. 
Comm. 2014), Emerging Farmer 
(Pers. Comm. 2014) 
Ostrom (1990), Ostrom 
et al. (1994), 
Bandaragoda (2000), 
Agrawal (2001), 
Haldane et al. (2010), 
Grafton et al. (2011) 
The sensitivity of 
institutional 
arrangements to 
local needs 
 
Clifford-Holmes et al. (2013), LSR-
WUA representative (Pers. 
Comm. 2014), Emerging Farmer 
(Pers. Comm. 2014) 
Ostrom (1990), Ostrom 
et al. (1994), 
Bandaragoda (2000), 
Agrawal (2001), 
Haldane et al. (2010), 
Grafton et al. (2011) 
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An enhanced 
opportunity for 
social inclusion 
 
Clifford-Holmes et al. (2013), LSR-
WUA representative (Pers. 
Comm. 2014), Emerging Farmer 
(Pers. Comm. 2014) 
Ostrom (1990), Ostrom 
et al. (1994), 
Bandaragoda (2000), 
Agrawal (2001), 
Haldane et al. (2010), 
Grafton et al. (2011) 
EFFICIENCY Financial 
sustainability 
through the 
estimation of 
annual monetary 
gains of the LSR-
WUA 
LSR-WUA (2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011 and 2012), LSR-WUA 
(forthcoming), LSR-WUA 
representative (Pers. Comm. 
2014), Emerging Farmer (Pers. 
Comm. 2014)  
Ostrom (1990), Ostrom 
et al. (1994), 
Bandaragoda (2000), 
Agrawal (2001), 
Haldane et al. (2010), 
Grafton et al. (2011) 
EFFECTIVENESS Transparency LSR-WUA website, LSR-WUA 
(2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 
2012), LSR-WUA (forthcoming), 
LSR-WUA representative (Pers. 
Comm. 2014), Emerging Farmer 
(Pers. Comm. 2014) 
WPP (2002), Roger and 
Hall (2003), Menard and 
Saleth (2011) 
Accountability and 
regulation 
LSR-WUA website, LSR-WUA 
(2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 
2012), LSR-WUA (forthcoming), 
LSR-WUA representative (Pers. 
Comm. 2014), Emerging Farmer 
(Pers. Comm. 2014) 
Saleth and Dinar (2004), 
Gandhi and Crase 
(2009), Shen and Speed 
(2010), Ostrom (2011)  
Communication LSR-WUA website, LSR-WUA 
(2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 
2012), LSR-WUA (forthcoming), 
LSR-WUA representative (Pers. 
Comm. 2014), Emerging Farmer 
(Pers. Comm. 2014) 
Saleth and Dinar (2004), 
Gandhi and Crase 
(2009), Shen and Speed 
(2010), Ostrom (2011), 
Muller (2006, 2008 and 
2013) 
Civil society 
participation  
 
 
Clifford-Holmes et al. (2013), LSR-
WUA representative (Pers. 
Comm. 2014), Emerging Farmer 
(Pers. Comm. 2014) 
Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom 
et al., 1994; 
Bandaragoda, 2000; 
Agrawal, 2001, Grafton 
et al. (2011)  
 
 
6.8. Conclusion 
 
This chapter described the research methods through which research questions for this 
study were answered. The assumption is that the considered research methods employed 
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took into consideration the type of research questions being addressed. This study formed 
part of a larger transdisciplinary research within the LSRV catchment. The key informant 
interviews were used to supplement the available transdisciplinary data in the study area. 
The following chapter provides an extensive analysis of the LSR-WUA case study.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
Lower Sundays River Water Users Association: Case Study Analysis 
 
7.1. Introduction  
 
The need for water management and allocation policies and legislation that advocate for 
equitable distribution, sustainability and efficiency of water resources has prompted the 
South African government to undertake massive reforms and policy restructuring since 
1994. Such legislation was conceived in the form of the Water Services Act (1997) and the 
National Water Act (1998). The key mandate of both pieces of legislation was to address 
socio-economic problems such as rural poverty and high levels of inequality that were 
inherited from the apartheid regime. This was done through promoting equity and 
sustainability in water management, and by accommodating developments in the sector 
such as local, provincial and national institutions (Perret, 2002).  
 
The government aims to maintaining equity, sustainability and efficiency in the water sector 
through various centralised and decentralised institutions. The institutions operate at 
different levels of the water sector towards a common cause “to ensure that water is 
distributed, conserved, used, protected and allocated efficiently for the benefit of all” (RSA, 
1998). This chapter will provide an in-depth analysis of the Lower Sundays River Water 
Users Association (LSR-WUA) as an institution operating at the local level.  
 
This chapter outlines the most notable historical events, which have contributed 
significantly to the current operations of the Association. The chapter discusses and 
analyses the highlighted themes from the case study using NIE concepts and frameworks set 
out in chapters 2 and 3. The analysis is crucial in describing the influence of the existing 
institutional and water governance arrangements, and economic dynamics in the Lower 
Sundays River Valley (LSRV) in the efficiency, effectiveness and equity of water allocation in 
the catchment.  
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7.2. Historical institutional context: From Irrigation Board to Water Users Association  
 
The Sundays River Irrigation Board (SRIB) was established through an Act of Parliament in 
1917, with the fundamental aim of constructing Darlington Dam (formerly known as Lake 
Mentz) (LSR-WUA, 2014). The government of the time provided funds in the form of a loan 
to finance the dam building project (LSR-WUA, 2014). The loan repayment was the 
responsibility of the irrigators. They raised funds through paying a canal levy imposed by the 
Irrigation Board in order to repay the loan (LSR-WUA, 2014).  
 
The SRIB was established solely for the benefit of the irrigators (LSR-WUA, 2014). The 
elected Irrigators served as Board members for a period of time prescribed by the SRIB’s 
constitution. In addition to ensuring that the canals were well maintained and operational, 
the board members were also responsible for performing financial and administrative 
responsibilities (LSR-WUA, 2014). Furthermore, the board members had to draft policies 
enforced by the 1913 Land Act to the specification of their localities (LSR-WUA, 2014). 
 
In August 2004, the SRIB was transformed into the Lower Sundays River Water Users 
Association (LSR-WUA) to operate in terms of National Water Act, 1998 (Act No 36 of 1998) 
(RSA, 1998; RSA, 2004; LSR-WUA, 2004; LSR-WUA, 2014). According to the Association’s 
constitution, which was prepared in accordance with the requirements of Sections 91(1)(f), 
93(1) and 94(2) of the NWA of 1998, some of the objectives of the LSR-WUA are to: ensure 
fair, equitable and efficient distribution of water to all members; improve access to water in 
previously disadvantaged communities; ensure efficient and consistent distribution of water 
by maintaining infrastructure in order to minimise water loss; promote efficient water use 
through capacity building; and encourage environmental management within its area of 
jurisdiction (LSR-WUA, 2004). The area of jurisdiction of the LSR-WUA is indicated in Figure 
7.1 and the overall water supply system of the LSRV is outlined in appendix 2. Within the 
area, the Association uses approximately 99 million cubic meters per annum (Mm3/a) (DWA, 
2011: iv).  
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Figure 7.1: The area of jurisdiction of the LSR-WUA. (Source: LSR-WUA, 2014) 
 
The Association intends to achieve its objectives through performing principal functions 
outlined in section 5 of its constitution, such as: supplying water for domestic, stock 
watering and irrigation use through constructing, purchasing, operating and maintaining 
waterworks; ensuring efficient functioning of the Association through prudent financial 
administration; provide overall control over waterworks and water resources; and 
preventing illegal water use, among other principal functions (LSR-WUA, 2004). 
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Subsequent to transformation, the LSR-WUA “retained all of the staff from the Irrigation 
Board” (LSR-WUA, 2014). Furthermore, the LSR-WUA was founded by elected members of 
the SRIB (LSR-WUA, 2004). The decision of the LSR-WUA to entrust former SRIB members 
with LSR-WUA duties was largely influenced by section 98(3)(c) of the NWA of 1998, 
wherein it is stated that “any person holding office with a *irrigation+ board when this Act 
commences continues in office for the term of that person’s appointment”.  
 
The Association still upholds the vision of providing expert-driven water supply services 
using operational and efficient infrastructure which was upheld by the SRIB before the 
promulgation of the NWA of 1998 (LSR-WUA, 2014). By implication, the current and future 
decisions made by the LSR-WUA are not independent from those made in the past under 
SRIB. In essence, the LSR-WUA preserved the status quo following its transformation from 
SRIB. It can hence be argued that the LSR-WUA displays a classic case of path dependency.  
 
In South Africa’s water sector, the clash of interests between various stakeholders is 
common (Naster and Hansen, 2009). While the upper-regime levels has successfully 
embraced the principle of IWRM in enactment of both the White Paper on a National Water 
Policy for South Africa of 1997 and the National Water Act of 1998, the lower-regime levels 
are yet to fully experience transition (Naster and Hansen, 2009; Kemerink et al., 2013). 
Naster and Hansen (2009) argue that the concept of path dependency offers a deeper 
understanding of barriers to transition in South Africa’s water sector. The argument is that 
previously disadvantaged and marginalised groups, such as rural households and emerging 
farmers, continue to be left behind because well-resourced stakeholders have superior 
leverage in the decisions of CMAs and consequently WUAs (Dent, 2009; Naster and Hansen, 
2009; Kemerink et al., 2013). For the purposes of this study, emerging farmers are “small-
scale farmers who have a water license or who are supposed to obtain one soon” (Faysse, 
2004: 6). This definition is used to define such groups within the WUA of South Africa 
(DWAF, 2000 and 2002; Faysse, 2004).  
 
It is further argued that the failure of the DWA to acknowledge the importance of analysing 
“knowledge equity” instead of focusing solely on “representative equity” at the reform 
phases in the water sector has resulted in the existence of persistent leverage by well-
106 
 
resourced players (Dent, 2009; Naster and Hansen, 2009; Kemerinket et al., 2013). 
Recognition of knowledge equity necessitates the upper-regime level institutions to 
acknowledge empowerment of previously disadvantaged groups as a pressing priority prior 
to the establishment of CMAs and WUAs (Dent, 2009; Naster and Hansen, 2009). Financial 
and technical skills development is necessary for empowering local governments and 
emerging farmers in order to eliminate the existing economic, technical and legal leverage 
of the commercial farmers in WUAs and tilt the decision-making scale towards greater 
equity (Dent, 2009; Naster and Hansen, 2009; Heinmiller, 2009; Kemerinket et al., 2013).  
 
Although cooperative governance forms the core of the NWA, translating the principle to 
practice has proven to be difficult due to the failure of the sector to establish both 
meaningful stakeholder participation and effective integration simultaneously (Naster and 
Hansen, 2009). The National Water Policy needs to acknowledge that factors such as old and 
effective networks, vested interests, existing formal or informal contractual water 
entitlements, and sunk costs towards canals, pipelines and other infrastruct ure, make it 
difficult for institutions to deviate from the path set in the past.   
 
Liebowitz (1999) argues that the process of overcoming path dependence is dependent on 
the form of path dependence an institution is following. Nonetheless, it is argued that 
influential parties in institutions are most likely to inherit historical paths , for as long as their 
powers and inherent institutional efficiencies are not compromised (Streeck and Thelen, 
2005; Sehring, 2009; Heinmiller, 2009). 
 
7.3. Lower Sundays River Water Users Association- Sundays River Valley Municipality 
Interactions 
 
In post-apartheid South Africa, the NWA of 1998 called for the transformation of irrigation 
boards to more democratic, inclusive and representative water users associations (RSA, 
1998; Pegram and Mazibuko, 2003; Brown, 2011; Kemerink et al., 2013). Furthermore, local 
government is now tasked with the responsibility of service delivery in the form of ensuring 
sufficient provision of water services to all users (d’Hont et al., 2013; Clifford-Holmes et al., 
2013). The LSR-WUA has a water quota of 9000 m3/ha/a to be allocated to commercial 
farmers within area of 16 664 ha (DWFA, 2005; Clifford- Holmes et al., 2013). 
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The SRVM receives approximately 3% of all the LSR-WUA’s allocations as per order 
placement procedures, which it then treats before distributing it as potable water largely for 
domestic use (D’Hont et al., 2013; Clifford-Holmes et al., 2013). The municipality is 
incorporated as a “user” by the LSR-WUA, and hence it is represented by a nominated 
member who serves in the Management Committee of the Association (LSR-WUA, 2003; 
Clifford-Holmes et al., 2013). By implication, the interactions between the SRVM and the 
LSR-WUA are governed by both the NWA of 1998 and the LSR-WUA constitution (RSA, 1998; 
LSR-WUA, 2003; Clifford-Holmes et al., 2013). By extension, as a water service provider 
(WPS), the SRVM’s decisions are governed by the Water Services Act of 1997, as well as the 
Strategic Framework for Water Services (RSA, 1997; Clifford-Holmes et al., 2013). 
Furthermore, since the municipality acts as both a WSP and water service authority (WSA), a 
service contract must be instituted in order to allow for self-regulation between the 
operations of the WSP and WSA. 
 
The SRVM, however, is struggling to ensure continuous provision of water services to all 
users within its jurisdiction. One of the contributory factors to this challenge is the lack of a 
contract between the LSR-WUA and the SRVM necessary for governing their operations 
(D’Hont et al., 2013; Clifford-Holmes et al., 2013). According to Clifford-Holmes et al. (2013: 
6), the refusal of the LSR-WUA to formulate a binding contract between itself and the SRVM 
is based on the argument that,  
“*T+he WUA treats all users the same, and does not require a contract between itself 
and a particular user - interactions are mandated by the constitution, facilitated and 
carried out by the WUA staff and overseen by the Management”.  
 
However, a water resource supply contract needs to be in place to govern the activities of 
the SRVM and the LSR-WUA by outlining the terms and conditions of raw water delivery, 
and the responsibilities and roles to be played by each party (DWAF, 2003; Clifford-Holmes 
et al., 2013). In essence, there are institutional arrangements missing between the SRVM 
and the LSR-WUA.  
 
Moreover, the SRVM representative neither attends the Management Committee meetings 
regularly, nor was he elected based on qualifications other than his knowledge on “how to 
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handle those white commercial farmers” (Clifford-Holmes et al., 2013: 7) currently serving 
in various capacities in the LSR-WUA. Another contributory factor is the lack of sufficient 
water storage to meet the water demand in the municipal jurisdiction (Clifford-Holmes et 
al., 2013).  
 
D’Hont et al. (2013) argue that the water supply system in the LSRV area should look as 
depicted by Figure 7.2. The LSR-WUA supplies raw water resources to the SRVM “according 
to an order placement procedure” (D’Hont et al., 2013: 5). The municipality stores and 
treats the water through its bulk water system to meet the demands of end users. 
According to Figure 7.2, there are three elements that interact with each other in the water 
supply system, namely: external factors, the means of stakeholders to intervene in the 
water supply system, and the outcomes of interest (D’Hont et al., 2013).  
 
According to D’Hont et al. (2013), the external factors influence the performance of the 
system as discussed in the chapter 5. It, however, is argued that factors within the system 
do not have any direct effect on external factors (Enserink et al., 2010; D’Hont et al., 2013). 
External factors that affect system performance include; policy changes, aggregate lifestyle 
expectations, the water supply system transferring water from the Orange River, and 
climatic variations such as floods, droughts and heat (Enserink et al., 2010; D’Hont et al., 
2013).  
 
In order to improve reliable water supply, the main stakeholders in the LSRV should 
intervene within their various capabilities and means. For instance, the SRVM could expand 
its water storage, the LSR-WUA could expand their delivery schedule to authorise raw water 
supply when needed during weekends, and the DWA could contribute to improved system 
performance by awarding grants (D’Hont et al., 2013). Alternatively, the SRVM could 
intensify the operational management of the water treatment works (WTW).  
 
The intervention of stakeholders through various means could lead to desired outcomes of 
interest such as reduced water supply disruptions in the area. Other outcomes of interest 
include facilitation of common understanding of the system, regulation of the maximum 
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capacity of the technical system, and identification of limiting factors within the water 
supply system (D’Hont et al., 2013).  
 
 
Figure 7.2: The water supply system in the LSRV area. (Source: D’Hont et al., 2013) 
 
7.4. Theoretical analysis of the existing interactions between the Lower Sundays 
River Water Users Association and the Sundays River Valley Municipality  
 
It has been argued that government and water institutions often assume that representing 
the interests of various societal groups in establishments such as WUAs will automatically 
lead to improved water resource management and equity (Wester et al., 2003; Kemerink et 
al., 2013). However, water institutions comprise of various stakeholders with divergent and 
competing interests (Cleaver, 2000; Goldin, 2010). Water institutions within the LSRV 
catchment are not an exception. The failure to acknowledge such competition consequently 
leads to failure to notice the sources of the discrepancies in institutional arrangements. As 
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argued in chapter 2, the interdependencies of economic agents need to be recognised by 
water resource institutions. 
 
Samuels and Medema (1998) argue that the Coase theorem has important implications for 
problems of legal-economic policy because it implies that where stakeholders’ actions are 
not bound by contract, bargaining is almost impossible, and law and policy do not matter in 
instances where parties can easily determine and choose water uses with the highest 
returns. The absence of crucial institutional arrangements proposed by the DWA to oversee 
the interactions between the SRVM and the LSR-WUA shows that government institutions 
do not always have the capacity to instigate water policies in order to avoid catastrophes 
such as unreliable water supply to end users. 
 
Allan (1999) maintains that government institutions often fail in their duties as regulators in 
the water sector because they have been unsuccessful in recognising the primary interests 
of user groups within catchments. It can be argued that the lack of success can be attributed 
to the failure to appreciate that establishing WUAs cannot automatically substitute for the 
domains of interactions, which existed within irrigation boards. Kemerink et al. (2013: 245) 
argue that, in fact, the establishment of WUAs contributes to complexity in the water sector 
as they lead to the “coexistence of different domains”. This coexistence of different 
domains consequently lead to overlapping institutional functions, missing institutional 
arrangements between parties and general fragmentation of water institutions (Kemerink et 
al., 2013). 
 
According to Warner et al. (2008) and Kemerink et al. (2013), there is a need to analyse 
representation and inclusion within the various domains of interaction that deal with water 
allocation. Actors in the water sector are generally constrained by institutional 
arrangements that were designed to attain Pareto-optimal solutions for the influential few 
such as irrigation boards. The irrigation boards’ primary objectives of maximising individual 
farmer’s payoffs cannot be replaced by the social welfare objectives imposed by the NWA 
overnight (Wester et al., 2003).  
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7.5. Lower Sundays River Water Users Association: Equity Considerations  
 
According to section 4.1 of the LSR-WUA constitution, the Association is committed to 
regulating the distribution of water in a fair and equitable fashion for all its users (LSR -WUA, 
2003). In the financial year 2011/2012, there were more than 400 users registered with the 
LSR-WUA (LSR-WUA, 2013). The three equity indicators, as discussed in chapter 3, which will 
be used to analyse the performance of the LSR-WUA are: responsiveness of the water 
institutional arrangements to the needs of lower income groups (Boyne, 2002), the 
sensitivity of institutional arrangements to local needs, and enhanced opportunities for 
social inclusion (Andrews and Entwistle, 2010). 
 
The choice of the indicators is not only influenced by the requirements for establishing 
WUAs enshrined in the NWA of 1998, but also by NIE theory and/or frameworks discussed 
in chapter 2. WUAs have been entrusted with pursuing responsibilities such as empowering 
historically disadvantaged groups and/or individuals, promoting equitable water 
distribution, as well as promoting democracy and “representativity” (Orne-Gliemann, 2008). 
 
7.5.1. Responsiveness to the needs of disadvantaged groups 
 
WUAs were created to bring together diverse users such as municipalities, emerging 
farmers, commercial farmers, and recreational and conservation bodies to ensure equity 
and cooperation amongst local water users (RSA, 1998; Orne-Gliemann, 2008). However, 
maintaining equity and responsiveness to the needs of disadvantaged users remains a 
challenge in some WUAs in South Africa (Orne-Gliemann, 2008; Brown, 2011; van 
Steenbergen, 2013). LSR-WUA is not an exception.  
 
In his Chairperson’s Overview for financial year 2013/2014, Mr Myers, the Chairperson of 
LSR-WUA noted that they are yet to expand considerably the representation of emerging 
farmers in the Managing Committee of the Association (LSR-WUA, 2013). He also noted that 
LSR-WUA is yet to establish and promote its communication with emerging farmers in order 
to ascertain long-term mutual benefits between the farmers and the Association (LSR-WUA, 
2013).  
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Lack of adequate representation of emerging farmers in the Managing Committee may 
consequently lead to inadequate responsiveness to their needs. The bargaining capacities 
and influential powers of commercial farmers subsequently count against the interests of 
emerging farmers as a result (Orne-Gliemann, 2008; Brown, 2011).  
 
Orne-Gliemann (2008) argues WUAs associations remain less responsive to the needs of the 
emerging farmers and other disadvantaged groups because balancing the social equity and 
political obligations with their finances as well as embedded interests, remains a challenge 
in South Africa. The disincentive of commercial farmers and/or the LSR-WUA to go out of 
their way to accommodate the water and farming needs of the emerging small -scale 
farmers stems from the institutional and financing architecture of WUAs. This point is 
address in depth and substantively in this research below under the section discussing the 
difficulty of entering into service level contract(s) between SRVM and LSR-WUA.   
 
The National Water Act of 1998 calls for a “balanced representation in terms of the various 
categories of users” (RSA, 1998). However, as stated by Kemerink et al. (2013), the concept 
of balanced representation proposed by the NWA remains loosely defined. According to 
Kemerink et al. (2013), it is not clear whether the categories of balanced representation 
referred to by the NWA mean demographic groups, specific gender groups or the so called 
disadvantaged groups.  
 
In an interview, with an official from the LSR-WUA, conducted during the course of this 
research, the ambiguity of the meaning of balanced representation came out through the 
responses of the representative. When asked about the representation of emerging farmers 
in the LSR-WUA, the Association’s representative responded,  
“The organisation is divided into seven wards. Six wards are for commercial farmers 
and one ward is for emerging farmers. There are emerging farmers’ representatives 
in every ward. There is one representative per ward in the six wards for commercial 
farmers, and there are three representatives in the seventh ward, which is for 
emerging farmers. Of all the nine representatives, four are black and five are white” 
(LSR-WUA representative, Pers. Comm. 2014).  
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The response given by the LSR-WUA representatives reflects that the Association defines 
‘balanced representation’ using racial groups and not gender. When asked about his about 
his general opinions about the representation of emerging farmers within the LSR-WUA, the 
interviewed emerging farmer argued that,  
“Having a representative within the Association gives us *emerging farmers+ the 
voice and the platform to communicate our concerns. It also helps because we get 
mentorship in various forms. But we [emerging farmers] do not have the power to 
influence the decisions on charges and other things made by commercial farmers. 
Remember, big commercial farmers run the Association” (Emerging Farmer, Pers. 
Comm. 2014). 
 
The response of the emerging farmer is in line with the theory on path dependency and 
unequal power relations discussed in the preceding chapters as well as with the argument 
posed by Kemerink et al. (2013: 252),  
“Securing a seat on a WUA management committee does not automatically mean 
that the views and interests of historically disadvantaged individuals are represented 
in the newly established management structures: elements such as authorization, 
accountability, expertise and resemblance (here defined as the extent to which 
people feel alike and associated with each other) play a major role in the 
effectiveness of representation.”  
 
Wellman’s (2008) study on WUAs in the Olifants-Doorn water management area (WMA), 
established that mere inclusion of emerging farmers and previously disadvantaged 
individuals in the board of the WUAs does not guarantee equity in the decision-making 
processes. One of the reasons for the discrepancy was a lack of confidence and knowledge 
amongst previously disadvantaged members about the operations of WUAs (Wellman, 
2008). 
 
Scholars of NIE argue that where financially disadvantaged users are not adequately 
represented within collective action groups such as WUAs, the interests of the elite users 
such as large commercial farmers overshadow those of disadvantaged users because the 
elite have the power to influence the direction of decisions within WUAs (Baland and 
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Platteau, 2001; Orne-Gliemann, 2008). They further argue that lack of adequate 
representation of disadvantaged groups within decision-making bodies such as Managing 
Committees of WUAs consequently translates into the failure of the institution to ensure 
fairness and justice for all members (Baland and Platteau, 2001; Orne-Gliemann, 2008; 
Gandhi and Crase, 2009).  
 
7.5.2. The sensitivity of institutional arrangements to local needs and enhanced 
opportunity for social inclusion 
 
By virtue of being a potable water supplier for small-scale domestic use, SRVM needs to be 
treated differently from other users within the LRV-WUA (Clifford-Holmes et al., 2013). The 
responsibility of providing reliable water supply to end users necessitates the need for 
contractual agreements between the SRVM and the LSR-WUA in order to ensure that 
problems of interrupted water supply are eliminated. However, ‘governance gaps’ that 
currently exist between the two institutions have rendered both the SRVM and LSR-WUA 
insensitive to the need of the local residents (Clifford-Holmes et al., 2013). Clifford-Holmes 
et al. (2013: 7) state that  
“When the operational issues pertaining to the Kirkwood system were raised, the 
DWA assessors challenged the SRVM, saying that the WUA is a service provider to 
the municipality and since the SRVM is the water service authority, they should be  
regulating the WUA’s supply.” 
 
The lack of an operational contract between the LSR-WUA and the SRVM has led to some 
degree of confusion towards the institutional operations and responsibilities of the two 
institutions. Worse still, the institutional distinctions created by water policy frameworks 
remain blurred in the LSRV. According to Clifford-Holmes et al. (2013), one of the 
contributory factors to such a discrepancy is little and/or no incentive by the institutions to 
maximise the gains of establishing effective interactions that would enable sensitivity to 
local water supply needs. The LSR-WUA has little incentive to change the operation’s status 
quo established by the SRIB, while the SRVM has little incentive to take an active role in 
participating in the Managing Committee and general operations of the LSR-WUA (Clifford-
Holmes et al., 2013).  
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New institutional economists argue that institutions, such as incentive systems, dictate the 
actions of parties involved (Zenger et al., 2002; North, 2005; Lieberherr, 2009). Contracts 
enforcing institutions are therefore necessary for creating incentives for the establishment 
of institutional arrangements that are both socially inclusive and sensitive to the diverse 
needs of all individuals (Greif, 2005; Menard and Shirley, 2005; Lieberherr, 2009). 
Furthermore, such institutional arrangements are necessary for offsetting potential rent-
seeking behaviour, discriminatory vested interests as well as power abuse by the historically 
advantaged (Greif, 2005; Menard and Shirley, 2005; Lieberherr, 2009). 
  
7.6. Lower Sundays River Water Users Association: Efficiency Considerations 
 
The efficiency indicator used in this study is the estimates of annual monetary gains of the 
LSR-WUA defined in chapter 3. The choice of the indicator is influenced by the NIE 
framework discussed in the chapter as well as the availability of data in the case study.  
 
The NWA of 1998 has tasked the management committees of WUAs with the 
responsibilities of maintaining financial and accounting records, ensuring  that the records 
truthfully represent the operations of the associations, and to safeguard the integrity of the 
associations’ financial statements (RSA, 1998; LSR-WUA, 2012). Correspondingly, the LSR-
WUA’s managing committee has diligently performed the tasks bestowed on them by 
releasing comprehensive and externally audited financial statements over the years (LSR -
WUA, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012).  
 
While the LSR-WUA has experienced a growth in its total expenses over the past four years, 
the Association has maintained positive financial balances over the period as summarised in 
Figure 7.3. The figure shows that the net income of LSR-WUA has been consistently growing 
for the past four years. It can hence be argued that the Association is at least solvent, which 
is important for their continued operation. This could be attributed to the budgeting and 
reserve funds practices of the Association. The reserve funds are kept to cater for large costs 
such as canal replacement (LSR-WUA, forthcoming).  
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According to Downes (2013), the budgeting process is generally view as a transaction cost 
minimisation measure if it is displays fiscally sustainability, budget transparency and budget 
participation. Downes (2013: 2) differentiates between an ‘effective’ budgeting system and 
a ‘sound’ budgeting system. It is argued that an effective budget takes into account the 
diverse interests of stakeholders within an institution (Onimode, 1999; Nils et al., 2003; 
Downes, 2013). Downes (2013: 2) argues that, 
“A sound budgeting system is one which engenders trust among citizens that the 
government is listening to their concerns, has a plan for achieving worthwhile 
objectives, and will use the available resources effectively, efficiently and in a 
sustainable manner in doing so.”  
 
Effective and sound budgeting systems are argued to be crucial for attaining increased 
efficiency in the operations of the institutions (Nee, 2003; Gandhi and Crase, 2009). 
Williamson (1998 and 2000) argues that budgeting, as a transaction cost minimising 
measure, is necessary for developing governance structures and organisational boundaries 
within which the institution can generate profits.  
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Figure 7.3: Total income and total expenditure of LSR-WUA between 2008 and 2012. Figures are in 
2010 Rands, using Producer Price Index (PPI) provided by Statistics South Africa (Source: LSR-
WUA, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012)  
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According to the financial reports of the LSR-WUA, more than 50% of the total expenses is 
paid to the DWA as water rates (LSR-WUA, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012). The LSR-
WUA, like other WUAs, acts as a billing agent acting on behalf of the DWA (DWAF, 2003; 
DWA, 2010). As a billing agent, the LSR-WUA has to collect water resource management 
(WRM) charges, consumptive use charges as well as water research levies (DWAF, 2003; 
DWA, 2010). WRM charges are set against registered volumes of raw water resources, and 
are payable by all users demanding raw water from the LSR-WUA, including the SRVM and 
irrigators (DWAF, 2003; DWA, 2010). Consumptive use charges include operational 
maintenance and capital costs, while water research levies are payable by all water users in 
the LSR-WUA to the Water Research Commission (WRC) as per the requirements of the 
Water Research Act (WRA). 
 
According to the Association’s 2009 and 2010 annual reports , the LSR-WUA prides itself with 
“sound” and “well controlled” finances (LSR-WUA, 2009) and “intense management” (LSR-
WUA, 2010). Furthermore, the Association has provisions for financial sustainability in the 
form of various funds such as the capital reserve funds, maintenance funds and contingency 
reserve fund (LSR-WUA, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012). The interviewed emerging 
farmer seems to agree that the LSR-WUA financial affairs are well managed. In his response, 
the representative held,  
“I have no problem with the Association’s (LSR-WUA) budgeting and finances. They 
have accountants and experts, so I am not complaining. But I can barely afford to 
cover water costs in some periods. There is a rumour that the rates are going up 
again, how worse is it going to be?” (Emerging Farmer, Pers. Comm. 2014) 
 
The efficiency versus cost-effectiveness paradox seems to emerge within the LSR-WUA. For 
instance, in his 2011/2012 Chairman’s Overview, Mr Myers highlighted that the Managing 
Committee of the LSR-WUA had adopted new governance and compliance systems which 
were not going to result in reduced costs, but which would “certainly serve to contribute to 
more effective control and general efficiency of our operation” (LSR-WUA, 2011). According 
to one of the Association’s reports, the management of the LSR-WUA aims to improve 
operational efficiency in the water supply system through the following:  
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“Losses in the system are reduced to the minimum and currently a mathematical 
model and related field measurements are being developed so achieve better water-
management control. This model will assess administrative and physical distribution 
efficiency by measuring the volume of water that was requested against the volume 
of water that was brought into the system and the volume that can be accounted for 
delivered at farm-gate sluice” (LSR-WUA, forthcoming). 
 
Similarly, in his 2012/2013 Overview, the Mr Myers mentioned the LSR-WUA has 
established ways through which water-workers could achieve water supply efficiency and 
the Association would in turn cover the costs of operations through increasing user charges 
(LSR-WUA, 2012). A representative from the LSR-WUA revealed, through an interview, that 
the Association can perform a charge assessment in an effort to cover its expenditures, “all 
users are aware of that” (LSR-WUA representative, Pers. Comm. 2014).  
 
In his overview, My Myers emphasised that the question that emerges from operational 
efficiency developments is 
 “What better level of service do I expect and am I prepared to pay the higher costs 
involved in delivering this level of service?” (LSR-WUA, 2012). 
 
Cost-effectiveness is achieved when the institutions fulfil their targets at the minimum 
possible cost (Grimshaw et al., 2004; Haas et al., 2011; Gleick et al., 2011). Williamson 
(1998) argues that cost economisation is a necessary tool for ensuring sustainability of the 
institution. He further argues that often, the objectives of reducing transaction costs and 
attaining cost-effectiveness are in tension (Williamson, 1998).  
 
Economists argue that efficiency, on the other hand, entails converting minimum inputs, 
such as time, expertise and finances, into maximum possible outputs and outcomes 
(Goulder et al., 1999; Tol, 1999; Tietenberg and Lewis, 2000; Grimshaw et al., 2004; Haas et 
al., 2011). New institutional and neoclassical economics scholars argue that water charges 
are one of the instruments water institutions use for attaining efficient allocations  and cost 
recovery (Tietenberg and Lewis, 2000; Grimshaw et al., 2004; Haas et al., 2011). They 
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maintain that water institutions should set prices at average cost in order to allow 
institutions recover their operational and maintenance costs.  
 
Theoretically, efficiency is attained when water charges are set at the marginal cost as this 
serves as a signal of the value of the water used to users  (Tietenberg and Lewis, 2000; 
Grimshaw et al., 2004; Haas et al., 2011). However, according to new Institutional 
economists, setting water prices at the marginal cost is more useful if institutional 
arrangements and local conditions are factored in while pricing (Tietenberg and Lewis, 2000; 
Grimshaw et al., 2004; Haas et al., 2011).  
 
Inasmuch as institutions are encouraged to recover their costs and to invest in both 
maintenance of water infrastructure and profitable water development projects, cost-
effectiveness should always be maintained (Saleth and Dinar, 2004; UNESCO, 2012). High 
water charges may consequently infringe on the right to access of water, especially of the 
poor households and emerging farmers (Grimble, 1999; UNESCO, 2012). As Rogers et al. 
(2002: 2) argue, increasing the water charges is regressive, and it broadness social inequities 
because of the “typical price and income elasticities for water and the typical income 
distributions encountered”.  
 
Essentially, the positive financial trends of the LSR-WUA reflect the Association’s financial 
prudence and sustainability. It can hence be argued that the positive financial balances of 
the Association reveal the ability of the institution to withstand and/or offset the dynamic 
problems it may face from time to time. This satisfies North’s (1990) basic definition of 
efficiency discussed in chapter 2 of this study. However, using the extended definition of 
efficiency in NIE, where effectiveness is a necessary condition to achieving efficiency, it can 
be concluded that the LSR-WUA’s operations are not efficient. This definition is consistent 
with the NWA requirement that ancillary functions should only be performed by WUAs 
mandated to perform the water services functions and with the resource capacity sufficient 
for the successful execution of their principal functions (RSA, 1998).  The high water charges 
imposed on emerging farmers is more likely to affect their productivity and profitability, 
hence failing to fulfil some of the main objectives of the Association. As argued in chapter 2, 
it is more important for institutions to do what they have proposed well, than  to do well 
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something else that was not necessarily proposed (Mihaiu et al., 2010). By implication, it is 
more important for the LSR-WUA to perform its principal functions well than to do well in its 
secondary functions.  
  
7.7. Lower Sundays River Water Users Association: Effectiveness Considerations 
 
Treating water as a both social and economic good necessitates water institutions to 
develop conflict resolution mechanisms and transparent structures that promote 
accountability, communication, civil society participation and other measures of 
effectiveness (Bandaragoda, 2000; WPP, 2002; Roger and Hall, 2003; Menard and Saleth, 
2011).  According to Saleth and Dinar (2004: 11),  
“The crisis in the water sector has also revealed the inherent limitations of today’s 
institutions in dealing effectively with the new set of problems related more to 
resource allocation and management than to resource development.”  
 
WUAs need to treat water users as clients, not just beneficiaries (Saleth and Dinar, 2004). 
This requires them to craft measures that balance the supply and demand for water 
resources through defining rules for water allocation, development and use in an effective 
way (Saleth and Dinar, 2004; Menard and Saleth, 2011). In NIE, however, the term 
“effectiveness” remains difficult to define (Lieberherr, 2009). This is because in NIE, 
effectiveness is considered an outcome of efficiency (Libecap, 2006; Lieberherr, 2009; 
March, 2010). Considering effectiveness as merely an outcome of efficiency implies that 
minimising transaction costs directly translates to effectiveness.  
 
Essentially, focusing on minimal transaction costs as a key way of defining effectiveness 
makes it difficult and almost impossible to disentangle effectiveness from efficiency as 
discussed in chapter 3 (Lieberherr, 2009). Some scholars within NIE, however, have 
developed a quantitative framework within which the effectiveness of water institutions can 
be evaluated (WPP, 2002; Roger and Hall, 2003; Menard and Saleth, 2011). Such scholars 
define effectiveness as, 
“The existence of the best feasible institutions (that are the outcome of individual 
choices), which increase the enforceability of contracts.” (Lieberherr, 2009: 20) 
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The indicators identified within the quantitative framework allow for an independent 
analysis of effectiveness without necessarily solely depending on transaction-costs and 
efficiency (Roger and Hall, 2003; Menard and Saleth, 2011). Table 7.1 summarises the 
indicators developed based on the theory discussed in chapters 2 and 3 with reference to 
the LSR-WUA.  
 
Table 7.1: Effectiveness indicators and their application to the LSR-WUA case 
Effectiveness Indicator Application to LSR-WUA 
Transparency   Annual general meetings (AGMs) are held as per the 
requirements of the NWA of 1998 and the LSR-WUA 
constitution and are open for all water users. 
 Minutes of the previous AGM are circulated and 
confirmed by all users beforehand.  
 Financial statements are circulated beforehand. Water 
users can ask for clarity, reject or accept and/or approve 
the statements in their form. 
 Annual reports are circulated before the AGM and water 
users can ask for clarity at any date before the announced 
date of the AGM. 
 
Accountability and 
regulation 
 The Management Committee has to operate according to 
the prescribed functions in the NWA of 1998 and the LSR-
WUA constitution. 
 Non-performing members are to be disqualified according 
to Schedule 4 of the NWA. 
 Annual financial statements are internally and externally 
audited in accordance with Section 33 (1) of the NWA.  
 Financial statements are prepared as per International 
Reporting Standards. 
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Communication   Notices are communicated to the members through 
letters and the Association’s website. 
 As at April 2014, the events calendar for 2014 has not 
been updated in the website. However, the annual reports 
and financial statements were up to date.  
 
Civil society 
participation  
 
 The SRVM representative in the Management Committee 
acts as an intermediary between the Association and the 
municipality, and subsequently potable water users. 
 Clifford-Holmes et al., (2013) note that “despite occupying 
a seat on the management committee, the SRVM 
representative rarely attended [meetings prior mid-2012+” 
 
 
Using these indicators, it can be concluded that the LSR-WUA arguably displays transparent, 
and accountable regulatory governance. The committee is responsible for budgeting, 
compiling reports and project planning, among other functions (LSR-WUA, 2012). It is 
argued that stakeholder participation in the budgeting and project planning processes leads 
to improved effectiveness of the institution (WPP, 2002; Roger and Hall, 2003; Menard and 
Saleth, 2011).  
 
Furthermore, the Management Committee consists of representatives for various users. 
This implies that the committee consists of people with diverse interests. New institutional 
economists argue that cooperative governance is inefficient in reacting promptly to shocks 
and accumulating capital due to complexities associated with managing incentives of 
individuals with divergent and varying interests (Menard and Shirley, 2005; Brousseau and 
Glachant, 2008). It is further argued that cooperative governance often leads to blame shifts 
between agents (Menard and Shirley, 2005). The blame shift problem seems to exist in the 
LSRV.  
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The representative of the LSR-WUA cited the “blame game” as one of the main challenges 
faced by the Association. He highlighted: 
“One of the main challenges faced with the stakeholders in the Valley is ‘blame 
game’. Because there are so many institutions and people involved, it is very easy to 
play the blame game. That is why there is a lot of, “We didn’t do anything wrong, 
you are wrong and because of you we don’t have the water!” in the Valley.”  
 
The lack of formal service level agreements between the LSR-WUA and other stakeholders, 
particularly the SRVM has consequently led to the absence of clear areas of responsibility 
and mechanisms of enforcing agreed obligations. This greatly increased transactions costs 
associated with continual negotiation and led to conflict in which no one accepted 
responsibility, and subsequently the “blame game” for service delivery failure.    
Furthermore, there seems to be an existing degree of doubt concerning the technical 
capabilities of municipal officials among consulting engineers who interacted with the SRVM 
(Clifford-Holmes, forthcoming). Such stakeholders justify the blame shift by offering racial 
explanations. In this regard a retired engineer was quoted by Clifford-Holmes (forthcoming: 
59) stating that, “These black officials only know how to do one thing - and that’s break 
infrastructure (sic)”. 
 
The problem of blame-shifting from one agent to the other seems to be common in the 
water issues in South Africa. In the National Development Plan (NDP), it is extensively 
argued that: 
“Example of what happens when the water in a town is found to be undrinkable. The 
media blames the Minister of Water Affairs. The community blames the mayor. The 
mayor blames the head of the water utility. The head of the water utility blames the 
technical engineer. The engineer says that the maintenance budget has been cut for 
the past three years and now the water is undrinkable. The head of finance in the 
municipality says that the budget was cut because personnel costs have crowded out 
maintenance expenditure. The mayor argues that the salary structure is negotiated 
at a national level by the level by the South African Local Government Association. 
The Association says that municipalities can opt out of these agreements if they are 
unaffordable. And so on. ” (NDP, 2011: 51-52) 
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NIE scholars argue that in a cooperative governance setup, agents often fail to cooperate 
and clear lines of power relations are often visible (Reuben, 2003; Ostrom, 2004; Brown, 
2010). Scholars argue that heterogeneity of endowments, as well as homogeneity of 
identities and interests, are some of the indicators that should be used for gauging the 
success of WUAs in terms of efficiency, effectiveness and equity (Saleth and Dinar, 2004; 
Dinar and Saleth, 2005; Grafton et al., 2011).  
 
7.8. Conclusion  
 
One of the main goals of this study was to describe the influence of the existing institutional 
and water governance arrangements in the LSRV in the efficiency, effectiveness and equity 
of water allocation in the catchment. This chapter answered the research goal though 
presenting the historical context of the LSR-WUA and discussing how embedded interests 
and path dependency have shaped the operations of the Association to date.  
 
Traditionally, irrigation boards operated as raw water suppliers to commercial farmers. 
Subsequently, the irrigation boards were called to transform to WUAs. The transformation 
of the SRIB to LSR-WUA exhibits path dependence. Although the LSR-WUA arguably displays 
transparent, accountable and regulatory governance with an effective and sound budgeting 
system, the institutional arrangements between the Association and the SRVM are less 
sensitive to local needs.  
 
Furthermore, the chapter argues that lack of adequate representation of emerging farmers 
in the Managing Committee may subsequently result in inadequate responsiveness to their 
needs. Using the indicators of effectiveness developed through the theoretical framework 
discussed in the preceding chapters, it is argued that the LSR-WUA arguably displays 
transparent, accountable and regulatory governance. However, the civil society indicator of 
effectiveness is not satisfactorily achieved due to lack of regular representation of SRVM in 
the management committee meetings.  
 
In the following chapter, analyses of preceding chapters are carefully outlined and a 
summary of the main policy implications are discussed. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
8.1. Conclusions  
 
The primary goal of this research was to analyse the institutional governance and 
performance of the Lower Sunday River Water Users Association (LSR-WUA), as a raw water 
supplier to various users, using equity, efficiency and effectiveness as key indicators. This 
goal is addressed through defining the underlying economic theory behind the South African 
National Water Policy, and its impact on the overall institutional design and operations of 
water users’ associations (WUAs).  
 
This study was premised on post-positivist and interpretive research paradigms. Institutional 
governance and institutional framework analysis form the fundamental foundation of the 
study, enabling the exploration of relevant governance dynamics and mechanisms in the 
water allocation and distribution process (Henderson, 2011; Lee and Cassell, 2013). 
 
A narrative approach using literature and document analysis provided an insight into the 
economic and institutional history of the LSRV. The influence of neoclassical economics 
South Africa’s National Water Policy as well as on the current institutional and governance 
arrangement in the LSRV was investigated through the selection appropriate institutional 
frameworks using the literature, such as levels of economic institutions  discussed in chapter 
4 (Williamson, 2000; Brousseau and Glachant, 2008; Lieberherr, 2009).   
 
In addition to analysing the LSR-WUA’s annual reports and various documents from both 
electronic and printed sources, the study also evaluated documents on case study data 
collected by Clifford-Holmes between October 2011 and August 2013. These documents and 
the data were specifically about the LSRV and SRVM. Face-to-face key informant interviews 
with the CEO of the LSR-WUA and an emerging farmer with more than five years in the 
study area were conducted to provide insights into the efficiency and equity of current 
water allocation in the LSRV. The interviews also provided supplementary data needed to 
address the research questions postulated by this study. 
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New institutional economics (NIE) indicators for effective, efficient and equitable water 
institutions, such as enhanced opportunities for social inclusion, sensitivity to local needs 
and community participation, formed the focus of the interviews. Financial reports of the 
LSR-WUA were used to analyse the financial trend of the Association as an efficiency 
indicator.  
 
With approximately 70% of land surface in South Africa receiving an average annual rainfall 
varying from less than 200 mm to 600 mm, it comes as no surprise that the country is 
classified as semi-arid (Palmer and Ainslie, 2007; Vetter, 2009; Cretat et al., 2012). However, 
the thesis argues that climatic factors are not the only problems faced by the water 
resource sector in South Africa. The apartheid history, institutional gaps existing between 
and across water institutions, and limited empowerment of resource poor and/or emerging 
farmers are some of the other factors constraining equitable access to water resources in 
South Africa. 
 
Despite of the promulgation of new water laws post-apartheid by the South African 
government, some parts of the country are still faced with inequitable, inefficient, and 
inadequate water supply (Thompson et al., 2001; Brown, 2011; Karar et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, despite having legislature that is internationally regarded as ambitious and 
forward-thinking reflective of the broad aims of IWRM, the South African government is yet 
to fully provide resource capacities to some municipalities and other local -level water 
institutions in order to enable them to embrace IWRM (Saravanan et al., 2009).  
 
The study discussed the water supply dynamics within the LSRV catchment. The Lower 
Sundays River Water Users Association (LSR-WUA) provides raw to commercial and 
emerging farmers, as well as to Sundays River Valley Municipality (SRVM). The water 
supplied by the LSR-WUA is predominantly used for irrigation purposes over an agricultural 
area of approximately 17 200 ha (LSR-WUA, 2013). The Association supplies raw water 
resources to a range of users such as the commercial farmers, emerging farmers, 
Scheepersvlake Dam and the SRVM through water canals depicted in appendix 2. 
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It is argued that there is noticeable inequality between the municipal populace and the 
commercial citrus industry with regards to water distribution in the LSRV. It is submitted 
that such factors as fragmented water institutions, and lack of clarity in respect of 
institutional arrangements and designs contribute to the inequity (Fischhendler and 
Heikkila, 2010; Lorz et al., 2011; Du Toit et al., 2011; Clifford-Holmes et al., 2012). 
  
Using the NIE description of path dependence discussed in chapter 2 (Lowndes, 2005; 
Streeck and Thelen, 2005; Heinmiller, 2009), the study established that the current and 
future decisions made by the LSR-WUA are not entirely independent of those made in the 
past under SRIB. As found by this study, the Association still upholds the vision of providing 
expert-driven water supply services using operational and efficient infrastructure which was 
upheld by the SRIB before the promulgation of the NWA of 1998 (LSR-WUA, 2014). The 
thesis argues that such factors as old effective networks, vested interests of commercial 
farmers, sunk costs towards the building of canals, among other factors, may have 
influenced the dependence of the LSR-WUA on the SRIB’s set path. 
 
While efficiency and effectiveness are often referred to as “doing things right” and “doing 
the right thing” (Elebring et al., 2012) respectively, this study argues that effectiveness is a 
necessary condition to achieving efficiency (Mihaiu et al., 2010; Richter, 2012). As argued by 
NIE, an institution cannot be efficient without being effective because it is more important 
for institutions to do what they have proposed well, than do well something else that was 
not necessarily a key objective. Using NIE principles necessary for robust institutional 
governance (chapter 2) as well as indicators for robust water governance institutions  
(chapter 3), the effectiveness indicators for this study included transparency, accountability, 
regulation, communication and civil society to analyse the operations of the LSR-WUA.  
 
Similarly, the equity indicators used in the analysis of the LSR-WUA case included 
responsiveness of the water institutional arrangements to the needs of lower income 
groups (Boyne, 2002), the sensitivity of institutional arrangements to loca l needs, and 
enhanced opportunities for social inclusion (Andrews and Entwistle, 2010). The efficiency 
indicator used in this study is the estimates of annual monetary gains of the LSR-WUA. The 
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NIE framework discussed in chapter 3 as well as the availability of data in the case study 
influenced the choice of the efficiency indicator.  
 
The LSR-WUA is one of the few effectively operating WUAs in the Eastern Cape and in South 
Africa. It is argued that the Association displays effectiveness  in terms of accountability, 
communication, transparency and regulation. Furthermore, the Association displays 
financial prudence in terms of a positive financial trend over the past five years . However, 
the absence of contractual agreement between the LRS-WUA, which acts as the bulk water 
supplier, and the SRVM, which acts as both the water services authority (WSA) and the 
water service provider (WSP), creates an institutional arrangement deficiency. Such an 
institutional arrangement vacuum can lead to a failure of the water institutions in the 
catchment to provide water resources effectively (Lorz et al., 2011; Du Toit et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, the interview with the emerging farmer revealed that having a representative 
in the Management Committee of the Association does not necessarily imply having an 
influence in the decision-making processes of the Committee (Emerging Farmer, Pers. 
Comm. 2014. The statements by both the Chairman of the LSR-WUA and the emerging 
farmer revealed that the charges for water use are high water charges (LSR-WUA, 2012).  
 
In light of this, it is argued that a positive financial trend does not necessarily fully satisfy the 
efficiency requirement of NIE, where doing the right thing is more important than doing 
things which were not necessarily key objectives right (Mihaiu et al., 2010; Richter, 2012).  
 
As argued in this study, financial and technical skills development is necessary for 
empowering local governments and emerging farmers in order to eliminate the existing 
economic, technical and legal leverage of the commercial farmers in WUAs. Financial and 
technical skills development is also crucial for tilting the decision-making scale towards 
greater equity (Heinmiller, 2009; Kemerinket et al., 2013).  
 
The other prominent proposition is that although the NWA is premised largely on 
neoclassical economics, some sections of the Act, such as the cooperative governance 
enactments, conform to NIE. The disposition of the NWA of South Africa towards 
neoclassical economics paradigm does not deviate from the international trend (Lieberherr, 
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2009). It is argued that the analytical tools of neoclassical economics and its conceptual 
framework have played a fundamental role in influencing the formulation and 
implementation of regulatory enactments, as well as in the design of optimal pricing of 
water resources (Berg and Tschirhart, 1995; Savenije and van der Zaag, 2002; Geradin 2006; 
Guthrie 2006; Lieberherr, 2009). For example, in South Africa the NWA proposes that WUAs 
have to be self-funding through water pricing.  
 
In light of the above, the thesis argues that the swiftly changing world, which entails 
emerging water users, requires policy-makers to embrace NIE economic principles such as 
institutional governance and arrangements in policy development. This could be done 
through incorporating local needs and knowledge during the formulation stages of water 
policy.  
 
Embracing NIE economic principles could also be done through not only recognising the 
interconnectedness of levels of economic institutions during the formulation and 
implementation stages of water policy, but also formulating institutional designs 
considering factors such as scope, history and power relations as discussed in the preceding 
chapters. As found in this study, the LSR-WUA remains less responsive to the needs of the 
emerging farmers and other disadvantaged groups because balancing the social equity and 
political obligations with their finances as well as embedded interests remains a challenge. 
According to NIE, the success or lack thereof, of WUAs to perform their duties effectively 
depends on the overall processes of institutional design (Ackerman, 2004; Orne-Gliemann, 
2008; Menard and Saleth, 2011).  
 
The SRIB was originally established solely for the benefit of the irrigators  and its operations 
were financed through the imposition of canal levy on irrigators. In its mandate of creating 
institutions progressively fashioned as a tool for the reallocation of natural resources in the 
country post-apartheid, South Africa’s water policy, through the NWA, entrusted a strong 
political agenda to local water management institutions (NWA, 1998; Orne-Gliemann, 
2008). As argued by Orne-Gliemann (2008: 2),  
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“The question remains however of the conciliation of these multiple objectives – 
IWRM, community participation, political agenda – within a unique local institution 
whose development is already impeded by historical legacies”. 
 
Subsequent to its transformation from an irrigation board, the LSR-WUA not only retained 
all of the staff from the parent organisation, but also preserved the vision of the SRIB. It is 
argued that the success of the LSR-WUA’s operations can be attributed to the adaptation of 
historical experiences and identities that proved to be effective and efficient in the SRIB. 
Chapter 7 illustrates, using various performance and governance indicators, that LSR-WUA 
arguably displays transparent, accountable and regulatory financial governance. Despite 
these positive elements, the institutional arrangements missing between the SRVM and the 
LSR-WUA lead to operational vacuums and water supply disruptions in the LSRV catchment 
area.  
 
The NWA mandate of equitable water distribution disregards the existing power relations 
and local dynamics, which consequently dictate the operations of the institutions involved. 
According to Ostrom (1990: 14), abstract policy formulation leads to dysfunctional 
institutional arrangements and operations “unless the models are well specified and 
empirically valid and the participants in a field setting understand how to make the new 
rules work.” There is, however, no single model or blueprint of achieving effective 
governance strategy or model that will be applicable to all contexts.  
 
8.2. Substantive Recommendations 
 
8.2.1. Policy formulation and governance 
 
The speedy development of diverse demands for water resources coupled with the rapid 
evolution of environmental and climatic problems should ideally lead to an increased 
pressure on policy-makers and governments to provide unified strategic plans for water 
users with dissimilar interests, as well as to develop credible approaches of implementing 
such strategies. As argued by Muller (2008: 5),  
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“The fragmented, incoherent and complex nature of modern society [necessitates] 
governments to find alternative ways and adopt new roles to cope with ‘the limits to 
governance’ which threaten to overwhelm public action.”  
 
The concept of ‘the limits to governance’ is used as an umbrella phrase for constraining 
factors such as fragmented institutions, failure to implement policies, uncertainties and fast 
growth pace of the modern world (Peters, 1998; Carley and Cristie, 2000; Muller, 2004, 
2008 and 2013).  
 
Various literature from a wide range of disciplines have, over the years, cited integrated 
management as a way of promoting sustainable, cooperative and coordinated development 
(GWP, 2000; Braga, 2001; Saravanan et al., 2009; Haigh et al., 2010). A question asked by 
Muller (2004: 400) is, “So why is it seemingly so difficult to develop integrated management  
approaches and what can or are being done in this regard?” is still relevant a decade later.  
 
In South Africa’s water sector, the IWRM approach is widely embraced to address persistent 
problems such as institutional inefficiencies, poor service delivery, a lack of integrated 
planning and allocation of water resources, and lack of participation of some of relevant 
water sector stakeholders (NWA, 1998; Milly et al., 2008; Du Toit et al., 2011).  
 
Although certain aspects of the water policy in South Africa embrace NIE principles in an 
effort to achieve optimal allocation of water resources , implementation remains a challenge 
in most cases. This is generally because the government and water institutions often assume 
that representing the interests of various societal groups in establishments  such as WUAs 
will automatically lead to improved water resource management, efficiency and equity 
(Wester et al., 2003; Kemerink et al., 2013). There is a need, therefore, to craft workable 
implementation strategies, depending on the needs of the community, through 
communication and thorough consultation during the formulation phase of policy. 
According to NIE, such strategies include having binary choice for organising transactions 
(Williamson, 1979; Samuels and Medema, 1998; Acemoglu, 2003). As discussed in chapter 7, 
the binary choice options include contractual arrangements such as long-term contracts 
that could guide the services offered by the LSR-WUA to the SRVM.  
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The prevalent ‘blame game’ in the case study as well as  in the water sector is arguabl y 
multi-causal due to complex interdependencies, intergovernmental systems and inter-
relationships as discussed in this study. A transdisciplinary approach in defining and solving 
inherent water access and institutional governance problems could lead to a more holistic 
thinking needed to narrow institutional gaps. Furthermore, it could also steer institutional 
administrators towards developing arrangements that work effectively within the 
limitations and opportunities offered by the existing organisational capacity. NIE argues that 
where stakeholders’ actions are not bound by contract, bargaining is almost impossible, and 
law and policy do not matter in instances where parties can easily determine and choose 
water uses with the highest returns (Samuels and Medema, 1998).  
 
8.2.2. Tailor-made Reform Process: A new approach of water governance? 
 
Post-apartheid water policy formulation seems to be over-reliant on a one-size-fits-all 
institutional reform approach in its quest for achieving equitable, effective, cooperative and 
integrated water resource management and allocation. However, the policy seems to 
disregard the influence of inevitable power relations and path dependencies that govern the 
operations of institutions such as the LSR-WUA. This study argues that establishing WUAs 
cannot automatically substitute for the domains of relations which existed within irrigation 
boards. The institutional arrangements that governed the operations of the irrigation 
boards were designed to attain Pareto-optimal solutions for the commercial farmers.  
According to institutionalists, a policy and/or institutional reform needs to make productive 
use of the window of opportunity created by the reform through learning, imitation and 
hierarchical enforcement (Djelic and Quack, 2007). Imitation in this context implies 
benchmarking from successful cases nationally and internationally and practicing aspects 
that apply to the context.  According to Nastar and Ramasar (2012: 22),  
“Understanding the power dynamics at play in water governance is crucial for 
interventions for strengthening the objectives of equitable and sustainable water 
access.”  
 
Prior to transformation, irrigators invested their resources in an effort to shape the direction 
of the SRIB towards greater profitability and productivity. An institutional reform could not 
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derail the Association from the vision of the SRIB, nor could it incentivise the LSR-WUA to 
give the SRVM any institutional arrangement by virtue of the municipality’s role in supplying 
treated water resources to households. The alternative could be adopting approaches that 
fit the type of institutional problem. This requires factoring in several local and institutional 
factors and formulating workable policies within that space. This could be done through, for 
instance, training and organisation of emerging farmers in order to overcome power 
differentials, as well as through explicit funding to help reduce transactions costs faced by 
emerging farmers.  
 
Researchers have to develop frameworks within which both water use and water allocation 
efficiency could be established. According to NIE, it is crucial to recognise and appreciate the 
interdependencies as well as competitions between and among of economic agents within 
water resource institutions (Goldin, 2010; Kemerink et al., 2013). This involves 
understanding the dynamics of water use and distribution at local level. Research should 
also focus on establishing the socio-economic implications of excluding key players in the 
water sector in relevant policy processes.  
 
This study focused on the water governance and distribution in the LSRV, using the LSR-
WUA as a case study. An extended research, ideally at a doctoral degree level (PhD), 
comparing and contrasting the governance and performance indicators of the SRVM would 
go a long way in understating institutional operations and factors affecting equitable, 
efficient and sustainable distribution of water resources to support socio-economic 
development within the Municipality. The ‘unhappy people-happy plants’ paradox  will 
continue to prevail for as long as the factors hindering the efficient and effective operations 
of the SRVM are not addressed. Further studies could extend this research not only by 
developing frameworks that combine NIE and public administration comparatives and 
indicators, but also by establishing the causal links between or among the indicators.  
  
While the conclusions and recommendations of this study are used to address some of the 
institutional factors discussed in the preceding chapters, it is worth noting that the study 
appreciates that there is no simple and single answer to address all of the institutional and 
governance discrepancies discussed in this thesis. In addition to recommending policies 
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designed to address unique and specific institutional dynamics, the general theme emerging 
from the study is, “We should stop looking for the magical ingredient and instead focus on 
getting the mix right!” (Muller, 2008: 15). 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
Department of Economics and Economic History 
Patricia K. Madigele. Email: finkymadigele@gmail.com/ g13m7764@campus.ru.ac.za  
 
KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW GUIDE 
My name is Patricia Madigele. I am a Master of Economics student at Rhodes University. The 
information obtained from this interview will be used in my study, which is entitled “The Economics 
of Institutions, Institutional Governance and Efficiency: The Case of Water Distribution i n Lower 
Sundays River Valley”.  The primary goal of the research is to explore the link between institutional 
governance, equity and efficiency in water allocation in the Lower Sundays River Valley (LSRV) with 
reference to the Integrated Water Resource Management as well as institutional and resource 
economics paradigms. The information obtained from this interview will be used purely for 
academic purposes and possibly as input to government policy. Your responses will not be used for 
any research other than the one indicated. You do not have to answer questions that you do not 
want to answer. You may end the interview at any time you want to. The proceedi ngs of this 
interview will be recorded with your approval. 
 
DATE: __________________________________ 
ORGANISATION: ___________________________________________ 
POSITION OF THE KEY INFORMANT: __________________________________________ 
 
1. GENERAL QUESTIONS 
1.1. The LSR-WUA is one of the few WUAs that are effectively functioning in South Africa. How 
was the LSR-WUA formed? Did it help that there was an effective irrigation board? How so? 
What were the challenges? What contributed to the success of the LSR-WUA?  
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1.2. Subsequent to the transformation of SRIB to LSR-WUA, did the retained staff undergo formal 
or informal (on the job) training to enable them to perform WUAs duties effectively?  
2. EQUITY INDICATORS 
 
2.1. What is the percentage of emerging farmers represented in the LSR-WUA? 
2.2. According to item 4.3 of the constitution, the LSR-WUA is committed to assisting previously 
disadvantaged communities to gain access to water resources. What have your experiences 
been of implementing programmes to assist historically-disadvantaged communities in 
gaining access to water? What sort of resources might help with the implementation?  
2.3. What has the LSR-WUA tried to do to enhance opportunities for social inclusion or to devise 
programmes which are more sensitive to local needs? What are the challenges around 
developing such programmes?  
 
3. EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS INDICATORS 
 
3.1. Has the LSR-WUA had much input from local residents (that is, commercial farmers, 
government officials, residents of urban and rural communities in the area)? If yes, in what 
form? If no, what are the possible reasons? What would help to encourage such 
interactions? What are the challenges? 
3.2. The National Water Act of 1998 calls for participatory water resource management. In your 
opinion, how well do you think the NWA has worked as far as participatory water 
management is concerned?  
3.3. How would you characterise the nature of the institutional relationship and practical 
interactions between the LSR-WUA and the Department of Water Affairs?  
3.4. What lessons can you pass on to other areas trying to get a WUA established? What could 
enable their success? What challenges should they anticipate? How should they avoid such 
challenges? 
 
4. CLOSING QUESTIONS 
 
4.1. Do you have any further thoughts of WUAs in general? 
4.2. Are there other people you think we should talk to?  
 
Thank you very much for your time. Your knowledge and insights will be very helpful to my study.  
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Figure A2: Water supply system of the Lower Sundays River Valley. Source: Clifford-Holmes, 2013 
